



NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE



TRENT UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARY








***By George Haven Putnam***

---

**A Memoir of George Palmer Putnam  
A Prisoner of War in Virginia (1864-5)  
Abraham Lincoln  
The Censorship of the Church of Rome  
Books and Their Makers during the Middle Ages  
Authors and Their Public in Ancient Times  
The Question of Copyright  
The Little Gingerbread Man  
The Artificial Mother  
Authors and Publishers  
Memories of My Youth  
Memories of a Publisher  
Some Memories of the Civil War**



Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2019 with funding from  
Kahle/Austin Foundation





SOME MEMORIES  
OF  
THE CIVIL WAR

TOGETHER WITH AN APPRECIATION OF THE  
CAREER AND CHARACTER OF

MAJOR GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM

LEADER IN THE COLONIAL WARS AND IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

BY

GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, LITT.D.

LATE MAJOR, 176TH REGT., N. Y. S. VOLS.

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS  
NEW YORK AND LONDON  
The Knickerbocker Press  
1924

E 468

P98

Copyright, 1924  
by  
George Haven Putnam



Made in the United States of America

## FOREWORD

“’Tis sixty years since.”—

These are the words with which Scott, writing in 1805, opens his romance *Waverley*, the story which gives so vivid a picture of conditions in the Highlands in 1745 during the uprising in behalf of the young Pretender. This sentence from Scott came back to my memory when, in bringing together for print a little group of Addresses having to do with events of our Civil War, I recalled that more than threescore years had passed since the boys of my generation had marched out to defend and maintain the Republic.

Two generations of American citizens have grown up since the war was begun with the firing of the first gun at Fort Sumter; and I had thought that it might be of interest to some members of these younger groups to have recalled to them a few of the incidents and something of the atmosphere of those strenuous years 1861-65.

The papers here collected are based in part upon personal experience, and they may, I hope, constitute

a contribution, however slight, to the *mémoires à servir* available for the historian of the period.

The papers in this collection were, with one or two exceptions, prepared for use as lectures, or have been written out from lecture notes. This will account for the occasional repetition of an incident, or a reference, a repetition which could hardly have been avoided without some dislocation of the narratives.

I must utilize this Foreword for an expression of appreciation of the value of the co-operation given by my secretary, Miss Charlotte M. Zamow. Without her loyal service it would not have been practicable for a veteran, whose writing arm was disabled sixty years back, to prepare this volume for the press.

G. H. P.

New York,  
January, 1924.

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD . . . . .	iii
CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR . . . . .	3
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE FIGHT FOR THE MAIN- TENANCE OF THE REPUBLIC . . . . .	27
JEFFERSON DAVIS, IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY . . . . .	75
THE MEN BEHIND THE GUNS . . . . .	90
THE LONDON "TIMES" AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR	157
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK . . . . .	184
AN INCIDENT OF THE CIVIL WAR . . . . .	220
GENERAL GRANT . . . . .	225
LETTERS FROM A VIRGINIA PRISON, 1864-1865 . . . . .	252
ISRAEL PUTNAM . . . . .	271



## Some Memories of the Civil War





# Some Memories of the Civil War

---

## CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR

*An Address Delivered in 1894 in the University of Princeton  
and Repeated on Other Occasions*

IT will be the conclusion of historians, a conclusion that has in fact already been presented in the histories of the past half century, that the essential cause of the war between the States was the difference of the opinions in regard to the institution of slavery held by the citizens of the slave-holding States on the one side and the citizens of the Northern States on the other. There were, of course, other factors that had influence in bringing about the war. The Southern writers have contended from time to time that the real issue was the maintenance of state rights in the most absolute sense of the term,—that is to say the right of each state not only to control its domestic affairs, but to make protest of dissatisfaction when the national policy was not in accord

#### 4 Some Memories of the Civil War

with the views of its citizens; and, if necessary to maintain those views, to refuse to accept the national authority as binding upon its citizens. The opponents of this view were those who believed in the permanency of the Republic and who held that the national authority must, in the last resort, be accepted as supreme. Those who contended that the founders had done a good piece of work in bringing the Republic into existence and that its continued existence should prove of importance through generations to come, not only for its own citizens but for its influence in bringing about republican institutions throughout the world, maintained that such continued existence was practicable only if the States constituting the Republic should be prepared to accept as final the decisions and authority of the national government.

There were also differences in regard to the economic policy of the Nation. The manufacturing interests of the country had secured large development throughout certain States of the North at a time when the interests of the South were almost exclusively agricultural. The men who were growing corn and cotton and who were exporting grain and cattle and hogs, came to realize that the prices for their food products were fixed in the markets of the world and could not be increased by any tariff legislation of the American Congress.

They realized further that the cost of all that they

had to buy in the way of clothing, farm equipment, etc., was added to, more or less largely according to the class, by the working of the tariff. It was not only that the cost of the imported article increased in proportion to the duty placed upon it, but that the competing articles manufactured in the United States, were, under combinations among the home manufacturers, brought up to a selling price that came as close as possible to the price at which could be sold the imported goods with the additional charge of duty and freight.

There was a further factor which, while not a cause of the war, certainly had much to do with hastening the outbreak. The historians of the period prior to the war who gave attention to the social and economic conditions of the Southern States, have made clear that the planters had very largely been living beyond their income. They had pledged to their factors in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and other financial centres the proceeds of crops not yet harvested and even of crops not yet planted. The very intelligent narratives by Frederick Law Olmsted, reporting his observations in travelling through the Southern States in the years immediately preceding the war, gave a picture of coming insolvency very much in line with that given by Alfred Young in his famous travels in France in the years preceding the Revolution of 1789. The volume by Helper, of North

## 6 Some Memories of the Civil War

Carolina, published in 1858, under the title of *The Impending Crisis*, emphasized the same fact that the Southern planters were drifting steadily towards bankruptcy. At the outbreak of the war, millions of dollars were due from the planters and dealers of the South to the factors and bankers of the North.

The first action taken by the Confederate Congress, meeting in Montgomery, was to wipe the slate clear of this indebtedness. The authorities directed the planters to pay into the Confederate treasury the amounts due to "alien enemies," that is to say, to the bankers and factors of the North. The planters were to receive from the Confederate authorities a quittance in full and the Government announced that so many years after acknowledgment by the North of the independence of the South, this indebtedness would be taken into account in the final settlement.

The essential cause of the war was, however, the determination of the South to secure recognition for slavery as a national institution instead of keeping it restricted, as a sectional institution, to the States in which it already existed.

The Southern statesmen of the earlier generation, including men like Washington, Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and others, held not only that slavery was an evil, but that it constituted a peril to the Republic. They looked forward to its extinction in the near

future. They realized that such extinction would certainly come about if there should be no extension of the territory within which it already existed. The Southern leaders of the later generation also realized that unless fresh territories could be secured, slavery must come to an end, and they were determined that it should not come to an end. The invention of Whitney's cotton gin had made very profitable the growing of cotton, and the planters had convinced themselves that the work of the plantation could be carried on only by the labor of slaves. The Southerners fought, therefore, to secure for slavery the right to exist, first in all the territories under the dominion of the United States and, secondly, in the States heretofore held as free. This was the real meaning of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, of the Dred Scott decision that a colored man had no rights that the law was bound to respect, and of the Fugitive Slave Law directing all citizens of the United States to give help in returning to bondage a colored person who had attempted to secure freedom.

The first organization that was instituted by the men of the Thirteen Colonies took shape in July, 1776. The Americans had arrived at the conclusion that the authority of Great Britain must be thrown off and that the responsibility rested upon them of organizing an independent nation. The first government was based upon the so-called Confederation.

## 8      Some Memories of the Civil War

It was the purpose of the men who were responsible for the shaping of these articles to prevent the rulers of the new nation from securing any autocratic powers. The Americans were getting rid of government by divine right. They did not propose to leave the supreme authority in the hands of an individual, or of a group of individuals. Their purpose was to maintain the rights of the individual citizen and of the thirteen communities which had secured their independence and which were now to take the shape of independent States.

After some years of experimenting, it was found, however, that the Articles of Confederation did not meet the requirements of a national government. The central authority had been given no power to enforce the collection of taxes, and without an assured income, there were no means of maintaining an army or a navy. Without an army or a navy, it was not possible to secure the respect from other nations which must constitute the basis of dignified and satisfactory international relations. The constitutional convention, the work of which was begun in 1787, and completed in 1789, decided, therefore, to replace the Articles of Confederation with a constitution that should make safe the foundations for a really national government. It was to be a federal nation comprising, at the outset, thirteen units each of which retained independent rights; but which placed in the

hands of the national authorities the whole resources of all the States which came into the federation. The Constitution gave the authority to tax, and to enforce the decisions as to taxation. It gave authority to maintain an army and navy and it made the President of the Republic the Commander-in-Chief of Army and Navy.

The most distinctive contribution made under our Constitution to the history of federal government was in the institution of the Supreme Court. This Court was to be the final court of appeal for questions arising between the States, and for all issues of sufficient importance to warrant appellate action; and it was to have the authority and the obligation to pass upon the constitutionality of legislative measures and to declare such measures invalid in case they were not in accord with the letter or the spirit of the Constitution. This American Constitution has been referred to by historians as "the most perfect political instrument ever struck out from the minds of men." Lord Bryce, in his treatise on Democracy, lays special emphasis on the importance of the Supreme Court as a balance wheel or governor on legislation. The decisions of the Supreme Court represent, as Bryce points out, the well-considered will of the people; while a majority in the House of Representatives might, as history has shown to be often the case, stand merely for the whim or the passion of the moment.

## 10 Some Memories of the Civil War

The boys of my generation fought through the Civil War on the basis of the preamble of the Constitution:

“We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

It is to be noted that this Constitution is the work not of the representatives of thirteen independent states, but of the people, the citizens of the entire domain of the United States. The theory under which South Carolina and its fellow states undertook, in 1861, to secede from the Union was the theory of the old Confederation. In this, the States had retained their full independence and had come together in a confederation or alliance merely as a matter of convenience. The men who framed in Montgomery, in 1861, the constitution of the new confederacy, recognized, by implication, that the Constitution of the United States had not considered the possibility of secession. The Montgomery constitution states that it is the work of “representatives of seven independent states.” It was clear not only from the wording of the constitution, but from the action of



these seven states in attempting to secede from the United States, that each state of the new Confederacy proposed to reserve its right to break away, in case its people might not be satisfied with the action of the legislature or Executive of the Confederacy.

The Constitution represented very largely, as said, the ideas of Alexander Hamilton, but if it had not been for the good judgment, marvellous patience, and personal influence of George Washington, it would not have been possible to secure from the convention of 1787 a consensus of opinion on any document that could be framed. Hamilton pointed out that, prior to 1776, the thirteen communities had never possessed as states a separate existence. Washington says, speaking in the convention, "What nation will treat with the United States if today we claim to be one state and tomorrow assert that we are thirteen?" He adds: "The Confederation was a little more than a shadow, and it was not possible for foreign nations to accept its obligations as binding." John Adams declares that "the independence of each State had never existed as fact." Hamilton was alone in the New York delegation in helping to shape the Constitution and in working for its adoption. The two other delegates finally left the convention and gave their influence later to oppose the approval by the State of the Constitution. Lansing, of New York, speaking in 1787, complained that "the Convention

had for its purpose the extinguishment of the independency of the States.”

In the contract which constitutes the national Constitution, the communities called States do not appear at all, and there is no germ of suggestion of any arrangement for the future dissolution of the nation thus constituted. The implication is of the purpose to construct a permanent or lasting nation. In fact no nation could, without stultifying its claim to be recognized as a nation, admit the possibility of its dissolution by the action of its own citizens. If the English language has any meaning, our ancestors, in the preamble to the Constitution, took a ground that is absolutely incompatible with the theory later promulgated by Calhoun and put into force by Davis and his associates in 1861. Under this theory, it was contended that the United States Constitution represented a voluntary compact between independent communities, which compact could be dissolved at the pleasure not of all the communities, but of any group of the communities, or even of any single member.

The Constitution, as originally framed, comprised seven articles. In the two years succeeding its adoption, ten further articles, in the form of amendments, were adopted. The first of these prohibits Congress making any law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise of

religious faith; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievance. This article provided in spirit (as it ought to have provided in letter) for the maintenance throughout the entire dominion of the Republic of freedom of speech and of the press. It was the case, however, that in all the years before the war during which the conflict of opinion was sharp in regard to the maintenance and the extension of slavery, the right of freedom of utterance was practically denied in the slave-holding States.

In Section III of Article I, there is a provision which constituted an important factor in bringing about the dissension resulting in the Civil War. This provision apportions representatives and direct taxes among the several states, not according to the numbers of voting citizens, but according to the respective numbers of their inhabitants.

In the Southern States, the slaves, called in the Constitution, "persons held to servitude," were represented in the House of Representatives by their masters, or at least by the white men elected in their several states. The slaves had no vote and no expression of opinion as to the selection of the representatives, or as to the policies which these representatives were to maintain. There was strong protest among the citizens of the Northern States in regard

to the right to count the slaves as part of the basis of representation. A compromise was finally arrived at under which each slave was, in estimating the representation of the State, counted as three-fifths of a white man. The vote under which the Missouri Compromise was repealed, the intention of the House being apparently to bring about the extension of slavery throughout the whole dominion of the United States, was carried by a majority of seven. The representatives of the slaves in the House comprised at that time no less than twenty members. The negroes were, therefore, compelled, under this inequitable concession made to their masters, to give the weight of their vote for the permanence and the extension of the institution of slavery. This was one of the concessions which Hamilton thought himself obliged to make in order to secure for the Constitution the acceptance of South Carolina and Georgia.

The results of the Civil War and the conviction, held at the beginning of the war by a comparatively small group of abolitionists, but impressed after three years of fighting, upon the great majority of the people of the North, that slavery was incompatible with the continued existence of the nation, brought about, in January, 1865, the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment. This Amendment provides that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime, shall exist within

the United States or within any place subject to the jurisdiction of these States.

The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1866, had for its purpose to secure citizenship for all persons born or naturalized in the United States; and the prohibition upon any state from making any law that should abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. The states are, moreover, prohibited from depriving, without due process of law, any person of life, liberty, or property, or denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.

This amendment was required in order to give due force to the amendment abolishing slavery. It was not sufficient that the colored person should be protected in legal freedom. It was believed by the legislators of 1865 that this freedom could be practically assured only if the colored person could be assured of all the rights of citizenship. History has made clear that the legislators of 1865 were in error in their action in this matter. It was important to save the negro from falling again into servitude, and it was essential that he should be assured of full justice under the law. The granting of citizenship, however, to uneducated and ignorant people constituted a demoralizing influence upon the negroes on the one hand and upon the whites on the other, and brought about on the part of the Southerners

various arbitrary, illegal, and persecuting methods adopted in order to prevent the exercise of the vote on the part of the negroes.

The Fifteenth Amendment, that came into force in 1870, had for its purpose a further emphasizing of the authority of the national government to secure for all of its citizens the full rights and privileges belonging to citizens. It reads:

“The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any state, on the ground of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and Congress shall have power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation.”

The purpose is in line with that of Amendment Fourteen, but it would appear as if, after some years of experimenting, the legislators of 1870 had decided that it was not sufficient to secure the voting privilege by implication under the term “all rights of citizens.” It was thought necessary to exert the authority of the national government and to make specific the assurance that such voting privilege should not be denied or abridged. This purpose of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has, however, not been fulfilled. These Amendments make evident the old-time truism that no law can become effective, or can continue effective, which is not supported by the

approval and the public will of a great majority at least of the community.

The foundations of the Republic were shaped and made secure as a result of the influence of the force of the character of Washington, the creative genius and resourcefulness of Hamilton, and the intellectual power and constructive ability of Marshall.

Madison contributed important service in helping to shape public opinion and to secure from a group of dis-integrated communities material for a nation. Hamilton's financial measures, beginning with the assumption by the national treasury of the war debts of the States, were fiercely opposed by the representatives of the Southern States. They had no objection to getting rid of their war indebtedness which, under Hamilton's plan, was to be made a charge upon the nation, and would be paid in great part by the wealthier citizens of the Northern States; but they realized that the new interest given to the citizens of all the states who would come to be holders of the bonds representing the national indebtedness, must strengthen the central power of the Government.

Hamilton finally got a majority, which was but a very small majority, of the members of Congress to accept his financial measures by making a concession in regard to the site selected for the national capital. The Northern States wanted the capital to be placed somewhere on the line of the Susquehanna. The

town of York was one of the places suggested. The Virginians contended that the capital should be placed on the Potomac, and in this contention they were backed by practically all the Southern delegates. Hamilton finally accepted the Southern view as to the capital in consideration of votes for his financial measures.

I may point out that the success in overcoming, in 1861–65, the armies of the South and in maintaining the Republic, was very seriously delayed through the fact that the national capital was within the territory of the slave-holding states. The necessity of defending Washington hampered the operations of army after army and caused the failure for the North of more than one campaign.

Four years of hard fighting were required in order to bring about, through the surrender at Appomattox of the army of Northern Virginia, the conclusion that the Constitution had created, not a confederacy of thirteen independent nations, each having the right to manage its own policies in its own way, but an independent nation with the power of doing what might be necessary to maintain its own existence.

The decision of the Founders that the slave-trade was to be prohibited after 1808 constituted, by implication, an expression of opinion that slavery was not a blessing to be perpetuated, but an evil to be



brought to a close. This was the view taken by Washington, Jefferson, and other Southern leaders of their generation. This was the view expressed in the ordinance of 1787 which prohibited the existence of slavery in the territory of the Northwest, that is to say the territory north of the Ohio River. The substance of this ordinance had been drafted by Rufus Putnam and his associate, Manasseh Cutler, at the time of the founding of Marietta, the first town in this new territory. The proposition was submitted by Cutler to a Committee of the Congress then sitting in Philadelphia, and, under the influence of Washington, was approved by the Committee and by the House.

The Compromise of 1820, which brought Missouri and Maine into the Union, constituted, in substance, a confirmation of the national policy adopted in 1787 in regard to the prohibition of slavery north of a certain line.

The conflict between the two sections, revived in 1850 after the Mexican War, turned upon this question of securing more territory for the creation of slave States.

The Republican Party, which was organized in Michigan in 1854, and which made its first national campaign, with Fremont as its candidate, in 1856, submitted to the citizens of the country the contention that slavery must be so restricted as to remain a

sectional institution. It was not to be accepted as expressing a national policy.

Abraham Lincoln pointed out that three measures representing the views of the slave-holders constituted an organized attempt,—he was inclined to describe it as a conspiracy,—to extend slavery through the territory of the United States. These three measures were:

The enactment in 1850 of the Fugitive Slave Law, which strengthened the previous legislation and imposed upon all citizens the duty to aid the slave-holders in recovering slave property which had escaped from bondage; the repeal of the Missouri Compromise in 1854; and the Dred Scott decision, given out in 1858 by Chief Justice Taney, under which it was affirmed that a colored person held to servitude in the United States had no rights under the law that a white man was bound to respect.

Lincoln and his associates contended that this Supreme Court decision was not in accord with the principles of the Constitution or the purposes of the Founders of the Republic.

The action of South Carolina, and of other States, in prohibiting colored persons from lecturing or from preaching, and in prohibiting under severe penalty the giving to any colored person instruction in reading, was in line with the conclusion of Taney that a slave was not a person. The safety of slavery

required the enforcement of ignorance for the negro. The attempt made by South Carolina in 1831 to assert the right to refuse to obey national legislation with the purpose of which it was not in accord, was headed off with sharp decision by the action of President Andrew Jackson. The action of South Carolina and the other states that followed South Carolina in 1861 was, of course, simply a continuation of the nullification movement of thirty years earlier.

Throughout all the years from 1830 to the beginning of the war, the citizens of the Southern States had acted as if they were outside of the Republic instead of being a constitutional part of the United States. If these states were within national territory, they had no right under the Constitution to prohibit free speech or the distribution of printed material, in so far as this did not conflict with the law.

In 1831, however, rewards were offered by the Governor of South Carolina and Georgia for the kidnapping of Northern Anti-Slavery leaders, Garrison, Frederic Tappan, and others. Freedom of the press was practically non-existent through the states of the South. They succeeded even in securing from the National Post Office the prohibition of the circulation through the Southern States of printed material in which any reference was made to slavery.

In 1856, occurred the assault in the Senate Cham-

ber by Brooks, of Virginia, upon Senator Sumner. Sumner, hemmed in by his desk, was taken at a disadvantage and the blows inflicted upon him which nearly brought death at the time, shortened his life. Brooks was hailed throughout the South at dinners and public meetings as a defender of Southern liberties. It was evident by 1858 that there had been developed on this Continent two civilizations, radically different in purpose and in character.

In 1858, these two policies came into direct conflict in connection with the admission of Kansas. The region in question was within the territory described in the ordinance of 1787. It was within the territory that, under the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and the Clay Compromise of 1850, had, as it was supposed, been secured for freedom. It was claimed by the South that the restrictions upon the extension of slavery had been put to one side. Kansas was invaded by armed citizens from Missouri who undertook to keep free soil men from the polls and themselves to place fraudulent votes in the ballot box. The Government of Buchanan gave full sympathy and backing to the leaders of the slavery party. They were unable, however, to dominate the substantial majority in Kansas, which had declared for freedom. It was the fight on the admission of Kansas that secured a national reputation for Abraham Lincoln. His famous debate with Douglas,

in 1858, reaffirmed the principles upon which the Republican Party was to carry on its political contest, the same principles upon which the war itself was later fought out. In the contest for the Senatorship, Douglas won, although the popular majority was in favor of Lincoln, but the discussion brought about the selection of Abraham Lincoln as President of the United States and as the leader in the war which was to save the Republic.

In the discussion in the House in 1858, a member from South Carolina made a plaintive appeal for the right, if he wanted to go to Kansas, to take his whole family, including his negro Mammy. He referred to his Mammy as one of the home circle whom he would not be willing to leave behind. From the Northern side of the House came the rejoinder: "We have no objection to your taking your negro Mammy to Kansas; we simply want to prevent you from having the privilege of selling her when you get there."

The debate with Douglas brought for Lincoln the invitation to come to New York in order that his qualifications for leadership might be considered by some of the men who were responsible for the Republican Party. The speech made on the 27th of February at Cooper Union confirmed for Lincoln the reputation that had come to him after the debate with Douglas. It was evident that this leader from the West understood the principles upon which the

Republican Party had been organized, and was ready to emphasize with his fellow citizens that if the Republic was to be preserved, these principles must be carried out. Said Lincoln:

“Let us not be turned from our duty by false accusations, nor frightened away from duty by menaces of destruction to the Government nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it.”

Years were required after the authority of the Republic had been re-established throughout the Southern States, before it was possible to secure such readjustment of the relations as was needed to make safe the foundations of the Republic. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments had done much to confirm the views of Hamilton and Marshall as to the extent of the national authority. The tendency of legislation and of Supreme Court decisions since 1865 has been to lessen the authority of the States in regard to certain matters which it was probably the intention of the Founders of the Republic to reserve for the states. It was, of course, the case that as new methods of transportation were developed, the citizens of the several states were brought closer together in their relations. In nearly all classes of business, the business operations of

citizens were carried on irrespective of state boundaries, so that these boundaries, expressing only political conditions, came to be more and more imaginary as far as the daily lives of the citizens were concerned. Business had to be carried on throughout the whole country and it finally came to be understood that the responsibility for shaping the laws controlling business, such, for instance, as those having to do with bankruptcy, must be transferred from the state legislatures to that of the nation. The many difficulties in connection with the succession of estates, and the rights of children render it important to bring about a national control of divorce, the laws in regard to which have heretofore been left to the responsibility of the States. The fight for a national divorce law is, however, still to be completed.

The enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment, taking out of the hands of the States the control of suffrage, and of the Eighteenth Amendment, asserting the national authority over such a domestic matter as drink, make a high-water mark for the development of national at the expense of state authority.

There is naturally at this time, and there must continue to be, a wide difference of opinion not only as to the wisdom of transferring to the nation so large a portion of the responsibility heretofore reserved for the state, but as to the wisdom of the national action

in these later amendments. There is no question, however, in the minds of American citizens today that the Republic, the foundations of which were laid by the Colonists of New England and Virginia, the independence of which was secured under the leadership of Washington and his associates, and the maintenance of which against the perils of disruption was assured by the work of the boys of my generation in 1861-65, has made good its right to exist. There is now full recognition of the value of its existence not only for its own people, but for the people of the world, as the greatest and most important example of representative Federal Government, "government by the people and for the people." As such representative, it must take its place as a leader in the Family of Nations, and must do its part to secure for all communities liberty with justice, and thus to maintain the peace of the world.



## ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE FIGHT FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE REPUBLIC

*Expanded from an Address Delivered February 12, 1890.  
and a number of times thereafter*

THE writer of the Hebrew Book of Proverbs tells us that "where there is no vision, the people perish." The history of humanity gives not a few examples of issues and perils in which the life of a community, so to speak, and its salvation in time of peril, had depended upon the guidance of the God-given hero. For the vision is, in the greater number of cases, not given to the people as a whole, but is revealed to them through the inspired leader.

In 1775, the men of the American Colonies found it necessary to fight for their rights as independent citizens and, after a year of conflict, came to the conclusion that these rights could be secured and maintained only through an absolute independence. They had convinced themselves that the protection of their liberties could not be assured if the political control, which carried with it the economic control of their lives, was to be left in the hands of a Parliament and a King who were three thousand miles

away, and who had no knowledge of the conditions and no sympathies with the purposes of the Americans. Then a leader was sought and was found. In looking back over the history of the period, the student can find no other man of the generation who combined, as George Washington combined, the qualities that were essential for leadership during the seven long years of struggle which resulted in the independence of the United States. Washington gave evidence of ability as a commander. He had resourcefulness, originality of conception, persistence, and patience. There were not a few failures, but the leader never lost heart. Military leadership was important, but it is probable that the greatest service rendered by Washington in the cause of the Revolution was through character. He had the power of impressing upon those who fought with him, and upon the citizens back of the fighting lines, his own high and assured purpose, his faith, and his confidence in the result, and when the fight had been won, and the thirteen communities were faced with not only the privilege but the responsibilities of independence, it was again due to the wise patience, persistence, and influence of George Washington that through the shaping of the Constitution, a foundation was secured for the new Republic. The success of the Constitution was due, in the main, to the brilliant genius of Hamilton, but the acceptance of the scheme

by the members of the Convention, and by the States back of the Convention, could never have been brought about if it had not been for the influence of the character and the power of the personality of Washington.

In the crisis that came half a century later, when the existence of the Republic was in great peril, the people again found their leader. We may bear in mind that the death of Washington came in 1799. It was just ten years later that there was born in a shabby little log cabin in Kentucky, Abraham Lincoln, the man who was to steer the Republic through an assault which at the outset it seemed impossible to withstand. The details of Lincoln's life as a boy, as a youngster, as a young struggling lawyer, and as a political leader of wisdom and of increasing influence, are now familiar to every thinking American. In a brief analysis such as is here possible, it is necessary only to make reference to a few characteristic incidents which mark the development of Lincoln's life and the growth of his power. The Lincoln family was originally of good stock. Representatives of the family came in the middle of the seventeenth century from Norfolkshire to Massachusetts. The immediate ancestor of our Abraham, whom we may call Abraham Lincoln the first, made his way to Virginia and from there to Kentucky. The home of this first Abraham was not far from the

region known as the "bloody ground." At the time the first Abraham staked out in the wilderness his claim for a farm, a farm which had actually to be created by felling the trees and pulling up the stumps, the Indians were still maintaining a claim to the country.

It was about 1790 that Abraham (the first) was working with his mule in one of the small fields that had been cut out of the forest, when a group of Indians coming from behind the trees shot him down in the furrow. Little Thomas Lincoln, who was the father of our Abraham, and who was at the time a boy of ten, ran in to tell the Mother that his Father was lying cold in the furrow. This incident (and many similar instances on the frontier along the Ohio and the Wabash) occurred one hundred years after the massacre at Deerfield, Massachusetts.

The line of white occupation of the Continent, marking the driving back of the Indian tribes, had taken just one century to move from the Connecticut to the Ohio. Thomas Lincoln grew up with no natural opportunities and with so little individual ambition that he never learned to read or to write. He failed to make a success either as a farmer or with any other occupation. His one piece of good judgment was in securing as a wife Nancy Hanks, the mother of our Abraham. Nancy was a step above her husband in training and in character. It

was from the mother that Abraham learned to read (using for the purpose the only book in the house, the Bible) and to write. The boy gave evidence early of ambition and of the power of concentration through which alone ambition can secure results.

We are told that when working in the field of a neighbor,—and he began his field work at a very early age,—his co-worker, the neighbor's son, brought into the field a copy of Euclid's *Geometry*. Abraham took up the book as it lay in the furrow and asked his comrade what was *Euclid*. The owner of the book replied, "I am trying to find out and do not yet know." The boy, more fortunate than Abraham, having the advantage of a school, had been ordered to make up in vacation time geometry that he had failed to master in his class. Abraham looked at the first page and his second question was, "What is the meaning of 'demonstrate'?" "I do not know," said the owner. "I am trying to find out." Abraham succeeded by borrowing the book during his noon hour in the field of labor in coming to understand the meaning of the term "demonstrate." Before the book passed finally out of his hands he mastered in his memory the whole series of the geometrical problems presented.

Judge David Davis, of the Supreme Court, tells us that when he was on the bench in a State Court in Southern Illinois, he was at once impressed with the

distinctive quality and ability of a long-legged, rough-looking youngster who was beginning his practice at the law and whose name was Lincoln.

“This young man,” said Davis, “presented his side of the case with a clearness of logic that reminded me of the reasoning of a problem in geometry, and I only learned afterwards that Abraham had utilized Euclid’s *Geometry* for the purpose of training his reasoning power.”

Another book that young Abraham succeeded in borrowing was the *Life of Washington* by Parson Weems. The neighbor, from whom he secured the book, cautioned him as to its value, for books were scarce in those days in Kentucky. The boy carried it in his shirt bosom during the day and, when night came, put it in the safest place of which he had knowledge, beneath his pillow. The log-cabin had not been well built and was not well cared for. The clay which had been placed between the logs to keep out the wind and rain, had dried up and fallen out, leaving breaks or interstices. The night on which the boy placed the precious book beneath his pillow, a rain, which beat through the cracks of the logs and wet boy and pillow (that was a small matter) brought wet also upon the book, and this was a real misfortune. The poor boy took the book back in the morning to the owner and explained what had hap-

pened. His neighbor was annoyed, but realized that no blame belonged to the boy. "Well, boy," he said, "the book is damaged and you better work out the damage." So many hours were to be given to hoeing in the corn field. Abraham put in the plaintive inquiry. "Will those hours pay for the book or only for the damage?" The planter could not withstand the boy's appeal and allowed that the completion of the work might carry with it the ownership of the book.

A little later, Thomas Lincoln, who was making no success in Kentucky, conceived the idea that he might do better somewhere else and moved across the river into Indiana. There Abraham secured work in a country store, and when he was a youngster of sixteen, he had the opportunity of joining a small party that made the trip down the Ohio and Mississippi in a barge to New Orleans. The products of the river country were brought to market in this fashion in barges which had to be broken up when they reached New Orleans, because they were unable to make their way back against the current of the river. It was in New Orleans that Abraham got his first real impression of slavery. There were, of course, slaves in the Kentucky country, but they were few in number and their relations with the white folks did not appear to be very different from those of the poor whites. The conditions of slavery at that time

in Kentucky are well presented in the first chapters of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in the description of Mr. Shelby's plantation. There can be no question but that under a nice-natured planter, a plantation assured happy and comfortable lives for the negroes. The trouble came only, as is so clearly indicated in Mrs. Stowe's dramatic story, when misfortune fell upon the planter. If money was needed, the easiest, often the only, way of securing the money was through the sale of the negroes, and it was as a result of such an emergency that Uncle Tom was taken away from wife and child and sent "down the river." But the conditions in the cotton fields of Alabama, the rice marshes of Georgia, or the sugar-cane plantations of Louisiana, were very different from those obtaining on the farms of Kentucky. It was in New Orleans that Abraham saw for the first time a slave market. He happened to visit the market at the time an auction was going on. He saw men, women, and children, put up for sale, stripped so that their fine points could be examined, and handled by the possible purchasers. He realized what was meant by the separation of husband from wife and mother from child. He then said to himself, and to the comrade from the barge crew who was with him, "If slavery is not wrong and evil, then there is no such thing as an evil. I am going to do what I can in my life-time to strike at this thing and to strike it hard."



A second visit to New Orleans confirmed the youngster in his realization of the damnable character of slavery. His indignation at the institution as bringing about criminal injustice to the African and demoralization to the white man, was strengthened through the later years. But his abhorrence of slavery never caused Lincoln to fail to do justice to the problems that confronted the slave owners. He realized that the Southerners had not created the institution. It had been brought upon them through the influence, in the first place, of the slave-traders of Liverpool and of Bristol. He understood the difficulty, or as it seemed to the Southern planters the impossibility, of carrying on their work without slave labor. While hating slavery and holding that it must be brought to a close, Lincoln remained to the end sympathetic with the difficulties of the slave owners.

After returning to Indiana, Lincoln, with a partner, bought out the owner of the country store in which he had worked. No money passed, because there was no money; the purchase was made with notes. Lincoln had had no business training and had no natural ability for business. The most important of his business qualities was the insistence upon the fulfilment of obligations. His partner drank up a large part of the stock of liquor carried by the concern and finally slipped off westward, leaving Abra-

ham responsible for the indebtedness. The young man accepted the responsibility and did what he could through the following years to meet the obligation, but it was seventeen years before he was able to pay, as he finally did pay in full, with interest, the amount of the debt.

After giving up the little store, Lincoln secured work as a surveyor. There was great need of trustworthy surveying work in the country. Very few of the owners of land knew what their proper boundaries were, and this ignorance brought about continued grievances and quarrels.

Lincoln was called in to help the county surveyor and, with his usual thoroughness, learned by heart the book on surveying. The travelling through the county brought him into touch with a wider circle of people and this had an influence later on in his political career. All who knew Lincoln, and practically all who met him, were impressed with his integrity of purpose and the thoroughness with which he carried out the work in his hands. It came about, therefore, that the young man, who as far as property was concerned was certainly not a citizen of importance, had offered to him the nomination for the State Assembly. He had already secured a reputation as a ready and forcible speaker. His reasoning powers, as before indicated, were exceptional, and had been well developed. He had the ability, there-

fore, to convince an audience. Lincoln had the power to hold a circle of hearers, partly because he had something to say and partly because he was able to lighten up the talks with pertinent and even humorous stories. He had the dramatic touch. In this first political attempt, Lincoln was, not unnaturally, defeated. He secured, however, a very reputable vote, and what was evidence of the respect in which he was held by those who knew him best, he carried his own village almost unanimously. Some of his friends understanding, as Lincoln probably did not understand, that campaigning cost money, raised \$200 to cover his expenses. After the election, Abraham returned to the neighbor who had brought him the money, \$198.50. It was for a time a question among his friends as to what he had done with the dollar and a half. It was found later that this single expenditure by the candidate had covered the purchase of some cider for friends who were calling to give help. Those of us who have had to do with political expenditures in these later years may look back with envy at the modest methods utilized by Lincoln in his first political campaign.

Lincoln secured, with a second attempt, election to the Assembly, where he soon made his influence count, and, in 1847, he was elected to Congress, where his two years covered the period of the Mexican War. Lincoln belonged to the group of Whigs, whose

opinions are well represented in Lowell's *Biglow Papers*, who opposed the war. He considered it an act of aggression upon the weaker neighbor, and the later historian has confirmed this contention held not only by Lowell and by Lincoln, but by hundreds of thousands of other patriotic citizens. The Mexican War was brought about under the influence of Southern leaders and had for its chief purpose the addition to the Union of States available for slavery. It was the expectation of the South that Texas, which had prior to the beginning of the campaign been brought to the Union, could be cut up into five states, giving ten new votes in the Senate on the side of slavery. This part of the plan was, however, defeated through the obstinacy of the Texans. The men who had secured the independence of the Texas Republic were not willing to give up the power and the influence that would, as they thought, belong to the larger community. Lincoln voted, as any patriotic Congressman ought to have voted, for the supplies for the little army which did such brilliant work in Mexico. The fighting of the men, led by Taylor and by Scott, did something to redeem the honor of the Republic, which had, in the judgment of Lincoln, been sullied by the uncalled for aggression.

One result of the Mexican War was to renew the contention over the division of the territories between slave States and free States.

Under the Compromise of 1820, it had been decided that slavery should not be interfered with in the States in which it existed at the time of the acceptance of the Constitution; and that it should be permitted to exist in the new States that were organized out of the Western territories, south of the line 36 deg. 30 min., and extending from there to the Rocky Mountains. This line went across the Southern tier of counties of Missouri, but Missouri had already received a number of slave-holding settlers. The South pressed fiercely the contention that these slaveholders ought not to be inconvenienced by making Missouri a free state. The Compromise, therefore, provided that, while accepting that in the region east and west of Missouri there should be no slavery north of the line in question, Missouri should be admitted as a slave state. As an offset to the consent of the North for the admission of Missouri, the South withdrew its objection to the admission of Maine which had for two years or more been making application.

The Mexican War had brought new territory under the dominion of the United States. These territories comprised the region now known as New Mexico, Arizona, and California. The Northern leaders in Congress were obliged to admit that under the policy of the Compromise of 1820, the territory of New Mexico and Arizona must be left open to slavery. The conditions of the Compromise would have left

open to the invasion of slavery the lower half of what is now the state of California. Here, however, the protests of the settlers of California had to be listened to. There had come into the region after the discovery of gold in 1847, a group of energetic workers, largely from New England and from the Middle States, who had no interest in and no regard for slavery. The control of the region had been taken possession of by a comparatively small expedition under Fremont representing the army and Commodore Stockton representing the navy, and was held by troops and by the naval vessels until the treaty of Mexico assured the ownership of the United States. The Californians insisted that they must be put outside of the provisions of the Compromise of 1820. The matter was finally adjusted by the Henry Clay compromises of 1850. These secured recognition of slavery for Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona and left California a free state. One condition, however, of these compromises was the strengthening of the Fugitive Slave Law, under which every citizen of the country was placed under obligation to assist the United States marshals and the representatives of the white owner in restoring to slavery a colored man (in the words of the Constitution "a person held to servitude") who had succeeded in escaping.

In 1854, under the leadership of Stephen A. Douglas, the Kansas-Nebraska bill was enacted. This bill

repealed the compromise of 1820, and it repealed, in substance, the conditions accepted under the Clay measure of 1850. It was intended to bring about the opening to slavery of all the territories which were controlled by the United States Government and to make these available for organization as Slave states. This repeal was carried in the House by a majority of thirteen votes. Under the compromise that Hamilton had been obliged to accept in order to secure the support for the Constitution of the Slave States, the Southern States had representation in the House first for all the white residents and secondly for the colored people on the basis of counting five colored men as three whites. The slaves had, therefore, in form at least, representation in Congress, but in fact this representation was, of course, controlled by the slave-holders. In one of his earlier addresses on national affairs, Lincoln pointed out that there were at the time of the enactment of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, twenty members representing the colored slave population. The slaves had, therefore, been compelled to vote for a measure which meant the extension and the confirmation of slavery and which was to postpone indefinitely any possibility of freedom for them.

It was in a speech in 1854 that Lincoln gave utterance to the statement that has become a part of the history of the struggle. "A house divided against

itself cannot stand. This nation cannot endure half slave and half free, and, please God, this nation shall endure.”

At the time of making this speech, Lincoln had convinced himself that there was not only a plan, but what he was inclined to call a conspiracy, for making slavery a national instead of a sectional institution. He called attention to the actions of three men towards this result: James Buchanan, then President, Stephen A. Douglas, then Senator, and Roger Taney, then Chief Justice. Douglas was responsible, as said, for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise; Buchanan had pressed for the enactment of a stronger fugitive slave law and had given the influence of the President in favoring the slave interests which were attempting to make a slave state of Kansas; and Taney, in deciding in the Dred-Scott case that a negro had no rights which the law was bound to respect, was in fact under the law to be considered simply as a chattel, had done what was in his power to undermine the contention of the North that the extension of slavery was contrary to the purposes of the framers of the Constitution and to the conclusions expressed in the ordinance of 1787.

The platform accepted at the meeting held in Jackson, Michigan, in July, 1854, for the newly organized Republican party, constituted the text for the contest in which Lincoln became a leader, and



this contest was for the preservation as free soil of all the territory of the United States not already committed to slavery. The debates held by Lincoln with Douglas in the campaign for the Illinois Senatorship of 1858 served to make clear to the peoples not only of Illinois but of the nation, the actual issue that was to be determined between the South and the North. In these debates, Lincoln pressed upon Douglas the question, "Can the people in our United States territory, prior to the formation of a state, consistently, and against the protest of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery?"

It was impossible for Douglas to answer this question without antagonizing citizens either south or north of Mason and Dixon's line, whose votes were essential for his election as President. Lincoln contended that taking slaves into free territory was substantially the same thing as reviving the slave trade. He presented as a summary of the contention of Douglas and of his supporters in the South, "If any one man choses to enslave another, no third man has a right to object." He goes on: "A man does not lose his right to a piece of property which has been stolen. Can a man lose a right to himself if he himself has been stolen?" "According to the founders," said Lincoln, "government derives its largest powers from the consent of the governed. The Fathers did not claim that the right of the people

to govern negroes showed the right of the people to govern themselves.”

The policy of Douglas in regard to slavery was based upon the theory that the people did not care. But the result made clear that the people did care.

Lincoln was beaten in the senatorial contest by eight votes in the legislature, but his popular majority was four thousand. Douglas realized with the end of this senatorial campaign that, under the incisive analysis of Lincoln, his proposed policy of squatter sovereignty had been shown up as an absurdity and that his chance for the presidency had vanished into thin air. After this debate, Lincoln came to be recognized as one of the leaders of the new Republican party. He writes in 1859: “Do not, in order to secure recruits, lower the standard of the Republican party. The true platform for 1860 is to prevent slavery from becoming a national institution.”

An incident that occurred in the House of Representatives in 1859 throws light upon the state of feeling of the time and the growing bitterness between the sections. Elihu Washburn, of Illinois, later Minister to Paris, held the floor. Some utterance of Washburn in regard to slavery aroused the temper of some of the Southern representatives. Wigfall, of Texas, later a Brigadier in the Army of the Confederacy, stepped to the front with a threatening gesture.

A brother of the Illinois Washburn, at that time a representative from Wisconsin, thought that Wigfall's hand went to his hip, and that a pistol was to be drawn. He stepped to the front to protect the brother who was still speaking. Barksdale, of Mississippi who also became a Brigade Commander and was killed at Gettysburg, jumps forward to protect Wigfall. The hand of the Wisconsin man went out and grasped at Barksdale's head. There was a beautiful covering of dark hair which, according to the gossip of the time, had secured the admiration of Barksdale's fellows. When, however, this grip of the man from Wisconsin came upon the hair, it lifted;—it was a wig,—heretofore, as said, unsuspected. The feeling of the House had been tense. There was nothing impossible in the thought of physical contest, or even of shooting, but as the wig was raised by the tall Westerner, the House broke into laughter. The tense atmosphere was cleared. Three of the excited men who had been on the floor went back to their seats, and the representative from Illinois completed his speech.

Through the winter months of 1860, the leaders of the new Republican party were giving thought to the all-important matter of the selection of a candidate. If the party was to become an influence in the nation, if in fact it was to retain its party existence, it was essential that it should win in its second campaign.

The election of 1856, while it secured the presidency for Buchanan, had brought full measure of encouragement to the leaders of the Republican party. The popular vote was large and enthusiastic. These men came in later years to realize that the cause would not have been furthered by the election in 1856 of their candidate, John C. Fremont.

Fremont had shown energy and enterprise as an explorer. He was a handsome man with good qualities as a comrade, and he had a clever wife. His later career showed, however, lack of judgment and decision, and when his wife was not at hand, he showed also a great capacity for saying and doing foolish things. The Republicans in New York, comprising here, as in the other States, the great majority of the old Whigs and the Free-soil Democrats, took the ground that William H. Seward was the natural leader for the new campaign. Seward certainly appeared to possess excellent qualifications for the presidency. He understood the issues of the day. He had shown courage and insight in maintaining the contention that slavery must not be extended beyond the States in which it then existed. He was an experienced statesman, a scholar and a gentleman. It was evident that the delegates representing New York in the Convention that was to be held in Chicago in June, 1860, would be instructed to give their vote to Seward as their first choice. Bryant,

known to the later generation as a poet, and remembered by some as an able editor, is to be recalled also as one of the wiser leaders of the new party. Bryant called into his office a group of New York citizens, mainly personal friends, to give consideration to the instructions that the New York delegates were to take to the Convention. My Father was one of those present in Bryant's office and it was by him I was told what passed. Bryant pointed out that the citizens present were doubtless in accord with the general feeling of the Republican party in New York in regard to the desirability of securing the nomination of Seward. He reminded his friends, however, that the West (and by the term at that time was meant what we now call the Middle West, the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, etc.) had increased largely its population and its political power.

“The delegates from the West,” said Bryant, “may not be willing to accept an Eastern candidate. They are taking the ground in their papers and in individual utterances that it is time for the West to be represented in the Presidential chair. If we cannot nominate Seward, we shall undoubtedly have to accept a man from the West. It is important that the New York delegation should have not only a first but a second instruction. We all know how a convention has from time to time been swept into making a nomination that was the result not of deliberate or well-considered selec-

tion, but of some phase of heated feeling started by an excited word from the floor or a yell from the gallery. A nomination so brought about may easily give to the nation a President of lower quality than the nation is entitled to."

Those of us who have read the history of presidential conventions realize that such a result has come about more than once since 1860.

"I think," suggested Bryant, "that we had better ask this young lawyer in Illinois, Abraham Lincoln, to come to New York and give us an address on the purpose and principles of the Republican party and the issues that are to be fought out in the coming campaign. It seems to me," said Bryant, "that Lincoln has given evidence in his debates with Douglas, which you will bear in mind were brought into print in the *Evening Post*, of a better grasp of the pending issues and a better understanding of the national duty in regard to the restriction of slavery than has been shown by any other of our political leaders, not excepting even our own New Yorker, Seward."

The men present were ready to accept Bryant's proposal. Somebody suggested that a young lawyer in Illinois might easily not have ready money at hand and that it would be well to send with the invitation a check for expenses, and this was done. Years after the war, Robert Lincoln, who was then a boy of fifteen at school in Exeter, Mass., told me that

his Father had written to him in January saying, in substance:

“DEAR BOY:

“I have just won a case, and as soon as I get payment of my fee, I am coming to look in upon you at Exeter. I want to see something of the East, and I want also to know what your own surroundings are and how you are getting on with your work.”

A week later, Lincoln wrote to his son:

“DEAR BOY:

“I am disappointed about my visit. B. says it will be some time before he can pay me, and I have no other money. I do not know when I can come.”

A week later, came another letter to Robert:

“DEAR BOY:

“I am coming after all. Some men in New York want to hear me talk, and they have sent me money for the trip. I can manage the rest of the way.”

The fact that Lincoln wanted to see his boy in Exeter had an important influence in the decision that was reached in June in the Convention in Chicago.

The address given by Lincoln in Cooper Union, New York, on the 27th of February, 1860, was, I

believe, the most important speech ever made in the United States; important not only for its content, but for its results. The speech itself was an admirable, fair-minded summary and statement, making clear the nature of the foundations of the Republic, the purpose of the founders, the obligations entered into at the time of the framing of the Constitution, the later obligations accepted by the North and by the South in the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and in the Clay Compromises of 1850, under which adjustment had been reached of the new territory secured in the war with Mexico. Lincoln recorded in this speech the opinions expressed by Southern statesmen, such as Washington and Jefferson, at the time of the framing of the Constitution, and later, that slavery was an uncivilized institution, the existence of which constituted a serious peril for the nation. These men all looked forward to the early extinction of slavery, and believed that this would come about if it were not permitted to extend beyond the States in which it existed at the time of the formation of the Constitution. In the Southern States was developed the belief that slavery was a benevolent institution, good for the negro and essential for the white man, and that it was essential, if the institution were to be maintained, that fresh territory must from decade to decade be secured for the organization of new slave states. This new slave terri-



tory would bring about an increase in the profit to be secured from Whitney's cotton-gin. These planters had convinced themselves that the cultivation of cotton, and also for that matter of rice and the sugar-cane, could be carried on only by negroes, and they had convinced themselves further that the work, arduous in itself, would be done effectively only by negroes who were slaves. They had also come to understand that, with the increasing feeling through the Northern States of the disgrace and the wrong of slavery, it was essential that the South should retain political power in Congress and, when practicable, in the Presidency. Such political power could be made secure only if new States could be added from which would come to the Senate men prepared to support slavery. The events in the Convention followed the line of Bryant's prophecy. On the fourth ballot, Seward was losing.

The delegates from New York, in accordance with the instructions given to them in regard to their second choice, gave their votes for Lincoln. The delegates from the New England States, where Lincoln, after leaving New York, had spoken eleven times, fell in behind New York, and Lincoln's nomination was secured on the sixth ballot.

With the division of the Democratic party, from which Douglas carried off a good many thousand of the voters in the North, Lincoln's election was as-

sured. He was at the time fifty-two years of age. No President of the Republic had taken his seat in Washington in the face of such imminent peril to the continued existence of the nation. The last message of the feeble Buchanan had taken the ground that while a state had no right to secede, the Federal Government had no right to compel it to remain in the Union.

During the months between the election on the first Tuesday of November and the inauguration of the new Administration on the fourth of March, the South continued its preparations for war. By the fourth of March, seven states had seceded. It was the expectation of Davis that by the time the new Administration came in, the new Confederacy would be fully prepared for war, while the North, not believing in the possibility of the breaking up of the Republic, would have made no preparations. In taking hold of the Government, Lincoln is confronted with an empty treasury. The outgoing Secretary of the Navy, a Southerner, had seen to it that the naval force of the United States, at best but a handful of vessels, had been sent to the Northern Pacific. The outgoing Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, had, during the later months of his office, taken pains to transfer from the Northern arsenals to the arsenals in the Southern States, what the Government had available of equipment and of ammunition. In the South,

public opinion had solidified and appeared to be substantially harmonious.

The fighting force of the Southern States was being rapidly organized. In the North, on the other hand, all was in doubt. Neither Lincoln nor his advisers were in a position to find out what loyal support could be depended upon. The attack on Fort Sumter on April 12th marked the beginning of actual fighting, and Lincoln then made his appeal for 75,000 volunteers, with which to maintain the national existence. New York, the great City of the Republic, sent through its Mayor, Fernando Wood, a discouraging reply to this appeal. Wood brought into print a pamphlet published under the title of *Tri-Insula*, in which he recommended the secession of the City from the State, and from the Republic. He proposed that New York should establish itself as a free City, following the precedent of the cities of the Hanseatic League, and more particularly of Hamburg.

“Let us have,” said Wood, “a free port offering hospitality to the commerce of the world. The Republic is broken up; let us leave the States to fight out their quarrel in their own way. New York, in making itself an independent City, can secure enormous prosperity. The productions of the country, whatever government may finally be established, must come out through New York and the commerce of Europe will find its way to our free port.”

The citizens of New York were, however, not ready to accept Wood's recommendation of secession as expressing the opinion of the community. A popular meeting was held in Union Square, late in April, at which Wood was obliged to preside, and was also, under the pressure of a committee headed by Jackson S. Schultz, later the first President of the Union League Club, compelled to make a loyal speech. The men who organized the meeting brought together substantial subscriptions for the aid of the depleted treasury. The same men later established the Union League Club, in which was crystallized the loyal opinion of the community. It was under the influence of the Union Leagues of New York and of Philadelphia that the first volunteer regiments were organized. The fact that loyalty in New York had aroused itself and was prepared to support the Administration brought, of course, enormous relief to Lincoln and to all who believed the continued existence of the Republic to be essential.

The first inaugural of Lincoln, and later the second inaugural, and the Gettysburg speech have been accepted as belonging to the classics not only of American history, but of the world's literature. All Americans are now familiar with the typical expressions in this address.

Speaking to the men of the South, Lincoln says,

“we are not enemies, but friends; political separation could not bring the present issues to a close. . . . You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I have the most solemn oath to preserve, protect, and defend it.”

Lincoln points out that it was not necessary for the Constitution to contain any expressed provision forbidding the disintegration of the state. The right and the duty of defending and maintaining its own existence is the fundamental law of all national government. Even if the theory be accepted that the United States was an association or federation of communities, the creation or continued existence of such confederation must rest upon contract, and the consent of both or of all parties originally assenting is required to rescind.

The inaugural ends with the pathetic appeal:

“We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained our relations, it must not break our bonds of affection. Memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot’s grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chords of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.”

Lincoln had, in accordance with the political and party tradition, appointed as Secretary of State his chief opponent for the nomination, W. H. Seward.

Seward found it difficult to shake off the conviction that the real leadership in national policy belonged to a man of his intellectual eminence rather than to the uncouth, half-trained lawyer from the West. On the first of April (a good day for a futility) Seward writes to Lincoln recalling that "the Administration has been in office for thirty days." He claims that there has been "no evidence of an assured policy." Who is to take direction? . . . "I am prepared," said Seward, "if the necessity seems to arise, to accept the responsibility of direction."

Lincoln replies: "There must be control. There shall be an assured policy for the Administration and the responsibility for the direction of such policy is mine. I depend upon securing for this task the loyal support of every member of the Cabinet."

A month later, Seward, writing to his wife, reports that "there is in the Cabinet but one vote and that is cast by the President."

In April, in Lincoln's first message to Congress, he puts the question, which was at that time vital for the nation, "Must a Government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence? Is there in all republics this inherent weakness?"

Under Lincoln's leadership, the answer of the people of the United States was, "no."

Carl Schurz says:

“Lincoln wielded the power of the powers of government when stern resolution and relentless force were the order of the day, and won and ruled the popular mind and heart by the tender sympathies of his nature.”

The outbreak of the war showed the wisdom of the Convention in selecting as its President not a Northerner who represented the typical and more extreme anti-slavery sentiment, but a man from the Border States who, while clear in his convictions as to the barbarism of slavery and the necessity for restricting slavery, was sympathetic with the problems and difficulties of the slave-holders. No Northern man could have secured, as Lincoln secured, the support for the defense of the Republic of a substantial portion of the population of the Border States. During the first year of the war, these states gave for the army of the Republic no less than 50,000 men, and before the war was over there had come into the ranks from Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Maryland, not less than 200,000. These men, many of them opposed to any action against slavery, were loyal to the Republic. They were fighting men knowing how to handle their muskets and ready so to do where most needed. With these men, entering into the ranks of the Federal Army meant civil war. In the states specified, families were divided; brother against brother, father against son.

The men who fought in the armies of the North were also making great sacrifices for their country. Those of us whose lives extend backward to the strenuous years 1861-1865 will recall how serious were the discouragements, particularly during the early half of the war. Some of you have visited the White House and have looked through the window in the middle of the South Room, which in the war years Lincoln used as his office. In standing where Lincoln stood, the thought came to me of the pathos of the weary months of discouragement from the first week of the war when Lincoln, looking out over the Potomac, could see the camp fires of the army of Northern Virginia, and must have put to himself the question whether he was to be the last President of the Republic. Through the two years following in which came the tidings of Bull Run, of the defeat of McClellan's army on the Peninsula, of the calamities that came upon Pope, of the failure of Burnside, and of the overwhelming of Hooker's force at Chancellorsville, during all these weary months the responsibility rested upon the President of maintaining such appearance of confidence and hopefulness as should give spirit to the boys fighting in the field (boys who had had so much discouragement under wrongly selected leaders) and as should ensure the continued support of the citizens behind the lines without whose co-operation the defense of the Re-



public must come to an end. Finally comes the relief of success.

The fourth of July, 1863, which marked the driving back of Lee's Army from Gettysburg and the final failure of the South to occupy any territory North of the Potomac, marked also the fall of Vicksburg and the opening of the Mississippi. There were still to be many weary months of fighting, thousands of lives and much treasure were to be sacrificed, but July, 1863, marked the crisis of the rebellion and indicated the triumph of the Federal armies. On that day, under Meade in the East and Grant in the West, the existence of the Republic was assured.

The narrative has been advanced a year in date. This sketch of the development of Lincoln and of the progress of Lincoln's work can at best but be incomplete, but it must include a reference to one of the great deeds, perhaps to be called *the* great deed of his Administration.

In 1862, nearly forty years had passed since Lincoln, looking at the slave auction in New Orleans, had registered a vow to do what he might be able to do during the years of his life to stamp out the barbarism of slavery. He proposed "to strike hard" against what he felt to be an assured and wicked injustice. And now, he who in 1827 had been an uncouth boy, without power or influence, was at the head of the Government of the Republic. The time

had come when the man Lincoln could carry out the resolution which a third of a century earlier had been framed by the boy.

In September, 1862, Lincoln read to his Cabinet a draft of the Emancipation Proclamation. This document was not submitted for the approval of the members of the Cabinet. Lincoln was ready to accept suggestions as to the wording and as to the date of issue, but the Proclamation expressed his own assured determination. On the first of January, 1863, this great decision, affecting the lives not only of the millions of colored people, but of all the citizens of the United States, who had the responsibility for national policy and for national conduct, became the law of the land. It was necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the Emancipation Proclamation, to secure the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth of the Constitutional amendments, but the deed was Lincoln's and the credit in the history of the country and of the world must belong to him.

It is not practicable in this address to give record of Lincoln's various puzzles and perplexities in the selection of the generals who succeeded one another as commanders of the Armies of the Republic.

You men of the younger generation may find it difficult to understand why the capable leaders who brought the war finally to a triumphant close should not have been at once discovered. You should realize

the difficulty of knowing, in advance of the testing, who were the capable leaders. Lincoln admitted freely his own mistakes in judgment, but he put into this matter of selection most earnest and conscientious thought and labor. The military historians admit that leadership is made, or may gradually develop, under the pressure of the events of war, of success, and of failure. Lincoln's counsel, at least in the later campaigns, showed a clearness of insight that was none the less weighty because it was sometimes expressed in a humorous language. To McClellan, before the decision had been reached to have that overconfident and ineffective commander retired, he writes (in Oct., 1862):

“If General McClellan has no immediate use for the Army, the President would like to borrow it for a time.”

To Hooker, after information had come to Washington in June, 1863, of the movement of a large portion of Lee's army from the Rappahannock to the Shenandoah Valley: “The Bull (Lee's army) is across the fence, and it ought to be possible to worry him a little.” On June 14th, with further pressure for action, he writes: “The animal (Lee's army) is extended over a line of forty miles. That line must be slim somewhere.” Poor old Hooker, however,

with the vitality and confidence crushed out of him by the disaster of Chancellorsville, had at that time neither the insight nor the energy to take advantage of his position. He was quite ready to surrender to Meade the anxious responsibility of the command of the Army of the Potomac.

Lincoln's service as the country's Executive gives, in not a few instances, evidence of an exceptional patience and forgetfulness of self. The relations of the President, who was, it must be borne in mind, the Commander-in-chief of the Army, with the conceited and, as far as the management of armies was concerned, incapable, McClellan, constituted one of these examples of patience and self-forgetfulness. The letter written by McClellan to the President at the close of the campaign on the Peninsula is one of the most insolent and absurd communications ever sent to his Chief by a General from the field, and in this case it is to be borne in mind the General was writing at the close of a disastrous retreat in which he had thrown away great resources and great opportunities.

It would be only ordinary human nature for the Commander-in-Chief, on the receipt of such a letter, to have dismissed his subordinate for incompetence and for insolence. Thinking, however, only of the cause, never of himself, Lincoln felt it to be wiser to give the conceited engineer one further trial for the

management of the armies. McClellan had his opportunity when, three days before the battle of Antietam, he had in his pocket the captured dispatches of Lee, showing that Lee's army was divided and indicating Lee's plans for getting it together, of crushing that army and of bringing the war to a close. Again, his dilatoriness and incompetence in the management of troops on the field resulted in a drawn battle. His refusal to advance after Antietam finally brought Lincoln's patience to an end. McClellan was ordered to report at Trenton, New Jersey, and he had no further part in the conduct of the war.

Lincoln was once more to have the sadness, one may say the mortification, of placing the direction of the army in the hands of a leader who was incompetent for the task. The crushing defeat of Hooker at Chancellorsville brought a serious burden upon the President. His friends reported that this misfortune added years to Lincoln's age. After Chancellorsville, however, Lincoln is able to place the army of the Potomac in the hands of a leader who, while not brilliant, is conscientious, capable and not overpowered by his own self-esteem, General Meade, and a few months later the President arrived at the all-important conclusion that all the armies should be under a unity of command.

Grant was called from the West to carry out the difficult task of overcoming Lee in Virginia, but from

the day of Grant's appointment all the armies of the North moved together upon a concerted plan.

Lincoln's troubles were not restricted to the difficulty of securing competent leaders for the army. He had to deal also continually with impossible suggestions from citizens, some of them like Greeley, citizens of importance. There is an amusing account of an interview between Lincoln and a group of ministers. The history does not tell us what was the policy that the ministers were advocating. It may have been, on the basis of pacifism, the necessity of bringing the war to an end; or possibly it had to do with immediate emancipation. The spokesman of the ministers tells the President that they were there "at the command of the Lord." "I have," he said, "a message from the Lord to the President." Lincoln replies, in substance: "I have need of all the counsel that the Lord will give to me and the Republic wants the help of the Lord, and I pray from day to day for counsel and for guidance. I can but think, however," said Lincoln, "that if the Lord has a message or a word of counsel to give me in regard to the discharge of my responsibilities, he will give it direct and not by way of Chicago."

In 1863, writing in response to renewed demands from certain leaders in England that the "futile fratricidal strife be brought to a close," Lincoln says:

"The war was begun with a purpose and, please

God, it shall be continued until that purpose has been accomplished.”

Lincoln was assuredly a man of peace. He contended that peace was the essential aim of the struggle of 1861-’65. He held, however, and this was his reply to the pacifists of his day, that peace was to be secured not by clamoring that war was harmful, but by removing the factors that made for war.

The chief factor in 1861 that brought about war was the purpose of slavery to dominate this Republic. It was the aim of the Southern leaders to make slavery, which had heretofore been a sectional and, so to speak, a domestic, matter, a national institution.

It is absurd to speak of the war as having been fought for the maintenance of state rights. The doctrine of the right of the states to individual action was, of course, invoked, but the issue would not have arisen if it had not been for this absolute cleavage between the opinions of the two sections as to the relation that slavery was to bear to the national territory and to the nation as a whole.

After the appointment, in 1864, of Grant as Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln takes no further active part in connection with the plans of campaign or of the direction of the army. He had done the best with the material available that was practicable for the leadership of these armies, and he was ready to leave

with the leaders the final responsibility for the work to be done.

A further example of the patience and self-forgetfulness of Lincoln is given through his treatment of Chase.

At the time of the Presidential Convention of 1864, a body of the Republican party (it was not easy to estimate how considerable or important) was in favor of replacing Lincoln with Chase. Chase had in fact been planning for many months to bring about his own nomination. Lincoln had full knowledge of Chase's efforts, but that did not stand in the way of his retaining Chase in the Cabinet as long as he believed that the services of the Secretary of the Treasury, services that had been original, forcible, and effective, could still be made of value for the country. Even when, with the active candidacy of Chase, it was impossible for him to keep his seat in the Cabinet of the President that he was trying to replace, Lincoln would not permit any sense of personal grievance to stand in the way of his recognition of the important part that Chase had played in the struggle, or of the fact that Chase could still be of service to the country. We can hardly think of any other political leader being ready, with correspondence in his hands showing personal disloyalty to his chief, to appoint the writer of these letters Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Chase failed to



secure the nomination from the extreme anti-slavery group. An attempt was made on the part of some of the malcontents to revive the reputation of Fremont as a political leader, but the nomination, at the Cleveland Convention, of Fremont and Dayton had no real influence in the campaign. The Republicans decided on Lincoln, and the issue lay between Lincoln and the discontented Democrats who were of opinion that General McClellan, having failed as a commander, might be a success as a President. The re-election of Lincoln by a very substantial majority gave fresh heart to the soldiers and to all the citizens who had loyal faith in the Republic.

I am pleased to remember that I had the opportunity, although I was at the time only twenty, of casting a vote for Lincoln in that election. In November, 1864, I was in Libby prison. The senior officers (we accepted always in prison the authority of the seniors) had decided to hold an election on the first Tuesday in November. There was, of course, no chance that the votes could be brought into record in time to affect the result, but the officers wanted the satisfaction of expressing their opinions. Some of us had doubt as to whether the men who had been kept in prison through the delay in bringing about the exchange, and who had legitimate ground for criticism and for grievance, could be trusted to give their votes in support of the Administration.

The election resulted, however, in the choice of Lincoln over McClellan by a vote of three to one. Years after the war, Robert Lincoln told me that when his Father got word, months after the election, of the vote in Libby prison, he was very much gratified. "If," said Lincoln, "the men in prison, who have been very badly treated by the Government, still have faith that I am the fitting leader for the work to be done, we are going to bring this war to a successful close."

Lincoln's career and character have been subjected in one respect to a more severe test than has been given to any other statesman or political leader. It is the usual routine in the production of biographies, or in the printing after a leader's death of his own writings, to have the task of the shaping of the biography, or of the selection of the writings, placed in the hands of some representative of the family, or sympathetic executor, who will take the pains to eliminate any utterance on the part of the subject of the biography, or the record of any event in his career, which might not count to the honor of his memory. Few men who have had years of active life can have escaped doing certain things, or making certain utterances, which did not express the best purposes of their own ideals. The long series of biographies of Lincoln have, however, been brought into print without any question, or criticism, from

Lincoln's representative, and the three comprehensive sets of his writings have been put together by editors who pushed their researches in every direction in order that no scrap of writing for which Lincoln was responsible should be overlooked.

Robert Lincoln declined to interest himself in supervising the selection of the material that was brought into print in these three sets. Practically, therefore, everything that Lincoln wrote has been made available for the readers of later generations; and the character of the writer stands the test.

I had myself the responsibility of editing one of these three sets and am able to say, after going over the material page by page, that there is no communication in regard to which the writer needed to give the caution "burn this letter." This is a fine evidence of the purity of Lincoln's nature and the straightforwardness of his actions.

On the second of April, Grant's persistent hammering finally brings about the breaking of Lee's lines and the evacuation of Richmond. On the fourth, against the counsel and in spite of the apprehension of nearly all his officers, Lincoln insisted upon coming down the River from Washington and making his way into the Rebel capital. There was no thought of vaingloriousness or of posing as the victor. The President came under the impression that some civil authorities would probably have remained in Rich-

mond with whom immediate measures might be taken to stop unnecessary fighting and to secure for the City and for the State a return of peaceful government. This hope was not realized. The members of the Confederate Government had been interested only in getting away from Richmond and they had given no thought to the duty they owed to their own people to co-operate with the victors in securing a prompt return of law and order.

On the ninth of April, came the surrender of Lee at Appomattox, four years, less three days, from the date of the firing of the first gun at Charleston. Before the surrender the men had scattered from the retreating columns right and left, in many cases carrying their muskets to their own homes as a memorial fairly earned by plucky and persistent service. There never was an army that did better fighting, or that was better deserving of the recognition, not only of the States in behalf of whose so-called "independence" the War had been waged, but on the part of opponents who were able to realize the character and the effectiveness of the fighting.

On the 14th of April, comes the dramatic tragedy ending on the day following in the death of Lincoln. The word "dramatic" applies in this instance with peculiar fitness. While the nation mourned for the loss of its leader, while the soldiers were stricken with grief that their great captain should have been taken

away, while the South might well be troubled that the control and adjustment of the great interstate perplexities were not to be in the hands of the wise, sympathetic, and patient ruler, for the worker himself the rest, after the four years of continuous toil and fearful burdens and anxieties, might well have been grateful. The great task had been accomplished and the responsibilities accepted in the first inaugural had been fulfilled.

The feeling with which Lincoln was regarded by the men in the front, for whom through the early years of their campaigning he had been not only the leader but the inspiration, was indicated by the manner in which the news of his death was received. I happened myself on the day of those sad tidings to be with my division in the village of Durham just outside of Goldsborough, North Carolina. We had no telegraphic communication with the North, but were accustomed to receive despatches about noon each day, carried across the swamps from a station through which connection was made with Wilmington and the North. In the course of the morning, I had gone to the shanty of an old darky whom I had come to know during the days of our sojourn, for the purpose of getting a shave. The old fellow took up his razor, put it down again and then again lifted it up, but his arm was shaking and I saw he was so agitated that he was not fitted for the task.

“Massa,” he said, “I can’t shave yer this mornin’.” “What is the matter?” I inquired. “Well,” he replied, “somethin’s happened to Massa Linkum.” “Why!” said I, “nothing has happened to Lincoln. I know what there is to be known. What are you talking about?” “Well!” the old man replied with a half sob, “we colored folks—we get news or we get half news sooner than you-uns. I don’t know jes’ what it is, but somethin’ has gone wrong with Massa Linkum.” I could get nothing more out of the old man, but I was sufficiently anxious to make my way to Division headquarters to see if there was any news in advance of the arrival of the regular courier. The colored folks were standing in little groups along the village street, murmuring to each other or waiting with anxious faces for the bad news that they were sure was coming. I found the Brigade Adjutant and those with him were puzzled like myself at the troubled minds of the darkies, but still skeptical as to the possibility of any information having reached them which was not known through the regular channels.

At noon, the courier made his appearance riding by the wood lane across the fields; and the instant he was seen we all realized that there was bad news. The man was hurrying his pony and yet seemed to be very unwilling to reach the lines where his report must be made. In this instance (as was, of course,

not usually the case) the courier knew what was in his despatches. The Division Adjutant stepped out on the porch of the headquarters with the paper in his hand, but he broke down before he could begin to read. The Commander took the word and was able simply to announce: "Lincoln is dead." The word "President" was not necessary and he sought in fact for the shortest word. I never before had found myself in a mass of men overcome by emotion. Thousands of soldiers were sobbing together. No survivor of the group can recall the sadness of that morning without again being touched by the wave of emotion which broke down the reserve and control of these war-worn veterans on learning that their great captain was dead.

The whole people had come to have with the President a relation similar to that which had grown up between the soldiers and their Commander-in-Chief. With the sympathy and love of the people to sustain him, Lincoln had over them an almost unlimited influence. His capacity for toil, his sublime patience, his wonderful endurance, his great mind and heart, his out-reaching sympathies, his thoughtfulness for the needs and requirements of all, had bound him to his fellow citizens by an attachment of genuine sentiment. His appellation throughout the country had during the last year of the war become "Father Abraham."

## 74    Some Memories of the Civil War

For the great mass of mankind, death means oblivion. When their activities have closed, there is a little ripple of emotion in the home circle and then the world knows no more of their personalities or achievement. We call that man *great*, the remembrance of whose life and service is extended throughout the world and whose memory gathers increasing fame from generation to generation.

It is thus that men are today honoring the memory of Abraham Lincoln. Today, more than one hundred years after his birth and more than half a century since the dramatic close of his life's work, Lincoln stands enshrined in the thought and in the hearts of his countrymen. He is *our* "Father Abraham," belonging to us, his fellow citizens, for ideals, for inspiration, and for affectionate regard; but he belongs now also to all mankind, for he has been canonized among the noblest of the world's heroes.



## JEFFERSON DAVIS, IN THE LIGHT OF HISTORY

*Published in "The Outlook," March, 1922*

HISTORY is defined as the record of events in which man has taken part. Students of history realize, however, the difficulty of securing from narratives written from varying points of view, and influenced of necessity by the personal prejudices of the writers, records of events that can be relied upon as accurate and faithful, or estimates that can be accepted as trustworthy of the men of any given epoch.

The historian whose chronicle is produced within the period described, or in the time immediately succeeding, is naturally influenced by the prejudices and antagonisms of his generation; and if the period be one of conflict, it is certain that the record of events will carry errors and the characterizations of the actors will be more or less inaccurate. This does not mean that the contemporary historian is dishonest, but simply that, working in an atmosphere heated by the passions of the pending conflict, or

still influenced by the remembrance of recent conflict, he cannot see straight and his conclusions can be taken only with allowances.

It is only in the later years, and often very much later, that the documents of evidence are available so that both sides of the controversy can be considered. The contemporary writer must, of course, be studied but his conclusions are not to be accepted as finally authoritative history.

The historian writing a generation or more after the events, has available for examination the documents presenting the two sides of the issues of the time, and he has the further advantage of being free from, or at least separated from, the passions and antagonisms of the conflict. He is often at some disadvantage, however, in being unable fairly to realize the grounds for these antagonisms of the combatants. It is a rare historian who is able to enter into the feelings and purposes of the men of any earlier period.

The later historian, aiming at an ideal of impartiality, fails also from time to time to present a clear-cut opinion as to the right and the wrong of controversies and conflicts. Sometimes, instead of making a conscientious examination of the records and the arguments, he yields to the temptation of laziness and sums up the matter with some such expression as "there was a good deal of wrong on

## Jefferson Davis, in the Light of History 77

both sides," that there was "really little to choose between the issues that had been fought out," and that it was "hardly worth while to attempt a conclusion as to the relative wisdom and patriotism of the leaders of the two parties."

There is a curious tendency, due perhaps also to a vague desire for impartiality but frequently indicating merely a muddled sentimentality, to forget, or to be oblivious of, wrongful policies that have caused misery to the world or criminal actions which have blackened the careers of certain leaders, and even to attempt to cover up with a coat of white-wash the misdeeds of these leaders. People are today, in reading the belated romance of the exile of Doorn, ready to pass into oblivion the spoliations and the murders in Belgium and France, and to put to one side the awful fact that this man, with a half-crazy obsession about his "divine right," must bear the chief responsibility for the deaths of ten millions of his fellow beings.

This tendency to sentimental white-washing comes to my mind in connection with a biography, or rather a eulogy, of Jefferson Davis that has recently been brought into print.<sup>1</sup> The author, Captain Morris Schaff, had an honorable career in the Civil War, doing his part in the fight for the saving of the Republic. He has also had experience as a writer of

<sup>1</sup> *Jefferson Davis—His Life and Personality*, by Morris Schaff.

historical studies and is the possessor of a style which is fluent and graceful, although occasionally somewhat florid, as if influenced by an admiration for the literary productions of writers of the Southern States.

It is my contention that the conclusions presented by Captain Schaff do not make a correct or trustworthy presentation of the great issues that were fought out in those strenuous years 1861-65, and I believe that his volume is calculated to mislead the readers of the generations that have grown up since the Civil War. It is my further contention that the characterization given of the Confederate Leader is not to be accepted as trustworthy.

Captain Schaff minimizes the wrongfulness of the attempt to break up the Republic; and in my judgment he overestimates the ability of Davis as a statesman or leader and credits his hero with great qualities and with a fineness of nature for which the career of Davis does not give warrant. I cannot accept Captain Schaff's view that Davis is to be included in the series of world's heroes.

Captain Schaff writes as if he had found himself in accord with the fiercely reiterated charge of Southern leaders that the North was bent upon the immediate destruction of slavery, without regard for the Constitutional rights of the slave owners. He forgets that the platform of the Republican

## Jefferson Davis, in the Light of History 79

party, so magnificently interpreted by Lincoln in his debates with Douglas and in his Cooper Union speech, contended simply for the restriction of slavery to the territory in which under the decisions of 1787, of 1820, and 1850, it had been authorized to continue.

Lincoln maintained that the citizens of all the states of the Republic were bound by the obligations accepted in 1787 by the Founders, and that they were also bound to carry out the provisions of the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and of the Clay Compromise of 1850. The one thing insisted upon by Lincoln and the other leaders of the new party, was that slavery was not to be permitted to become a national institution. It must be kept restricted within the territory that had been assigned to it under the Constitution and under the later compromises. There must be no more slave states. It was the belief of leaders like Lincoln and Seward that slavery thus restricted would die out. This had been the expectation and also the hope of the Southern leaders of the earlier and wiser generation, — Washington, Jefferson, and Marshall. But the Southerners of the Civil War period, led by men like Davis, of Mississippi, Rhett, of South Carolina, Toombs, of Georgia, and their associates, were determined to secure recognition for slavery as a national institution, and failing that, they were

resolved to break up the Republic. It was Toombs who proposed to fight the war through until he could "call the roll of his slaves on Bunker Hill." Captain Schaff writes, if not with acceptance of, at least with sympathy for, the Southern contention that the Union was not a nation, but a confederation of independent states, which had reserved to themselves full liberty of action. He certainly fails to make clear to the readers of the later generations the fact that our Constitution was not a compact between the states. The framers did their work not as delegates of states. They tell us that they were speaking for:

"We the people of the United States."

Those of us who took part in the struggle for saving the Republic were maintaining the purpose of the free people of America.

The men, who in April, 1861, drafted in Montgomery the constitution of the new Confederacy, recognized by implication the force of the statement in the document of 1787. The Montgomery constitution was framed by the representatives of certain "sovereign and independent states." Its provisions left each of these sovereign states which had come together of their own free will, at liberty to break from the Confederacy whenever there might be legislative or executive action which the people of

such sovereign state did not approve. In 1864, for instance, Governor Brown threatened, on the ground of some grievance against the administration in Richmond, to take Georgia out of the Confederacy. If the Confederate armies had been successful, it is not probable that the union of the Southern States, based on such a crumbling foundation, could long have endured.

As Captain Schaff reminds us, Jefferson Davis had the heritage and training of a gentleman. He was not a scholar but he was well read and his speeches gave evidence of intellectual power. In his year of service in the Mexican War he had won deserved distinction for courage and for executive ability. It may be remarked that the remembrance of this distinction brought trouble later when as President, Davis was commander of the armies of the Confederacy. He could not shake himself free from the belief that he was a master of strategy, and his repeated interferences with the campaigns of the generals resulted more than once in serious disaster for the cause. He had had a creditable career in public service. As a young man, he was a member of the State Legislature of Mississippi, and later he served for years in the House of Representatives and as Senator. He held in Pierce's Cabinet the post of Secretary of War.

John Bigelow, when managing during the war

years the Information Bureau in Paris, was wicked enough to recall that Davis as a member of the Mississippi Legislature had given his approval to the repudiation of the State Bonds. The record of this vote for repudiation on the part of the man who in 1861 was president of the new Confederacy, interfered not a little with the credit in Europe of the Confederate Bonds.

In 1858, some troops from the regular army were sent to back up the raiders from Pike County, Missouri, in the attempt to force upon the State of Kansas the fraudulent Lecompton constitution. In some utterance of the time Davis, then in the Senate, is quoted as saying: "The authority of the national government must be maintained. There shall be no civil war in this Republic." It seems probable that in 1858, when these brave words were spoken, the scheme for the organization of the Confederacy was already in train and was known to Davis and his associates.

Davis certainly possessed many of the qualities for leadership. He was courageous, persistent, clear-cut in his convictions, and confident in the soundness of his judgment and his policies. On the other hand he was vain, self-sufficient, jealous, and controversial to the point of being quarrelsome. His preferences and appointments showed also that he was not a good judge of men. He had fierce differ-



ences with a number of the most valuable of the Confederate leaders, civil and military. The group might easily have included Lee, but it was impossible for anyone to quarrel with Lee. Grant tells us that the interference of Davis with the Confederate armies at Chattanooga, an interference that included the selection of Bragg as Commander and the diversion to Knoxville of Longstreet, ensured Grant's success in the campaign. Sherman records his relief and satisfaction when Davis removed his troublesome antagonist, Joe Johnston, whom Sherman ranks second only to Lee, to make place for Davis's favorite, Hood, a plucky fighter and an incompetent commander. Sherman tells us that he "knew his Hood."

Davis had the opportunity in his volumes of Autobiography to make a dignified and forcible apologia for the Confederacy. He preferred to devote the book in the main to an apologia for Davis; and many pages of the two large volumes are given to wearisome details of his quarrels and controversies with the generals and other leaders. In connection with this book, I had some personal relations with Davis. I was called upon to serve as arbiter for the purpose of passing upon certain serious charges that the author had brought against his publishers. After going into the matter with some care, Davis's representative admitted frankly that there was no

foundation whatever for the complaints that Davis had made, and promised that no more such complaints should be brought into print. "My friend and client," he remarked, "does not always see straight." Davis had raised no question with his publishers until some two years after the publication of his memoirs, apparently assuming that the few thousand copies sold represented all the demand that could be secured. When, however, the memoirs of Grant secured within the first year a sale of two hundred and fifty thousand copies, Davis was convinced that his publishers must have treated him unfairly.

The soldiers and the people of the North had good ground for indignation against the Confederate authorities for the disgraceful treatment of the prisoners. The officials controlling these prisons had been appointed by Davis, and the conditions obtaining in Andersonville, Belle Isle, Libby, Danville, Salisbury, and elsewhere, were repeatedly brought to the personal attention of the president. There rests upon Davis the chief responsibility for the barbarous mismanagement of these prisons, a mismanagement that brought death or permanent crippling upon thousands of brave Yankee boys. I was myself a prisoner in Libby during the last winter of the war. The railroad transportation was inadequate to bring food to Lee's troops and to

the city, and the prisoners were naturally left hungry. It was the obstinacy of Davis that kept prisoners in Richmond that winter when further south there was sufficient corn-meal.

At the very time when the group of prisoners in which I was included were being deprived of their overcoats, blankets, and shoes, a friend of mine, Captain Sturgis, then on the invalid-list and acting quarter-master at Camp Morton, Indiana, was issuing blankets, overcoats, and shoes to the Confederate prisoners in his charge. We also were compelled to give up, after being stripped to the skin for the search, what moneys we had. The prison adjutant promised that when we were exchanged this money should be returned. Five months later, on my way to the flag-of-truce boat, I made formal application to Commissioner Ould (an appointee of Davis) on behalf of myself and on behalf also of General Hayes, of Boston, and of the other comrades who had survived the winter, for the return of the moneys belonging to us. Ould hemmed and hawed, and then said that "the accounts were somewhat confused but that the matter should receive attention later." We never got any money back and I have failed to hear of a single person, officer or private, whose money was returned to him. During the winter, the fathers of the prisoners brought pressure to bear to establish communication so that they

could reach with money or with supplies their starving and freezing boys. Davis refused to lift a hand to arrange for any communication, and nothing in the way even of messages was allowed to come through. At Camp Morton, on the other hand, the moneys taken from the prisoners were placed to their credit in the prison bank. Moneys sent for the prisoners by friends, North or South, were also deposited to be utilized as needed.

Some of the men who were captured with me were taken to Andersonville, and two of them survived to get back. Their accounts were fully in line with the evidence presented in the report issued in 1864 by a Congressional Committee. This report carried photographs of men whose feet had rotted away in the putrid soil of that camp of horrors. In 1864, a committee from the stockade appealed to Captain Wirz for permission to move the stockade to a dry and clean slope nearby. The ground within the enclosure had become thoroughly infected. Wirz refused the request, saying, in substance, that the Yankees might as well rot there as elsewhere. I was told that an old physician in Andersonville, after an inspection of the stockade, was so mortified at the conditions, which would he felt bring disgrace to Georgia and to the Confederacy, that he secured signatures from a group of leading citizens to a petition addressed to Davis, calling for the re-

moval of Wirz and for decent treatment of the prisoners. The petition was handed to Davis in person by a trusted correspondent in Richmond and was pigeon-holed. Davis took no action.

After Appomattox, Lincoln was asked what should be done with Davis when he was captured. "I do not see," said Lincoln, "that we have any use for a white elephant." It was Lincoln's intention that Davis should get away in safety and the unofficial word was passed through the lines of troops on the coast that Davis's party was not to be interfered with. He was, it may be recalled, captured by a squad of cavalry which had come through from the West and the commander of which had no knowledge of the unofficial instruction.

It was the very general belief at the time that if Davis had got away he would probably have been made the scapegoat of the Confederacy. His fellow Southerners would have forgotten his arduous toil and his persistent courage, and would have emphasized his self-sufficiency, his petty jealousies, and his serious blunders. It was the good fortune of Davis to be for nearly two years the only prisoner from the ranks of the Confederacy. The treatment accorded at Fortress Monroe to the late leader was stupid in the extreme. It was not only indecent, but it was bad politics and it constituted a disgrace for the Administration of President Johnson. For the ex-President,

however, this imprisonment proved a blessing. There was placed upon him as the sole prisoner from the Confederacy, the halo of martyrdom. Davis came to be regarded by his fellows of the South as the representative of the lost cause and the regard and honor extended to him on this ground by his fellow citizens of the South, doubtless brought consolation and satisfaction for the closing years of his life.

To Davis had come the privilege of serving as commander in chief of some of the finest soldiers that the world had known and his armies had done magnificent fighting for the purpose of breaking up the Republic and in order to preserve the institution of slavery. It is the judgment of historians that this fight was a blunder and that the tremendous sacrifices which it involved for the whole country, but particularly for the South, were worse than wasted. Slavery was an anachronism that could not be, and that ought not to have been, preserved. It was an absurdity to attempt in the nineteenth century to make slavery the corner stone of a new nation. The destruction of the Republic would, as later history has made clear, have been a disaster for mankind. The leadership in this cause of Jefferson Davis, while courageous and persistent, was marred by personal vanity and self-sufficiency and was, as said, characterized by serious blunders.

## Jefferson Davis, in the Light of History 89

A place must be given to Davis in the history of our country, but neither on the ground of achievement nor of character can he take rank among the world's heroes.

## THE MEN BEHIND THE GUNS

THE SERVICE RENDERED BY CERTAIN CITIZENS IN  
THE WORK OF SAVING THE REPUBLIC. 1861-'65

*Expanded from an Address first delivered before the  
Loyal Legion in 1908*

It is a very natural impression on the part not only of the veterans themselves, but of the casual readers of the history of the Civil War, that the Republic was saved by the military leaders and by the devotion and sacrifices of the men who did the fighting in the field.

It is, of course, true that if it had not been for the service rendered by the generals and by the rank and file, the forces that had been organized in the states of the South would have accomplished their purpose of destroying the Republic and of establishing with the corner stone of slavery, the southern confederacy.

It must always be remembered, however, that if it had not been for loyal service of great citizens, who, with no less patriotic devotion, were doing work far behind the fighting lines, the Union could



not have been maintained. These citizens, no less than the men who were on the fighting line, were the men behind the guns.

The first and the greatest of the men who stood behind all the guns, the great captain who, by persistence, by never-failing patience and by greatness of soul, maintained through four long years of conflict the spirit of the soldiers who were fighting at the front and of the citizens who were working in the rear, was, of course, Abraham Lincoln, whose leadership brought the armies and the nation to their final victory. By the side of the President, stood the Cabinet, the great figures in which were Seward, Stanton, Chase, Blair, and Welles. Secretary Seward was a statesman, a scholar, and a patriot. No one could question Seward's devotion to the cause of the Union, and through the years of his life as a political leader, he had given evidence of insight and of a comprehensive grasp of the cause of the difficulties that were threatening the maintenance of the Union. He was self-confident to the point of vanity, and it was difficult for him to understand why he who had been through a generation a leader, and as he thought *the* leader in the fight for the restriction of slavery, should not at this final stage of the conflict have been placed in the presidential chair. This surprise and disappointment seems, during the first six months at least

of his service as Secretary of State, to have confused Seward's judgment. In a letter written by him to the President thirty days after the Cabinet had been organized, he took the ground that there was no leadership in the administration, and that the state was without a guiding policy. He said further that he was ready to take the responsibility for the direction of the policy of the nation. Lincoln quietly made clear to Seward that the task had been placed upon him as President, and that he was prepared to fulfil its responsibilities. Seward's letter was put away, and if it had not been for the death of Lincoln would probably never have come into record. This utterance was followed up by some suggestions which at this date strike the student of history as curiously absurd to come from the pen of a man calling himself a statesman. Seward took the ground with the President, and in his letters to Minister Adams in London, that the best prospect for the maintenance of the Republic would be to bring about a state of war with England, or France, or both. Seward had convinced himself that as soon as the nation should find itself engaged in war, the Southern States would return to their allegiance and would be ready to fight for the stars and stripes. It took all the patience of Lincoln and the discretion of Adams to prevent these counsels of Seward from coming into public knowledge and from bringing

about the breach with England and with France for which he was hoping. We now know that the South would have hailed with satisfaction the European war to which Seward was looking forward so hopefully, and that the French Emperor, working with the war party in England, would have eagerly accepted the opportunity of intervention to secure Southern independence and to secure at the same time the foothold in Mexico for which France was striving. After he had worked off these first vagaries, however, Seward settled down to steady work, and during the last three years of the war he showed himself a wise, courageous, and effective minister.

Secretary Stanton had upon his shoulders the task of organizing out of a mass of patriotic but unskilled citizens, armies that would work and that would fight. No one could question Stanton's patriotism or courage, or the effectiveness of his will power. He never permitted himself to be discouraged and his capacity for work was enormous. He was, however, as the President and his associates promptly realized, by no means an easy man to do work with. His demeanor was arrogant and his temper was fierce, and he seemed to lack the power of discrimination between those who were striving to undermine the government and loyal citizens who were bringing suggestions of support or co-operation.

It was the case that during the years of the war, a long series of good soldiers and of loyal citizens came away from the Secretary's office with the feeling that they had been unduly suspected and often needlessly insulted. It is possible that the work of the department could have been carried on more effectively by the clever assistant secretary, Mr. Charles A. Dana, who gave evidence of a much better judgment of men and a larger capacity for the management, with the minimum of friction, of the complex responsibilities of the war department.

Secretary Chase was brought into the cabinet as the representative of the fiercest of the anti-slavery groups. His task of finding resources for the maintenance of the armies in the field and for the support of the national credit at home and abroad was one of the greatest that had ever been placed upon the shoulders of a finance minister, and the task was accepted by a man who had had no previous experience whatsoever either in office or in financial operations, or in business undertakings. It is easy to point out now the serious blunders that were made in the direction of the financial policy of the treasury; they were blunders the responsibility for which must in large part be accepted by the Cabinet as a whole and by Congress, but with the knowledge available at the time and with immediate pressure of providing moneys to offset an expenditure which

before the war was over amounted to more than two million dollars a day, it may be said that the task was brilliantly accomplished. Chase had, like Seward, been seriously bitten by the presidential bee and, unlike Seward, his disappointment and annoyance that he did not secure from the people the recognition of his qualifications for the highest post in the country, continued through the whole years of the war. His vanity, which brought him into continued antagonism with his associates, made him one of the most uncomfortable members of the Cabinet. His attempts to undermine with the leaders of the party and with the country at large, Lincoln's reputation in order to further his own presidential chances, came to be known to Lincoln, but could not interfere with the President's purpose of retaining for the country the value of Chase's services. At the very time when Lincoln had in his hands letters from Chase that could only be described as disloyal to his chief, Lincoln was ready to say, "I will make that man Chief Justice."

Secretary Blair was in the Cabinet as the representative of the Border States Unionists, the men who believed in the maintenance of the Republic, but who opposed, and some of whom very fiercely opposed, any interference with the institution of slavery. It was, of course, all-important for the success of the Union that the support of the loyal

citizens in the Border States, the states which saw Civil War in its fiercest and most personal form, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, and West Virginia, should be secured and assured. It is probable that if the Republican party had in 1860 selected as its candidate a Northern statesman, a leader like Seward or Chase, who stood chiefly for the anti-slavery sentiment of the North, it would not have proved possible to secure for the support of the Union the service of the Border States loyalists. This service was, however, not only important but essential. During the first year of the war, some sixty thousand men from these Border States took up arms in defense of the Union. These men knew how to fight, they had the keenest interest in the success of the fighting, and they were on the spot where the first fighting had to be done. They were rallied to the support of the Union mainly through their faith in the sympathy and the personality of the President who was himself a Border State man by birth and by training.

The business of the administration would, of course, have worked more smoothly and with less addition to the personal cares and burdens of the President if he had selected for his Cabinet a group of men who could have worked together harmoniously, men whose character and whose purpose were, so to speak, homogeneous. Lincoln took the ground,

however, that the chief purpose was to maintain the Union, and in his belief this could be done only if the President could rally to its support representatives of all the groups who, whatever their differences on slavery or on other of the great questions of the day, were prepared to work for the safety of the Republic. It was on this ground that he accepted for himself the increased friction and continuing burden upon his own vitality that was inevitable in bringing together into one Cabinet men whose characters and purposes were so divergent and whose personalities were so aggressive.

Secretary Welles has come down to history as a man who did his work quietly and well and said little. His diary shows him as a man who knew how to observe and how to criticize. Welles was, like his associates, conceited, but his conceit does not seem to have been aggressive. He points out cleverly enough the weaknesses and the pettinesses of his associates, but it was very seldom that he permitted himself to come into conflict with them. In the months that succeeded the death of Lincoln, favorable opinion of his own judgment and his scorn of the judgment and doubts of the patriotism of the men who disagreed with him seem to have increased disproportionately. His description of the events with which he had to do under the administration of Johnson gives one the impression of scolding rather

than of criticism, but his war service was loyal and effective. The man from Hartford showed that he knew how, in the face of serious difficulties, to create a navy and to keep it in effective action.

Behind the President and the Cabinet, stood the groups of great citizens, the war governors, the merchants, the fighting editors, the preachers, and the poets.

Among the governors, we should bear in honorable memory men like Andrew, of Massachusetts, the state which was the best organized of the time and which had the credit of sending into the field a magnificent series of well equipped troops. Brough, of Ohio, and Morton, of Indiana, also did magnificent citizens' work in keeping their states in line and in making effective the resources at their command. It may be remembered that in Indiana, as well as in Ohio, the governors had to withstand a great element of organized disloyalty, such as the New England Governors could have known nothing about.

Among the editors, we may recall Greeley, of the New York *Tribune*, energetic and inspiring, but more than once cranky and troublesome to a degree. Lincoln spoke of Greeley's support as equal to that of an army corps and made time more than once for personal correspondence with the New York editor in regard to some matter in which Greeley



was sharply criticizing the action of the administration; Raymond, of the New York *Times*, possessing no such capital of popular support as belonged to Greeley, but contributing through his paper wise judgment and good counsel to the enlightenment of public opinion; Bryant, of the New York *Evening Post*, whose fame as a poet sometimes causes the later generation to forget the importance of his work as a good citizen and a great editor; and Bowles, of the Springfield *Republican*, a man who made the paper of a small town count for influencing opinion throughout the nation.

Among the merchants should be borne in mind men like Jackson S. Schultz, William E. Dodge, Francis G. Shaw, A. T. Stewart, and many others in New York, and John Milton Forbes, of Boston.

When in April, 1861, the news came to the North of the beginning of the war through the firing on Ft. Sumter, there was no certainty either in Washington or in New York itself as to the stand that the great City would take. In 1861, New York, while not such a composite bundle of nationalities as it became fifty years later, was made up of very varying groups, and it was difficult to say that the City possessed a community. The group of merchants included many of Southern birth, and many more whose business interests were largely, and in some cases exclusively, bound up with their Southern

connections. The anti-slavery sentiment had never influenced any large body of opinion in New York. Lincoln was anxiously awaiting an expression of opinion from the commercial centre of the country. Unless New York could be depended upon to give full support in resources and in influence to the cause of the Union, the Republic could hardly be maintained. The Mayor of the City at that time was Fernando Wood, a man whose cleverness was more assured than his character. Wood was a typical representative of the Tammany Hall of the day, and the loyal citizens were of opinion that his purposes were bound up rather with the interests of Wood than with those of the City. Wood brought into print in April, 1861, a monograph entitled "Tri-Insula," in which he put forward a scheme for the organization of a state made up of the three islands, Manhattan, Long, and Staten. He took the ground that there was no prospect of saving the Union, and that the sooner New York City should shape plans for its own future, the better the chance for its own success. He recommended that New York should organize itself on the basis of one of the old Hansa towns, Hamburg or Bremen, as a free port, and he contended that whatever political organization might be arrived at for the rest of the country, it would be impossible for the hinterland to avoid utilizing New York for the exporting of the products of the country.

A Committee of One Hundred was instituted, of which Jackson S. Schultz, a leading leather merchant, was the Chairman, and of which I am glad to bear in mind my father was a member, to wait upon the Mayor, and to make clear to him what the City expected. "Mr. Mayor," said Schultz, "the loyal citizens of New York propose to hold tomorrow evening in Union Square a meeting which will commit New York to the support of the Union. It is proper that the Mayor should preside over that meeting, and the Mayor will make an address and will pledge New York City to do its duty in providing resources and men to maintain the Republic, and if the Mayor is not ready to do this thing—"and then Schultz stopped. The inference was that he could not remain Mayor very long. "Mr. Schultz," said the Mayor, "I am prepared to admit that you gentlemen are fairly representative of the great interests of this City. I may admit further that the City has the right to its own opinion in regard to the duty of the City at this time, and that it is proper for your Mayor to express the conclusions that the citizens have reached. I will come to the meeting and I will, as you request, pledge the City to the support of the Union."

One of the newspaper reports of the day refers to a small newsboy who had managed to dodge the policemen and to perch himself in the crotch of a

tree that grew through the platform. Schultz had called the meeting to order, and had told the citizens that the Mayor would now address them and would pledge the support of New York to the work of the administration. As Wood stepped to the front, the newsboy is reported to have called down, "Now Nandy, mind what you say, you have got to hold to it this time."

I have referred among the representative merchants to John M. Forbes. Forbes declined to accept any office, but during the four years of the war he gave his time, his influence, and resources most freely to the national cause. In 1862, when a fresh attempt was to be made to secure some subscriptions in Great Britain for the new seven-thirty loan, Forbes was asked to take over to London some millions of dollars worth of the bonds and to use his personal influence in securing sale for these. It was an exceptional task to place upon a private citizen, but the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury (who was acting under the suggestion of the special Commissioner David A. Wells), was quite sound. Forbes took one or more trunks filled with the bonds and used not only his personal influence but his personal credit to place these bonds in the London market. He actually pledged the resources of his firm as a guaranty for the payment of interest and principal. The purchases in England of the

war securities were never important as compared with those secured in Amsterdam and in other continental centres, but an important portion of those sales was due to this action of Forbes.

I may recall in this connection the patriotic service rendered by a man who was not a great merchant, but a subordinate official, Mr. L. E. Chittenden, who held the post of Register of the Treasury. During this same critical year, 1862, Mr. Adams sent word from London of a requirement for the immediate delivery of bonds to the amount of ten millions of dollars. These bonds were to be used as securities for a loan of five million dollars which had been proffered to Adams in order to facilitate an arrangement for the purchase of the two rams that Laird was at that time building for the Confederacy; or as a guaranty against the damages to which Laird might be shown to be entitled if the government interfered to prevent the delivery of the rams to the Confederate Commissioner, Captain Bullock. If the bonds were to serve their purpose, it was necessary that they should be shipped from New York by the first steamer, which sailed in three days' time. Enough bonds were in readiness for the purpose, but it was, unfortunately, the case that but a small portion of them were in larger denomination than One Thousand Dollars, and no one of the other series had, as required by

law, been completed with the signature of the register. It was necessary to write this signature ten thousand times within the space of seventy hours. The task was performed by Chittenden. After the first few hours, it was necessary to support the strength of his arm with appliances of one kind or another, and when the work was completed, his arm was so far disabled that it was years before he recovered its use.

Abram S. Hewitt, who, during the first years of the war, did loyal service in many ways, may be particularly recalled in connection with his noteworthy co-operation with Grant's campaign for the reduction of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. Grant knew that the field guns that he had available would have little effect on the earthworks of the forts, and he made application for thirty mortars. The Ordnance Department reported to the President that they could supply the mortars, but they had available but one mortar bed. A mortar bed is a framework of solidity and elasticity, which is needed to absorb the recoil of the mortar and to prevent the shock from shattering the resting-place beneath, whether this be a fortification or the deck of a vessel. The Ordnance Department reported that to construct thirty mortar beds, three or four months' time would be required, but Grant's expedition could not wait until the close of the winter.

Hewitt, under urgent telegraphic requirement from Lincoln, agreed to deliver thirty mortar beds in thirty days, and actually made delivery in twenty-eight days. The mortar beds were placed each on a platform car constructed for the purpose, under the direction of Thomas Scott, who, fortunately for the armies, had accepted the control of our military transportation. Each car had upon it a sign in black letters on a white ground "*U. S. Grant, Cairo. Not to be switched under penalty of death.*" That train got through, and as other things had also been delayed, the mortars were not too late for Grant's requirement. As Grant had apprehended, the field guns had not been able to make any breaches in the entrenchments of Donelson, and the infantry assaults had failed to carry the works. It looked as if the attempt on Ft. Donelson must be a failure. When, however, the six mortar schooners coming up the river were brought up to the point below the Fort, and the first shells from the mortars had landed within the entrenchments, General Buckner, a trained soldier, reported to his superior, Floyd, that the Fort was untenable. General Floyd turned over to Buckner the disagreeable responsibility of completing the surrender. "My relations," said Floyd, "with the Northern authorities are a little peculiar, and it will be best for me to get away quietly." Floyd had, during his

service as Secretary of War under Buchanan, taken pains to transfer supplies from the Northern arsenals to those in the South, while Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasury, was emptying the Treasury. Floyd was also under charges for misappropriation of funds.

The account of the making of these mortar beds was given to me by Hewitt himself. I was sitting on the piazza at his home at Ringwood, N. J., and noticed in front of the house, commanding the green slope down to the little lake, a mortar properly placed on the mortar bed, and coiled in front of the mortar a section of an enormous iron chain. I naturally made inquiry in regard to the articles with which I knew some history must certainly be connected. "The chain," replied Hewitt, "is something in which you may properly have a family interest." "What," I inquired, "you don't mean to say that these links are part of the chain that my kinsman General Israel put across the River at West Point in 1776?" "Yes," said Hewitt, "this is a portion of the historic chain. General Putnam had the chain forged in the foundry here at Ringwood. During the Revolution, this foundry was in constant service, but in later years the ore in the adjacent region had been found unprofitable for working. I happened to notice a year or two back the entry of this chain in a catalogue of certain



material that was to be sold at auction at West Point. I went up to the Academy, bought in the chain, and then, in an interview with the Superintendent, expressed my opinion that this article of historic interest ought not to have been disposed of. The Superintendent agreed that the sale was an error. I then told him that I had bought the chain and that I was willing, after taking a few links as a memento, to give the rest to the Academy with my compliments and with the single condition that it should be preserved. The Superintendent wrote me an appreciative letter, and the chain is now in the historic museum of the Military Academy." "Then," I said, "how about the mortar and the mortar bed?" "The mortar bed," said Hewitt, "was made in my own works on the Hudson, and both mortar and mortar bed were given to me by Lincoln. At the time Lincoln's order reached me by wire on Saturday evening, I had never seen a mortar bed and had no knowledge of the construction of the same. I waked up the ordnance officer, at the headquarters of the Ordnance Department in Green Street, and he, after reading Lincoln's telegram, sent an instruction to the Superintendent of the Arsenal at Springfield, Mass., to send to me in New York, by special train and New London boat, the pattern mortar bed that he had in stock. The New London boat was instructed, under military authority, to

await the arrival of the special train. Early Sunday morning, my foreman and myself received the mortar bed at the New York pier and, after studying it over through the morning, I sent word, by wire, at noon to the President that I could make thirty mortar beds in thirty days. I received word from the President, by wire, to go ahead. After the mortar beds had been delivered, I received from the President a letter of warm appreciation. He wrote that I had conferred an exceptional service upon the army and the country. He wanted me not to fail to see him when I should come to Washington. A year later, being in Washington, I went over to the White House to pay my respects to the President. The aide in charge of the reception room recognized me and said at once, "I ought not to detain you, Mr. Hewitt; the room is, as you see, full and the President is under the necessity of leaving very shortly for a Cabinet meeting." "Well," I said, "I will not wait, but I will leave my card in order to show that I have called as I had promised to." The card went in. While I was putting on my overcoat, the door opened and Mr. Lincoln came forward holding out both hands. "Where is Mr. Hewitt? I want to see the man who does things." I was pulled into the inner office and, irrespective of the people who were waiting and of the appointment with the Cabinet, Mr. Lincoln went on with his personal greeting.

I said I must not take his time and got up to go. He then questioned me about the business that had brought me to Washington. "I might possibly," he suggested, "be able to be of service." "Mr. Lincoln," I replied, "you can be of service in this matter. My business in Washington, or part of my business, is to collect the money due me for those mortar beds." (Mr. Hewitt explained to me that he had not thought it in order to make any profit out of the nation on an emergency requirement. He had charged for the mortar beds the cost of the material and the amount paid to the workmen. For his own service and for the service of his department heads he had made no charge. The bill was what in business is called *flat*.)

"What," said Mr. Lincoln, "the nation is in your debt for money as well as for service! This is disgraceful."

There was a violent ringing of the bell and the aide who reported was told to bring Mr. Stanton to the President. Stanton's office was, fortunately, close by.

"Mr. Stanton," said Lincoln, "this is Mr. Hewitt, of New York. I want to straighten out a matter in regard to which I have a sense of mortification. Mr. Hewitt rendered a year ago a great service to the cause, and we are not only under obligations for that service, but we actually owe him money."

“Mr. President,” said Mr. Stanton, “I recall that a bill was rendered to the Ordnance Department from Mr. Hewitt’s concern in New York, but the Department found difficulty in approving the bill because the order for the mortar beds had been given rather irregularly. Mr. Hewitt had in fact received no order excepting the word, by wire, from the President.” “Do you suppose, Mr. Stanton,” said Lincoln, “that if I should write on that bill ‘*Pay this bill now,*’ the treasury would make settlement.” “There is no knowing, Mr. President,” said Stanton, “what, under the present administrative methods, the treasury would not do.” The bill was sent for and Mr. Lincoln wrote at the bottom, “Pay this bill now. A. Lincoln.” The *now* being underscored. “Now, Mr. Stanton,” said Lincoln, “I want you to do me a service. I am going to trouble you to go to the Treasury Department with Mr. Hewitt and to secure for this bill the signatures that are necessary to enable Mr. Hewitt to take back with him to New York a draft for the amount. I think the Administration is under obligations to see to it that there is no further delay.” “Stanton shrugged his shoulders, but this time he accepted the decision of the President, and walked with me,” said Hewitt, “rather sulkily, to the Treasury Department. The bureau heads made the accustomed objection that the bill had not been approved by

the Ordnance Department, but when attention was called to the instruction of the President, each clerk passed the paper for settlement. At the last desk," said Hewitt, "I secured the draft for the amount, \$30,000, and the payment was for me at that time of some importance. I would, however," he added, "have given a thousand dollars of the remittance if I could have taken back with me to New York the bill with Lincoln's inscription and signature.

"Towards the close of the war," continued Hewitt, "after the requirement for the use of mortars had passed, I wrote to the President asking if I could purchase back one of the mortar beds that I had made and with that the mortar which had been made available through the construction of the mortar bed. Mr. Lincoln instructed the War Department to send to me, with the compliments of the Government, a mortar with its mortar bed. I have no idea," added Hewitt, "how the Ordnance Department, with such irregular procedure, ever arrived at a final adjustment of this account."

This iron merchant Hewitt, the "man who does things," had a hand in another noteworthy service of the time. Early in 1862, the Swedish scientist Ericsson presented to Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, the drawings for his boat the *Monitor*. The purpose was, as Ericsson explained, to secure a vessel which should carry a heavy piece of armament,

but which should itself be of such inconsiderable compass as to make a bad mark for any antagonist. Welles had no personal knowledge of Ericsson, and it was undoubtedly the case that he was receiving from month to month numerous suggestions and schemes, most of which came from half-baked inventors and had no value. It could not have been easy, under the pressure of routine business, and of a number of more or less scientific propositions, to separate the wheat from the chaff. He told Ericsson that he was busy managing the navy of the United States and that he had no time even to consider speculative schemes of naval construction. The inventor came back to New York not only disappointed for himself, but anxious as to the safety of the American Navy. He had heard that the Confederates had some new naval construction in train that was likely to make mischief. Rumors had come to Washington and to New York that an armored vessel was being constructed by the Confederates in the Norfolk Navy Yard. Ericsson reported his disappointment to his friend, Mr. John A. Griswold, of Albany, and Griswold talked the matter over with Hewitt and with Mr. Bushnell, previously of Hartford. The three men found themselves impressed with the simplicity and probable effectiveness of the Ericsson scheme for the mounting in a revolving tower on a raft of a gun that could

do effective work. The three iron merchants provided the \$300,000 that were required to construct the *Monitor*. As further talk came from the South in regard to the naval undertakings of the Confederates, work was hastened on the building of the Ericsson boat, and the *Monitor* was completed in ninety days. The work had been so hurried that it was not possible to do it thoroughly. When she started on what was supposed to be merely a trial trip from New York to Hampton Roads, she leaked so seriously that the crew was kept at work through the night on the trip along the Jersey Coast bailing and pumping to keep the craft from sinking. They were, therefore, a fairly tired lot of men when on the morning of March 9th they arrived at Hampton Roads. But the decisive battle, as a result of which the *Merrimac* was driven back to Norfolk and Washington was preserved from the Confederate bombardment, had to be fought during the hours of this same day.

The service rendered by the three iron merchants had indeed been important. If the *Monitor* had proved a failure, their \$300,000 would have been a gift from them to the cause. I understood, however, that Secretary Welles did give the approval, which was certainly in every way called for, to the re-funding of the outlay incurred, when the *Monitor* was finally accepted for the United States Navy.

Ericsson and his public-spirited co-workers had not merely saved Washington, but they had also, as soon came to be realized, brought about a revolution in naval construction.

With the merchants stood the preachers, Beecher, Bellows, Cheever, Storrs, and many others. The happy thought came to a group of New York citizens that the eloquence of Beecher might be made of service in emphasizing with friends and with opponents in England the purpose and the justice of the fight for the Republic. In 1863, Beecher went to England on what might be called a missionary undertaking. He began his campaign in what was really an "enemies' country," in the town of Liverpool. The merchants, particularly the shipbuilding interests of the town, were fully committed to the cause of the South, and Beecher found himself confronted in St. George's Hall with a howling mob. He held his ground, got in a sentence or two edgewise, and finally secured a hearing. The Liverpool mob found itself impressed with the sterling pluck of the Yankee preacher. The speech not only counted at the time, but as printed later, constituted a clear and forcible presentation of the cause for which the North was fighting. Similar speeches, delivered in the main to more friendly audiences, had a large effect in correcting the misstatements and lies that had been scattered through England by the London



*Times* and by the coterie which was trying to make a market for the Confederate cotton bonds. Dr. Bellows did noteworthy work in his pulpit in New York and on lecture stands throughout the country, but will perhaps be best remembered as far as war times are concerned with his magnificent service in helping to create and to direct the Sanitary Association and Sanitary Fair. No citizens' organization of such magnitude had ever before been contemplated, and the men in the front were ready to appreciate at its full value the practical service rendered on hundreds of battlefields by the representatives of the commission and the evidence thus given that the men behind the guns were thinking and working for the army. Co-workers with Dr. Bellows in the Sanitary Commission were great citizens like Frederick Law Olmsted and Louisa Lee Schuyler.

The influence of the patriotic poets like Whittier and Lowell should not be forgotten; men whose verses helped in periods of discouragement to inspire both citizen and soldier, and to maintain a hopeful faith in the assurance of saving the nation.

The largest tribute for citizens' service must, however, be accorded to the ministers abroad. Their work was carried on in different, and, as far as England and France at least were concerned, in hostile, communities. They were working alone, and, particularly during the first two years, under

special discouragement. These ministers had on their hands during the long years a fight the effective management of which was vital for the safety of the Republic. It was their task to maintain the national credit, to defend the good name of the Republic against aspersions and libels of all kinds, to correct the false statements of the rebel emissaries and of their sympathizers in Europe as to the progress of the war; to prevent the ports of Europe from being made a base of supplies for ships, men, and munitions brought together for the destruction of the Republic, and to make clear both to our friends and to our opponents during the many discouragements of those four years that our resources were ample for our task; that if our people remained determined we were bound to win out, and that our people were determined. Whatever doubts might come to a representative in European capitals, it was his duty to keep a stout heart and a confident mien, and this duty was magnificently performed by ministers like Charles Francis Adams, in London, and John Bigelow, in Paris. We had abroad at this time in addition to Adams and Bigelow, in Italy George P. Marsh, scholar and gentleman; in Berlin, first Governor Wright, and then Mr. Judd, and in St. Petersburg, Mr. Cameron, Ex-Secretary of War, and later Bayard Taylor.

The influence of Marsh was exerted to good pur-

pose, but relations with Italy were at the time not important. Governor Wright was a public spirited citizen who had given evidence in Indiana of capacity for local political leadership. He had no language but English, and that of the Indiana variety, and he was, therefore, shut out from any knowledge of the public opinion about him. The word given in the press, the conversation in the salon, and the talk of the street brought to him no information. The Legation was run by a clever Virginian named Hudson. Hudson was an accomplished man and had a good working knowledge of German and of French. He gave such word to the Minister as seemed to him convenient of the opinions of Berlin and of Germany, and he did what was in his power to shape such opinions in favor of the cause of the Confederacy. He took the ground quite frankly that the United States had broken up and that he was expecting shortly to return to Berlin as the Ambassador of the Confederacy. While he was still in office as Secretary, he wrote and printed a clever pamphlet which had been planned for the purpose of furthering the sale of the Confederate cotton bonds, and this pamphlet was distributed the instant that he was relieved from office. It was Hudson's contention that each dollar's worth of Confederate indebtedness was based upon the security of a dollar's worth of cotton, a security that was continually appreciating

in value. This cotton, said Hudson, was either in Liverpool to be sold for the account of the Confederate government, or on the ocean, or on the wharves of New Orleans, Galveston, Charleston and Savannah in readiness for shipment. The suggestion that the intercourse of the Southern States with Europe could be interfered with by a blockade was dismissed with scorn. "The absurdity," said Hudson, "of thinking to blockade successfully three thousand miles of coast line!" Hudson failed to state that very little of the cotton referred to was in the ownership of the Confederate government, and that no measures had been taken, or could easily be taken, under which the government could appropriate this cotton. He emphasized the fact, which was true enough, that the cotton was from week to week appreciating in price, but he failed to point out that the chief reason for this appreciation was the increasing efficiency of the blockade that made it more and more difficult to get the bales of cotton from the wharf at Charleston to the cotton exchange at Liverpool.

He also failed to mention that while the first issue of Confederate bonds had definitely been based upon a certain supply of cotton said to be the property of the Confederacy, the later issues were made without any relation to such cotton security. It was Hudson's conclusion that the

repayment of the Confederate bonds, interest and principal, was absolutely safe, irrespective of the outcome of the war. He then went on to point out the lack of foundation for the corresponding securities that were then being offered in Europe by the National Government of the United States. These bonds, said Hudson, are promises to pay on the part of the United States so-called, a nation which, when it existed, was made up of thirty-six states; that nation, however, no longer exists; seven of the thirty-six states have broken away and others will doubtless follow. A promise to pay, constituting an obligation of this old-time nation, is not binding and would not be considered as binding by a fragment of such nation. Why should we believe that New York and Massachusetts, or any other of the Northern States, would consider themselves bound by an indebtedness incurred on behalf of the old confederation of thirty-six states? The prospect, therefore, of securing the repayment of this indebtedness depends entirely upon the success of the North in conquering the South, and this we know has been declared by all authorities, political as well as military, to be an utter impossibility. These Northern securities constitute, therefore, an investment that is to be described not only as speculative, but as hopeless.

This pamphlet of Hudson was utilized effec-

tively by the financial representatives of the Confederates in Europe, the Jewish bankers, the Erlangers, of Frankfort, to further the sales of the Confederate bonds. Wright and Hudson were succeeded in 1861, after an interval of some months, by Judd, of Illinois, and his Secretary, Christman. Judd was a clever political leader, who had had the honor, on behalf of the state of Illinois, of placing Lincoln in nomination at the Chicago Convention. He possessed good qualities for political leadership at home, but very few qualifications for the work of a Minister abroad. Like his predecessor, he was quite free from any knowledge of foreign languages, and his Embassy also was run by the Secretary. Christman, a naturalized German, was, of course, well at home in the Berlin community. He had himself been among the Forty-Eighters, and if his post had been more than that of Secretary, he may easily not have been *persona grata* to the Prussian Government. He was, however, a clear-headed and patriotic man, and the work of the Legation was safe in his hands.

I was at the time myself a student in Berlin, and, in common with other youngsters, had found myself very indignant at the utterances of Hudson often quoted to me by German friends and still more indignant and concerned at the purpose and possible influence of his pamphlet. We Americans

had had quoted to us more than once from German friends the statement by Hudson that there was no hope for the maintenance of the Republic, and our rejoinders were, not unnaturally, not given great weight as against the Secretary of the American Legation. The influence of Hudson's word and of his pamphlet constituted a powerful factor in the shaping of the opinion of North Germany during the early months of the war. The Germans were not at that time inimical to the Republic, but they were frank disbelievers in its maintenance. Gradually, through correspondence from German-Americans in the States and largely through the publications emanating from Bigelow's Press Bureau in Paris, to which I will refer later, opinion in Germany was corrected and reshaped, but during the first year of the war, the price of the Confederate bonds ranged higher than that of the United States 7.30's. Realizing the mischief that was being caused, and that was still to be caused, by Hudson's utterances, I hurried into shape a translation of the pamphlet and sent pamphlet and translation to my father. He was quick to recognize the disadvantage of having such statements distributed throughout the Continent without a prompt reply. He placed the material in the hands of David A. Wells, who was at that time special commissioner of the Treasury, and who had made his first business experience as

a partner with my father. Wells put into shape with all possible speed an answer to the misstatements of Hudson in a monograph which was printed in the course of a week or two under the title of *Our Burden and Our Strength*. In this pamphlet was made clear the absurdity of Hudson's contention as to the obligation back of the promises to pay of the United States. Wells also explained what resources were available back of all of our national obligations.

My father was impressed with the importance of securing for the information of Europe and also for the strengthening of public opinion in the home communities publications of the character of Wells's monograph. He had in mind a work similar to that instituted by Thomas Paine in 1776 for the encouragement at home and abroad of the friends of the American cause. For this purpose, he instituted the Loyal Publication Society, the first funds for which were subscribed by William E. Dodge, Jackson S. Schultz, Francis George Shaw, John A. Griswold, Moses Grinnell, and other merchants of that group. In the course of the war, some ninety publications were brought into print by the Loyal Publication Society, the first in the series being Wells's *Our Burden and Our Strength*. All of these pamphlets which were likely to prove of interest to transatlantic readers were printed



not only in English, but in the three or four of the more important of the Continental languages, and their distribution through our Consuls and our banking representatives proved of large service not only in furthering the sale of the bonds and strengthening the credit of the nation, but in correcting public opinion as to the purpose of our contest.

It had been the expectation of Charles Francis Adams that he would come into relations in London with a circle of friends, or at least of men who had fair understanding of the nature of our contest and who would be prepared to be sympathetic with the cause of the North and with the Americans who were fighting to maintain the existence of the Republic. He was, therefore, both surprised and disappointed to find himself in London and in an atmosphere that was, to say the least, antagonistic. The statesmen who were at that time in charge of her Majesty's Government, Palmerston, Russell, Gladstone and others, had convinced themselves that the Republic had already been destroyed, and they had also reached the conclusion that its destruction would (in some manner not quite clear to students of history) be for the advantage of Great Britain. The opponents of the North included, in addition to the chief men of the Cabinet, leaders in society in London and in the country houses, a large number

of the great merchants of London, and particularly in Liverpool, and even the scholars of Oxford and Cambridge. The larger number of the papers whose influence counted, and all of those which were known outside of England, were giving vigorous and from time to time unscrupulous support to the cause of the South. *The Times* was the only British paper that was read on the Continent, and it was through *The Times* that the citizens of France, Germany, and Italy secured their information,—it would be fairer to say their misinformation,—in regard to the nature of the war and the progress that was being made by the South in establishing its independence. The caricatures of *Punch*, which for four years were colored with bitter satire on the Pharisaism of the North and the weakness of the attempt, under the leadership of the Baboon and Western ruffian Lincoln, to excite servile war in the South and to bring about domination by the colored population of the South, found their way to some extent into the pages of papers in Germany and in France. The *Morning Post* and the *Telegraph*, while not known on the Continent, had great influence throughout Great Britain. They secured their American news chiefly through the American correspondents of *The Times*, but their editorials were nearly as fiercely anti-Northern as those that were dictated under the policy of John Delane.

Delane of *The Times* was active in the group of Englishmen who were backing up the Confederate cotton loan. He was giving cordial co-operation to the undertaking of the Lairds in building a fleet for the Confederacy and the editorials and the financial columns of *The Times* were used to back up the credit of the Confederate treasury.

In 1862, *The Times* describes the troops of the North as made up of "German and Irish mercenaries, wretched immigrants, drugged with whiskey so as to enable them to be driven to the firing line."

The Confederate cotton loan, steered through the columns of *The Times*, secured subscriptions not only from the merchants who were friendly to the South and from the great ship-building interests whose ship-building for the South was dependent upon the success of the loan, but from not a few of the country gentlemen and political leaders who desired through their subscriptions to show their sympathy for the Southern States. Among these latter one regrets to note the name of Mr. Gladstone who was a subscriber for two thousand guineas.

Outside of the Cabinet, the political leaders who were most active in their sneers and assaults upon the North were Roebuck and Beresford-Hope. Carlyle gave the weight of his influence and the force of his pen to pointing out the impossibility of the success of the North and its undesirability if it were pos-

sible. In Oxford, Goldwin Smith, Jowett of Balliol—at that time a youngster—and Charles Reade, then sojourning at Magdalen College, were almost alone among the Dons in their sympathy with the North; while in Cambridge the only scholar whose name has come into record as willing to speak out at the time in behalf of the North was Leslie Stephen, of Trinity Hall. In the Cabinet, the Duke of Argyle and Sir George Lewis did something to withstand the pressure of Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone for intervention in behalf of the South. Outside of the Cabinet, Lord Stanley, later the Earl of Derby, Monckton-Mills, later Lord Houghton, A. E. Foster, and Richard Hargreaves, correspondent and friend of John Bigelow, did what they could to withstand the trend of public opinion towards the South. The opinion of the Queen, influenced and guided by that of Prince Albert, was effective not only during the life-time of the Prince (he died in December, 1861) but throughout the remaining years of the war. The Englishman whose clear-headed service and eloquent speech were, however, by far the most valuable, was John Bright, who associated with himself in the fight for the cause of the North his old-time co-worker Richard Cobden. It was Bright who made clear to the cotton operatives of Manchester and Oldham, whose work had been stopped and whose families had been

brought to the verge of starvation by the cutting off of the supply of cotton, the real nature of the contest on the other side of the Atlantic. It was largely through his public-spirited efforts to save these operatives from starvation that throughout the long years of privation they could not be induced by the Southern sympathizers to make any protest or any application to the Government for intervention that should bring the war to a close.

I may mention here, although somewhat in advance of the chronology of my narrative, the gift made in 1863 by public-spirited merchants of Boston and of New York to help these patient and starving operatives.

John Bright had learned that a plan was in train for subscriptions in the States for the needs of Manchester, and he suggested that the subscription might conveniently take the shape of a direct contribution of food. A committee, which included in Boston John M. Forbes, and in New York A. T. Stewart, Moses and Henry Grinnell, Jackson S. Schultz, Abram S. Hewitt, George P. Putnam, and others, fitted out with corn, pork, and beef three vessels which in the course of November and December, 1863, made their way to Liverpool. Their cargoes were turned over to a committee that had been instituted by Bright, and there came to the American merchants grateful acknowledgments from

the representatives of the workers in the cotton districts.

The most valuable of the journals which supported the cause of the North were the *Daily News* in London, *The Chronicle* in Newcastle, and the *Guardian* in Manchester, and with these should be mentioned the *Spectator*. Hutton, the editor of the *Spectator*, told his friends some years later that the support given by his paper to the anti-slavery cause had caused the sacrifice of a very large proportion of his subscribers, and had actually brought about, at least during the year 1864, a deficiency in the annual returns in place of the usual substantial profit.

Adams possessed the temperament that fitted him to understand and to negotiate with Englishmen. He was a man of magnificent nerve, courage, and imperturbability, with a clear head and with a full measure of confidence in his cause and in himself. He had need, before the four years were over, for all his self-control and for all his fighting capacity. The record of his ministry comes to us in the narrative by his son Henry Adams who in 1861 was a boy of seventeen and who served as private secretary for his father. Henry tells us that his father found it desirable practically to give up all attempts at social intercourse in London. Excepting for a few of the official functions which it was necessary for

him to attend, he kept himself secluded in his own home. The atmosphere of society was for the representative of the American republic too discourteous and too repellent. The Confederate envoys on the other hand, the first two commissioners, Judge Mann, of Georgia, and Yancey, of Mississippi, were the pets of society, and were able to utilize their pleasant social relations for shaping an opinion in regard to the progress of events on the other side of the Atlantic that was very far from being based upon the facts.

In November, 1861, there came a serious test for the capacity and the fairness of Adams. Jefferson Davis had decided to send to replace his first commissioners envoys of a more formal character. He selected for the purpose as special envoy to London, Judge Mason, of Virginia, and for Paris, John Slidell, of New Orleans.

These Commissioners, slipping through the blockade at Wilmington, made their way to Jamaica and sailed for Southampton on the mail steamer *Trent*. Captain Charles Wilkes, commanding the United States Cruiser *San Jacinto*, had learned from the American Consul in Jamaica that the Commissioners were on the *Trent*, and he took upon himself the responsibility of stopping the steamer when she was one hundred miles or more out of the harbor, and of taking off the Commissioners, on the ground

that they were contraband of war. The *Trent*, with a very angry Captain and a group of indignant passengers, made her way to Southampton. The British government, and a goodly proportion of the British people, were not unnaturally highly agitated by this "impudent action on the part of the Yankees." Their indignation was none the less because there was a long series of British precedents very much in line with this action of Wilkes. The first report in fact that was given to the Cabinet by the law officers of the Crown was to the effect that Great Britain was not in a position to criticize this action as in contravention of the principles of international law as maintained by her own precedents. Whatever the technical rights in the matter, it is easy to understand that the action of Captain Wilkes was, under the conditions, unwarranted, absurd, unprofitable, and likely to produce results very serious for the Republic. These two Southern gentlemen on their way to Europe were not dangerous to the United States, while intervention on the part of the British fleet would in 1861, or later, easily have turned the whole course of the struggle and would almost certainly have brought about the independence of the South. The capture of the Commissioners was, however, it is curious to remember, received with enthusiasm not only by Irish editors like Bennett of *The Herald*, but by a large



portion of the Northern press. Resolutions of cordial approval were passed in Congress and Wilkes was voted a special sword in recognition of his patriotic deed. Even a quiet city like Boston lost its head in its welcome to Wilkes, and at the banquet given to him there thoughtful citizens, apparently forgetting all that there was at stake and forgetting also our old time American contentions, joined in praising the manly act of the rash captain. The members of the Cabinet, with fuller knowledge of conditions and of all that would be risked in a war with Great Britain, were not carried away by this ebullition of public feeling, although they had ground for anxiety in finding that the policy that they had decided was necessary, namely, the surrender of the Commissioners to Great Britain, was likely to weaken their popularity with large bodies of citizens. The so-called "outrage" was very welcome indeed to men like Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone, who were looking for a more or less legitimate text or pretext for intervention.

I happened to secure years later in a personal word some light on the relations between Palmerston and the Confederate Commissioner in London, relations that continued later with his successor. In one of my annual trips across the Atlantic, I found myself sitting next to a gentleman of my generation who spoke of himself as a Judge from Georgia.

We naturally fell into conversation in regard to the causes and the outcome of the war, and the Judge mentioned that he had himself carried a musket as a Sergeant of Cavalry. "My own most interesting service," he went on to say, "was, however, not in the ranks, but when acting as secretary for my father who was the first Confederate Commissioner to London." "Then," I said, "you are the son of Judge Mann, of Georgia." He was pleased that I should have remembered the name of his father and went on to tell me about their experience together during the eight months of their sojourn in London. "My father had himself the responsibility of doing what might be practicable to shape British opinion in favor of the cause of the South. He was to come into relations with the editors to give them information as to the nature of the contest and the certainty of Southern success, and to help their leader writers with suggestions as to the kind of defense that would be most effective for the cause of the South. He had also the more serious task of doing what might be practicable to strengthen the credit abroad of the Confederacy, and to further the sale of the Confederate cotton bonds, with the proceeds of which Mr. Bullock was carrying on in the ship-building yards in the Mersey and in yards in France the construction of cruisers for the Confederate navy. We found ourselves," said my informer, "in very

pleasant relations with political and other society in London. The cause of the South was popular and leading Englishmen took pains to give us evidence of their confidence and of their sympathy. Lord Palmerston, at that time, as you know, at the head of her Majesty's Government, made frequent visits to our office in Suffolk Street, Pall Mall, East. My father, being a cautious man, thought it wise to send me, a youngster, out of the room at the time of Palmerston's visits, but he gave me word from time to time as to the matters that had been under discussion in regard to Palmerston's keen interest in our success. He told me also about the correspondence between Palmerston and Louis Napoleon, who was from nearly the beginning of the war pressing upon Great Britain the policy of a joint intervention. This report of the interest of Louis Napoleon in our success was confirmed later by the letters that came to my father direct from Paris, and, as we all know, the interest of Louis Napoleon was very ably worked up later by John Slidell. One afternoon," said my friend, "my father came back to the office so hopefully excited that he hardly maintained his usual formal dignity. He was actually jumping along the sidewalk, and as he came into the office, he called out, 'We've got them. Those fools of Yankees have captured a British ship. This means that we shall have intervention on the part of England joined

with France. We shall now secure our independence without fighting for it.' That evening," continued my friend, "Palmerston came to the office and my father was still so happy in his excitement that he did not send me out of the room. The two tall men stood before the map of the States (we did not call it, Major, the United States in those days) and decided where the French and English fleets could strike to best advantage. New York was to be taken possession of by one fleet and the other was to make its way up the Potomac, and, in co-operation with the army of General Joseph E. Johnston, was to capture Washington, and it was at Washington that the terms of peace and separation were to be decided. The [plan of action was discussed until long after midnight, and my father went to bed happy and confident in the assured independence of the Confederacy. A week or two later he returned to the office with slow and dragging step, and I knew that something had gone wrong. 'Oh!' he said, 'those Yankees are not quite such fools as we thought they were. They have given up the Commissioners; Judge Mason is coming to London, and you and I are going home. We shall, of course, win out our independence, but it will be at a serious cost of life and of resources. You youngsters do not realize the kind of conflict that we have before us.'"

- This conversation was for me like the lifting of a

curtain. All the histories of the time indicate the sympathetic action on the part of Palmerston and Russell in behalf of the South and make reference to the correspondence between Palmerston and Louis Napoleon in connection with the plan for bringing about a joint intervention, but that the head of a government which was in form friendly should feel himself to be warranted in considering schemes with an official, whom he had no right to receive or to have counsel with, in regard to the dismemberment of a friendly state, seems to me something exceptional in the history of international relations.

During the first six months of the sojourn of Adams in London, the vagaries of Secretary Seward constituted a serious difficulty. Seward's earlier letters to Adams were suggesting from time to time a more strenuous, not to say fiercer, attitude towards the British Government. Seward seemed to have no realization of the difficulty that Adams had in maintaining in the face of news which, during this year, and for a year later, was largely discouraging news, a satisfactory position or an assured contention in regard to the cause of the North. We realize now that Adams was in no position to make threats of war against Great Britain, and it was threats of war that Seward was advising. After the first year, however, Seward settled down to a quieter and more judicious policy. He gave up the idea of

securing the unity of the United States by breaking off friendly relations with Europe, and during the last three years of the war he seems to have served as a wise, a watchful and an effective foreign minister.

In the spring of 1862, Adams begins his long correspondence with Russell in regard to the operations of the Laird shipbuilding concern for the construction of the Confederate navy. Captain Bullock, of Georgia (who was, as we may recall, the brother of the mother of Theodore Roosevelt), was an experienced naval officer and a shrewd and diplomatic manager. He succeeded in doing all that was possible, and much more than in the hands of a less capable man would have been possible, with the resources at his command and with an American Minister watchful of his actions, in securing the construction in English shipyards of vessels to be known later as the *Alabama*, the *Florida*, the *Rappahannock*, and the *Georgia*, vessels which did succeed in getting to sea and which at sea rendered such service to the Confederacy as could properly be credited to the destruction of a great series of peaceful merchantmen. Emboldened by his success in getting the *Alabama* into commission, Bullock and the Lairds proceeded with the construction of two rams which were expected to do work of a different character than the burning of merchantmen. These rams, more powerful than anything that the United States had at that

time afloat, would, particularly if they could act in concert with two similar rams at that time under construction in France, have been able to curl up the line of blockade from Pamlico Sound to Galveston, and in opening the ports of the South to supplies from England and France, might easily have decided the contest.

From week to week, Adams emphasizes with Russell the fact that No. 290 in Laird's Shipyard, later to be known as the *Alabama*, was being built to serve as a Confederate cruiser. This fact was, of course, perfectly well understood in London as in Liverpool, and was referred to openly in society and in the papers. Lord Russell's evasive correspondence declined to admit that the evidence was sufficient. "Her Majesty's Government," he says in substance, "could not take the responsibility, on the ground of vague charges or possibilities, of interfering with the legitimate business of British ship-builders." Some years later, this same evidence, presented before the Tribunal at Geneva, was held to be quite conclusive not only as to the actual ownership and status of No. 290, but as to the fact that it should have been conclusive with an administration that proposed to carry out its responsibilities conscientiously. Russell refuses to interfere and the *Alabama* escapes, and with the first reports of its destructive operations on the American mer-

chant service, Adams begins a similar series of correspondence in regard to the two rams. Some of the evidence in regard to the nature of the contracts for the rams which had been collected by the persistent efforts of Adams and of the American Consul at Liverpool was submitted to the Attorney General Collier, who reported to the Cabinet that under the provisions of the British foreign enlistment act, the government could properly be held responsible if it permitted the rams to escape. This report of Collier was some years later utilized by Adams and by Evarts before the Geneva Tribunal. Russell still refused, however, to be convinced. In Paris, John Slidell was writing to Davis that the two French rams were nearly in readiness and that he, John Slidell, understood from his correspondence with London that they would, on putting to sea, be joined by the two rams from the Mersey. The *Times* refers to one of Russell's statements as a "clever interpretation of the neutrality law, by means of which the Yankees had been outwitted." Adams maintains his temper, but decides that the time has come for plain speaking, and in a letter written in September, 1862, he uses the phrase, "It would be superfluous for me to point out to your Lordship that this is war."

At the time of writing this letter, Adams says that he supposed that his stay in London was drawing



to a close. He was fully expecting that it would be impossible to prevent rupture between the United States and Great Britain, and that he would surely be recalled by his government. After a further Cabinet Council, however, it was finally decided, against the judgment of Russell and Palmerston, that the rams should not be permitted to get out. This decision gives to Adams the feeling that the corner had at last been turned; that something had been gained.

During this same autumn of 1862, Adams conveys to the British government the readiness on the part of the United States to accept the provisions of the declaration of Paris, under which vessels of peace should in time of war be protected from capture on the high seas. Russell expresses the willingness of Great Britain to accept this adherence of the United States to the conference of Paris only provided that the provision of the declaration should not be made applicable to the war at that time pending.

In September comes the text of President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. This is received by the English papers and the English political leaders as "of no importance"; "futile effort." The *Times* speaks of it as a "Yankee trick that could have no possible effect."

In October, 1862, the Cabinet is again considering, under the instruction of Lord Russell, the subject of

intervention. Gladstone, understanding that the intervention policy had been practically decided upon, makes use in a speech at Newcastle of the oft-quoted sentence, in substance as follows:

“Jefferson Davis has created an army; he is creating a navy (Gladstone does not mention the co-operation of Great Britain in this second undertaking) and he has apparently succeeded also in creating a nation.”

The Cabinet meeting is held on October 23rd, and by a close vote intervention is decided against. It appears from the *Life of Palmerston* that he had been annoyed at what seemed to him to be an attempt on the part of his younger associate Gladstone to force his hand. The day after this Cabinet meeting, Adams has an interview with Russell whose manner, as Adams reports, is more friendly than usual. Russell speaks of “improving the relations” between the two states. It was many months afterwards that there came to Adams the knowledge that on the preceding day Russell had moved, and had strongly advocated, intervention in co-operation with France.

In June, 1863, Mr. Roebuck moves in the House that Her Majesty’s Government be instructed to enter into negotiations with the great powers of Europe for the purpose of securing co-operation in

the recognition of the Confederacy. A majority of the members of the House were undoubtedly in favour of the policy advocated by Roebuck, but John Bright, in a magnificent speech, succeeded in emphasizing the importance for the civilization of the world of the maintenance of the American republic, and the duty of Great Britain, and particularly of the liberals of Great Britain, haters of slavery and believers in representative government, to give their influence to the support of the cause of the North and to refuse to permit Great Britain to be made a party to the establishment of a state founded on slavery. The indignation, the conviction and the eloquence of the great representative of the English middle classes and of the English conscience were too much for the supporters of Jefferson Davis. Very much to his surprise, Roebuck's motion was voted down.

On the 4th of July, 1863, Mr. Mason, at the table of Lord Wynford, announces his certainty that General Lee is already in possession of Washington. By the middle of July, the social atmosphere and the political opinion in London undergo a change, the news has arrived of Gettysburg and of Vicksburg.

An example of patriotic service rendered in Washington is to be connected with this story of the British rams. At a time when Adams had nearly given up hope of securing any action on the part

of her Majesty's Government in preventing the rams from going to sea, he received a call from an Englishman whose name has, as far as I know, never come into record. The caller was keenly interested in the success of the North and realized what peril was involved not only for the Republic itself, but, as he held, for the welfare of Great Britain, in the possible escape of the rams. The caller told Adams that he had learned that if a deposit were made with some representative of the foreign office of the sum of five million dollars to be utilized as an offset to damages that the government might be called upon to pay if the stoppage of the rams should be declared to be unwarranted, it might very possibly secure from the foreign office the instructions that Adams had been demanding. This offer was promptly forwarded by Adams to Washington, not by cable, because there was as yet no cable, but by a comparatively slow mail. The offer was coupled with the suggestion that it would be in order to place in the hands of the lender of the five million dollars as security for its repayment United States bonds to the amount of, say, ten million. The report from Mr. Adams was placed before the Cabinet, and it was at once decided that the offer should be accepted and the bonds should be sent. The Secretary of the Treasury reported that he had in his hands bonds available for the purpose, but that they

required before they could be placed in the market the signature of the Register of the Treasury. It was also unfortunately the case that the bonds at hand included but few of the larger denomination and no less than ten thousand signatures were required to put into valid form the bonds to the amount of ten million dollars. It was understood that if advantage was to be taken of the offer, the bonds were to be sent by return. The story of the writing by L. E. Chittenden, the Register of the Treasury, within the three days available, of these ten thousand signatures, is told in another place in this volume.

The responsibilities that John Bigelow had on his hands in Paris were similar in general character to those which were being taken care of in London by Mr. Adams, but there were certain material differences. The attention of Adams was, of necessity, concentrated upon the conditions in England and the influences and actions that were to be withstood on the part of the members of the British government and of the other British friends of the Confederacy. Mr. Bigelow accepted from the outset, however, the responsibility for influencing the opinion of the continent and for distributing throughout the continental capitals the information that was needed for the purpose of withstanding the misleading, not to say lying, reports of the London *Times*, and the still

less trustworthy reports of American news that were being distributed from the offices of the financial agents of the Confederacy, the Erlangers of Frankfort. Mr. Bigelow did not hold the office of Minister. As before mentioned, the position of American Minister in Paris had been given to Mr. Dayton, a well meaning Westerner, with no training as a diplomat and with no knowledge of French or of other continental languages. As far as it is possible to judge from the record of Dayton's service in Paris, he seems to have been singularly free from ambition of any kind. It did not seem to him often important to take leadership in any way in the contest that had to be waged in defense of the republic. He was quite ready to turn over to Mr. Bigelow, the Consul General, work the responsibility for which properly rested with the Minister. Bigelow was a fluent French scholar, and had knowledge also of German and of Italian. He realized the mischief that was being done throughout Europe to the credit of the Republic, and the interference caused to the sale of the United States bonds, by the untrustworthy correspondents and leaders of the *Times*. Bigelow organized in Paris a Bureau of Translation and of Correspondence, from which were circulated throughout Europe publications making clear the nature of the contest and the resources of the North, and correcting the misstatements of the *Times*. Bigelow

made time also for the production of a volume of his own, which gave a historic sketch of the causes of the war and included a statement of the resources which the North had available in men and in money for carrying the contest to a successful conclusion. This volume was translated into French and German and had a wide circulation. Bigelow came into friendly relations with the Swiss author Gasparin and aided in the preparation of Gasparin's volume published under the title of "*Un Grand Peuple qui se Relève.*" This volume, most eloquently written, was an appeal to the higher sentiment of Europe in behalf of the cause of the North and of the fight that was being made against the institution of slavery. Similar service was rendered by Bigelow to Laboulaye in the preparation of a book written by the latter on the work of the Republic and on the service that had been rendered, and that was still to be rendered, to liberals throughout the world by the maintenance of the United States. Bigelow found himself, like Adams, very much alone in Paris, but in certain ways his position was still more unsatisfactory than that of his comrade in London. The members of the British administration with whom Adams was contending were antagonistic and sometimes insolent. Their official utterances were often untrustworthy, but they were gentlemen, and they came to feel a full measure of respect for the gentle-

man from New England who was maintaining so sturdily the cause that he represented. Bigelow was called upon on the other hand to deal with a set of gamblers. The third Napoleon had, under the direction of his half-brother Morny, the chief gambler of the lot, surrounded himself with a set of soldiers of fortune. The group included hardly a single man whose record has stood the test of history. The opposition of the liberal government to the cause of the North was based not only upon what were believed to be the political necessities of the Emperor and his pals, but upon a very direct commercial interest that had been given to the whole group. A few years earlier, a Swiss banker named Jecker had lent some money to the ruler of Mexico who had preceded Juarez. The latter, in taking his seat as President, discovered, or claimed to have discovered, that the loan was more or less fraudulent, that is to say, that no such amount of money had been paid as was represented by the Mexican obligations issued. Juarez either repudiated the loan or declared that it would not be paid until verification had been made. The Jecker claim against Mexico was purchased by a company which was organized for the purpose by Morny, and this claim constituted the pretext for the French occupation of Mexico.

We may recall that at the outset the avowed purpose of the expedition on the part of France, Eng



land, and Spain was the collection of certain moneys due to groups of citizens in each country and the protection of the business interests of these countries in Mexico. The representatives of England and Spain came to realize that they were being made use of by Morny and his gambling associates, and their expeditions were withdrawn. The Jecker claim, multiplied many times, formed the capital of a company in which Morny owned a thirty per cent interest. The only investment made by Morny was his influence, not to say his control, over the policy of the Emperor, but this was, of course, a very large factor in the possibility of profit for the company. The French army of occupation was strengthened and a year or more later the occupation was, so to speak, legalized by the appointment of Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico. Mr. Dayton and Mr. Bigelow had, under instructions from Washington, made clear to Napoleon's government that whenever the matter of our Civil War should be completed, the United States would expect to take action to compel the withdrawal from the Continent of a foreign Prince supported by a European army of occupation. Mr. Slidell, the clever representative of the Confederacy in Paris, at the beginning at his own instance, and later with the cordial approval of Jefferson Davis, expressed the readiness of the Confederacy to extend to the Emperor

all needed facilities for the French undertaking in Mexico in consideration of recognition of the Confederacy by France and intervention at the proper moment by the French fleet. Slidell came into close relations with Morny and through Morny secured an almost controlling influence over Louis Napoleon. During 1862-63, he was writing from week to week to [Davis reporting that the Emperor was practically ready to sign the order for immediate action on the part of the French fleet. Slidell complains from time to time of the vacillating character of the Emperor, but still says that there is requirement only for some distinctive Confederate success, with the news of which he feels assured he can secure the adoption of a policy of intervention. The first step in the carrying out of such policy was to give the freest possible hand to the ship-builders who, under the direction of Captain Bullock, the able naval representative of the Confederacy, were constructing vessels in various French ports. Some of these vessels were being built in the Imperial yards and fitted out with Imperial munitions. Certain ships which had been built by the Lairds, such as the *Georgia*, the *Florida*, and the *Rappahannock*, had had their outfit completed in French ports. From week to week, Bigelow was placing before Drouyn de Lhuys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, evidence that this work of construction

and of outfitting was being done for the service of the Confederacy, but Drouyn de Lhuys was still more ready than was Lord Russell to characterize such evidence as inclusive or incomplete, and was entirely unwilling to place any barriers in the way of the use of the French ports as bases of supplies for the Confederate navy.

The most important piece of naval construction of the time was the building of two powerful rams which were expected to be in readiness at about the time the rams that the Lairds had in train on the Mersey should get to sea. These vessels were more powerful than anything at that time afloat in the American navy, and the four, or for that matter two out of the four, would have had no difficulty in curling up and crushing the line of vessels that were maintaining the blockade, from Pamlico Sound to Galveston. When this had been done, the ports of the Confederacy would be thrown open to supplies from France and from England, and the resulting friction would, as was undoubtedly calculated, have brought on war, intervention, and the independence of the South.

Bigelow's best efforts had not been able to prevent the escape of the vessels above referred to, and his final work was concentrated upon the task of keeping these dangerous rams from going to sea.

In July, 1863, Bigelow wrote a letter to the Ameri-

can Consul at Marseilles and arranged to have it stolen on the way. The letter so stolen was promptly brought into print in the *Moniteur*. Bigelow tells his correspondent in Marseilles that he has heard that large amounts of Northern money had recently been invested in the construction of certain fast cruisers, and that these cruisers would shortly come out from the Gulf of Mexico carrying letters of marque from Juarez. "I can but think," says Bigelow, "that when these cruisers begin their operations, the commerce of France must suffer very severely." The suggestion was plausible enough. Juarez was ready to give letters of marque to any vessel, wherever constructed, which might increase the difficulties of the French invaders of the Mexican Republic, while he was particularly desirous of embroiling the United States with France. He believed that if this could be done the independence of Mexico could be maintained. We now know that no such cruisers had been built, and there was no record even that they had been planned. How much Bigelow knew about the truth of this gossip, it is impossible now to say, but the threat, if it may be considered a threat, produced the desired result.

Bigelow was in close personal relations at the time with Berryer, the leading advocate of France. Berryer, as a legitimist, was strongly opposed to the Empire, and as an old-time gentleman he had felt

a personal antagonism to the clique of gamblers who were carrying on the business of the Empire. He was at that time eighty years of age, but was still one of the most eloquent men in France. Bigelow had gone to Berryer more than once to secure counsel in regard to the best shaping of the protests against the use of the French ports for the service of the Confederate navy, and Bigelow had secured from Berryer valuable counsel, and he had, properly enough, offered to the great advocate the usual retainer or fee. Berryer had persistently refused to accept any money for the service. He took the ground that in helping the United States, he did what was in his power and what was his duty in the cause of decent government.

With the text of Bigelow's letter as printed in the *Moniteur*, Berryer made in the Corps Legislatif a powerful onslaught on the policy of the Empire. He pointed out the waste of the national resources in men and in money that had already been brought about through the causeless and wicked invasion of Mexico. He prophesied that the Mexican people would succeed in maintaining their independence and that the fall of Maximilian could bring to France only loss of prestige, not to say disgrace. He emphasized further that the enmity of the great American Republic, the existence of which had been so largely due to the co-operation of France, would in itself

be a serious misfortune. The commercial relations of France with the North were of enormously greater importance than any that could be looked for with the states of the Confederacy, even if the Confederacy might succeed in establishing itself as an independent nation. Further, says Berryer, the policy of the Empire is now threatening immediate disaster for the commerce of France. When these swift cruisers, carrying the Mexican flag, are let loose upon the Atlantic, the merchants of France will realize the folly and the wickedness of this gambling policy in Mexico of Morny and his associates. The invective was powerful not only on its political side, but because it aroused the conservative feeling among the people of the Empire as to the perils that were impending. The result of Bigelow's letter, emphasized by Berryer's speech, was an order from the Emperor to stop the sailing of the two rams which were at the moment practically ready for the sea. In a letter expressing keen disappointment, not to say dismay, Slidell reports the result to Davis.

Slidell's reports to Davis through the years of the war, corroborated, as they were, by other history, make clear the relation between certain of the operations of the Confederate armies and her hopes and promises of aid from France.

The European military critics, writing with natural

admiration of the brilliant operations of General Lee, who was probably the greatest military genius that had as yet been produced on the American Continent, have found ground for question, not to say for criticism, of Lee's two invasions of the North. Lee's historians had realized that the most successful work done by Lee, as might naturally be expected with a commander who had the training and the temperament of an engineer, had been in his defensive operations. They could not understand why he should risk resources of men and munitions, which called for the most careful economy of management, in making marches northward into territory that could not in any possibility be held, in place of utilizing these resources behind the lines of entrenchments so admirably constructed in Virginia, from which positions it had proved possible to inflict such serious repulses upon the Northern invaders. We now understand that these invasions were made chiefly for the purpose of impressing the imagination or the hopefulness of Louis Napoleon. They were not planned by Lee, but had been ordered by Davis. If Lee had been able in September, 1862, to hold his ground at Antietam and later to isolate and possibly to capture Washington, French intervention would, as Slidell's letters made clear, have come with certainty before the close of the year. If, on that critical third day at Gettysburg, Lee had

succeeded in breaking the lines of the army of the Potomac and in driving Meade's troops southward, there would have been given good opportunity for the isolation and probably for the capture of Washington, and it was news of that kind which Slidell was awaiting with eager hopefulness, and which would, as Davis felt assured, have brought prompt intervention from France. Even as late as July, 1864, an attempt almost of the character of a forlorn hope was thought worth repeating with a much smaller force. The raid of Early, which had and which could have had no importance considered from a purely military point of view, was, as we know, very nearly successful in the attempt to force entrance into Washington. If in the fourth year of the war Early could have held the capital, even though for but a few hours (that was all that was in any case possible), there would in all probability have been a sufficient pretext for the expected action of France. The sacrifice of Early's entire force of fifteen or eighteen thousand men would have been fully justified if it could have resulted in the advance of a French fleet into the Potomac. These risks and possibilities were realized no less by Bigelow than by Slidell, and they added, of course, seriously to the anxiety and the burden of the American representative. In his long years of lonely anxiety, in the midst of a bitterly antagonistic circle, Bigelow may easily have looked



back to the time, nearly a century earlier, when another great American, Benjamin Franklin, was serving in Paris as the representative of the Republic. Franklin, favorite of society, gaining the confidence of the Court, securing through Beaumarchais and other great Frenchmen the co-operation needed for the fitting of the ragged continental armies, Franklin, with all his anxieties, must in any case have had a less burdensome and more cheery experience than that which came to Bigelow.

In Paris, as in London, the atmosphere changes and the difficulties lessen after the news of Gettysburg and of Vicksburg. In spite of the sturdy defense that Lee was still making within his entrenchments in Virginia against the repeated assaults of Grant's army, it was evident by the spring of 1864 that if the men of the North were determined, their unexhausted resources in men and in money gave certainty of a successful issue to their contest, and representatives like Bigelow and Adams were making clear in their respective capitals and throughout Europe that the men of the North were determined.

In estimating the services rendered during these four years of contest for the life of the Republic by the men who were on the firing line and by the great citizens who had their duties in the rear, we certainly owe the fullest possible measure of grateful recognition to these two great American citizens, Charles

Francis Adams and John Bigelow. They magnificently fulfilled their responsibilities. They maintained during all the discouragement of the first two years full confidence in the justice and in the future of their cause, and they were finally able to impress their confidence upon Europe. It was upon their patience and persistent courage, their cheery sturdiness of faith and of action, their wisdom in utilizing to the utmost the means available for extending and for strengthening the prestige of the Republic, that the final success of our struggle very largely depended. It is for us, half a century after the close of the struggle, to hold in full honor and in grateful memory the service rendered to the nation, and we may say to the world, by these great citizens, themselves to be classed among the leaders in the struggle for the maintenance of the Republic, Charles Francis Adams and John Bigelow.

## THE LONDON *TIMES* AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

“*Putnam’s Magazine*,” November, 1908

THE recent publication of Dasent’s *Life of John Delane* will recall to Americans of the older generation the part played by Delane and the *London Times* during the strenuous years of the Civil War, 1861–65.

During these years (and for not a few years both earlier and later), the *Times* and *Punch* were accepted as the most typical and the most influential of the exponents of public opinion in England. I do not say in the British Islands, because Ireland possessed then, as now, a public opinion of its own, which, being fiercely antagonistic to things English, was quite ready, irrespective of any considerations of reasonableness, of the weight of the arguments, or of wise policy, to denounce whatever England supported, and to approve whatever England opposed. It would also be inaccurate to use the term Great Britain, for the liberalism of Scotland maintained then, as now, views on affairs international, as well as on many matters of domestic policy, which were, as a rule, not in accord with the opinions and decision of the groups that

controlled the policies of the British administration of the time—views decidedly opposed to the preferences and prejudices of the clubs and social circles of London.

But it was precisely the opinions and prejudices of London clubs and of London society that found expression in the cartoons of *Punch* and in the editorials and correspondence of the *Times*. During these years, in which Palmerston was the controlling influence in the Cabinet, and also the popular idol of the voters in England, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the administration of the time was the administration of the *Times*—that is, of John Delane. We know now that a great part, probably the greater part, of the people of England, and certainly a substantial majority of the people of Scotland, were in sympathy with the cause of the North, and were heartily opposed to the use of the influence and power of Great Britain to help to establish a nation founded on slavery. But it was undoubtedly the case that the statesmen who, in 1861, controlled her Majesty's Government, were ready to welcome the breaking-up of the troublesome republic of the West, and were looking forward with cheerful expectation to the opportunity of adjusting, and if needs be of enforcing, the terms of the separation.

It is equally true that the opinions and the prejudices of the club circles and of society in London and

of the great country houses, and even of a great part of the scholars of the universities, were expressed generally, and often bitterly, in opposition to the North and in admiration of "the grand fight for freedom" that was being made by the Southern States.

Among the more important of the opponents of the North may be mentioned Palmerston, Russell, Gladstone, Lowe, and John Delane. Disraeli seems to have expressed but little interest in the contest, and may be described as neutral. The chief friends of the Northern cause were Prince Albert, the Duke of Argyle, John Bright, Richard Cobden, James Bryce, and John Morley. The last two were at the time but youngsters whose careers were still in the future. Prince Albert was able before his death, at the close of 1861, to render an all-important service (which will be referred to later) in helping to prevent the capture of the *Trent* from being made the occasion or the pretext for war.

The Memoirs of Palmerston and of Louis Napoleon give evidence that the British Minister was in substantial accord with the American designs of the Emperor, and was ready to do all in his power to secure for these designs the support of England. The French and English fleets were to act in co-operation in bringing the "fratricidal strife" to a close, and while Great Britain was dictating in Washington the

terms of separation, Louis Napoleon was to be left with a free hand to carry out his schemes of domination in Mexico.

It was my fortune to secure in a personal word an interesting confirmation of the keen interest taken by Palmerston in the success of the Confederacy. In 1861, some months before the appointment as emissaries of Mason and Slidell, the South had on the other side of the Atlantic three representatives, more or less official. Of these the best known was Yancey of Mississippi. The names of the other two were Ross and Mann, the latter being from Georgia. Some years ago, I met, as a fellow passenger on the trip to Liverpool, a judge from Georgia, who told me that in 1861 he had been in London acting as secretary for his father who was at the time serving as Commissioner for the Confederacy. To his father's office (which was in Suffolk Street, just off Pall Mall East) Palmerston was in the habit of making frequent visits. He came on foot, possibly having thought best to leave his carriage some streets distant; but his tall characteristic figure was, of course, easily to be recognized by his fellow Londoners. The Commissioner made a practice of sending the young secretary out of the office during the Minister's visits, but he confided later to his son some at least of the matters that had been under discussion.

“On one afternoon in November,” said the Judge,

“my father came into the office in such a state of elation that for a time at least he was oblivious of his usual diplomatic reserve. ‘We’ve got them, my boy,’ he called out. ‘Those fools of Yankees have captured a British vessel. This means the intervention of England in our struggle, and the recognition and the independence of the Confederacy.’

“That night,” continued the Judge, “Palmerston came early to the office, and this time, my father, still excited by the prospect of immediate success for the Confederacy, did not send me out of the room. I have in my mind,” he continued, “the picture of the two tall figures standing before the map of the States (never, of course, referred to by us as the United States), and deciding together where the British fleet could strike to best advantage. One force was to threaten New York, while a second was to operate on the Potomac, in co-operation with General Johnston, for the isolation and capture of Washington. Great was my father’s disappointment,” continued the Judge, “when a few weeks later came the news that the Yankees, not as great fools as we had hoped, had decided to surrender the envoys. He was still, of course, confident of our final success, but he felt that in the loss of this chance of immediate action on the part of England (action with which the French Emperor was more than ready to join) a great opportunity had been lost for the

immediate establishment of the Confederacy, and that a long and exhausting struggle was now inevitable."

The record of the despatch demanding the surrender of Mason and Slidell is now a matter of history. As first drafted by Palmerston and Russell, the demand was worded in a form in which no self-respecting government could have received it. The despatch had been written with the expectation and intention that the demand would be refused, and refusal meant war, and war on the part of Great Britain meant the independence of the Confederacy and the breaking up of the United States. This was the result for which Palmerston and Louis Napoleon had been hoping and scheming, and it looked as if the opportunity for the success of the scheme had been given by the rash act of Captain Wilkes. War was prevented only through the wise counsels of Prince Albert, backed by the firmness of the Queen. The responsibility for the final wording of the demand for the surrender rests (as the Memoir of Albert makes clear) with the Prince, although it is stated that, by reason of Albert's weakness (he was already a very ill man), the memorandum itself was in the handwriting of the Queen. Curiously enough, it is on record that the law officers of the Crown reported that, according to the principles of international law laid down by Lord Stowell, and enforced by Great Britain, a belligerent had the



right to stop and to search any neutral, not being a ship of war, even on the high seas, if such neutral were suspected of carrying any despatches. "Consequently," reports Palmerston, in a letter to Delane (see the "Life," volume ii, page 36),

"this American cruiser might, by our own principles of international law, stop the West Indian packet, search her, and if the Southern men and their despatches and credentials were found on board, either take them out, or seize the packet and carry her back to New York for trial."

Notwithstanding this opinion of the law officers, the British Government prepared for war, and war was, as said, avoided only because the despatch was rewritten in such shape that the demand of Great Britain could be assented to by the American Government without loss of dignity. Lincoln, in fact, was able to score a small diplomatic triumph. The American administration was well pleased that "her Majesty's Government had assented to the old-time American contention that vessels of peace should not be searched on the high seas by vessels of war." This contention was, it may be recalled, one of the causes of the War of 1812-1815, but in the Treaty of Ghent which brought this war to a close, no formal abrogation had been made by Great Britain of the right

of search, the American and British Commissioners having simply agreed, as between gentlemen, that the right should no longer be exercised upon American vessels.

The great journals, headed by Delane's *Times*, placed themselves, with hardly an exception, on the side of the South, *Punch* and the *Saturday Review* making a close second to the *Times* in the bitterness of their sneers and misrepresentations. The North had the support of the *Daily News*, under the direction of John Robinson, the *Spectator*, conducted by Richard Holt Hutton, the *Manchester Guardian*, and some of the leading journals of Scotland. Delane, the able managing editor of the *Times*, was undoubtedly, during the period in question, the most powerful manipulator of public opinion in Great Britain, and for Delane (and I may refer for confirmation to the pages of his "Life,") Palmerston was the ideal statesman and ruler for the Empire. The pages of *Punch* make clear that its managers shared Delane's enthusiasm for the self-sufficient, genial, truculent, autocratic, popular Minister, and accepted him as fairly representing the typical and dominant spirit of his generation of English voters and of English society.

The rôle of a journal like *Punch* is, in form at least, that of a mirror of the impressions and pre-

judices of society rather than of a leader or shaper of opinion, but the reiterated presentation of cleverly drawn cartoons depicting the shrewd, handsome Palmerston playing the game off his own bat and easily getting the better of his adversaries, and of the brutal bully Lincoln devising fresh schemes of oppression and atrocity, really created, rather than reflected, the public opinion of the day. From the outset of the war, the *Times* took the ground that the attempt of the North to preserve the national existence was a futile absurdity, and that this attempt, as continued, became a crime. Through these same years, the clever cartoonists of *Punch*, working obviously in accordance with a general editorial policy, devoted their pencils to emphasizing in every way possible the futility and the wickedness of the cause of the North, and to ridiculing and abusing the boor Lincoln and the despicable Yankee leaders generally. Confederate successes were emphasized and exaggerated and were made the text for reiterated sermons on the wickedness of the North in continuing the "fratricidal struggle," while Northern victories were either ignored or dismissed as untrue or exaggerated. Gettysburg and Vicksburg, for instance, the decisive victories of July, 1863, which marked the turning-point of the war, were not even referred to in *Punch*, whereas full measure of space had been given to Confederate triumphs. While the *Times* mentioned

both events, its references can hardly be considered as examples of fortunate military criticism.

Every cartoon of Lincoln in *Punch* was drawn in a spirit of malevolence. He is presented as a boor, a churl, a sharper, a braggart, a poltroon, amusing himself with a book of Joe Miller's jokes, while his minions carry desolation into civilized communities. The references in the editorials of the *Times* are in full harmony with the cartoons in *Punch*. The influence of the *Times* and of *Punch* in shaping public opinion was, of course, not confined to Great Britain. *Punch* was to be found in the club-rooms of the leading continental cities, and was on the exchange list of their journals and not a few of its cartoons were reproduced in Paris and in Berlin.

It is proper to remember, however, that on the arrival of the news of the President's death, Mark Lemon, who had been the controlling editor of *Punch* during the war, permitted the publication of a beautiful poem on Lincoln by Tom Taylor, which did much to offset the long series of abusive cartoons and references.

It is not too much to say that, during these years, for Europe generally the *Times* was British opinion. It was accepted, and on good grounds, not only as expressing the opinion of English society, but as indicating the policy of the administration of Great Britain. The long series of falsifications brought

into print in its "leaders," and in the letters of its New York correspondent, undoubtedly delayed for years any correct understanding throughout Europe of the causes and purposes of the war, of the actual progress of campaigns, and of the extent of the resources available for meeting the national indebtedness. The loss to the North in the obstacles placed in the way of the distribution of its bonds, and the further loss in the higher interest that had to be paid on these bonds, caused by the deliberate misstatements and vilifications of the *Times*, must be estimated at many millions of dollars.

With the group of the influential friends of the North must be named a young Don of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, who was at the time hardly known outside of his University, but who was to take rank later among the leading authors and essayists of his generation. Leslie Stephen, whose first wife was a daughter of Thackeray, had become keenly interested in American affairs, first through correspondence with certain New England friends—Lowell, Holmes, Norton and others—and later, as a result of two sojourns in the States, and of a careful study of the history and conditions of the war. He now became convinced that the *Times* had, partly as a result of a definite policy for the breaking up of the Union, but largely also through sheer ignorance, bumptiousness, and slovenliness, foisted upon England and the Continent

a mass of misinformation in regard to the causes of the war, the record of the campaigns, the character, the resources, and the acts of the combatants, and the probable result of the struggle.

At the close of the war, in 1865, Stephen printed, under the title of "The *Times* and the American Civil War," a wicked little pamphlet in which he summarized some of the most flagrant and characteristic of the inconsistencies, blunders and absurdities in the statements of "fact," the descriptions and conditions of the record of "events" and the prophecies of results, that had found place in the correspondence and editorials of the *Thunderer* during the four years 1861-65.

It will, of course, be understood that neither Leslie Stephen nor the writer of this paper would have contended that a belief in the rightfulness of the cause of the South, or an expression of sympathy with the pluck and gallantry of its fight for independence, was in itself pernicious or even reprehensible. The argument for the constitutional right of secession was held to be well founded not only by a substantial majority of the Southerners who were ready to risk their lives in its support, but by not a few students of history on both sides of the Atlantic. The skill of the military leaders of the South and the pluck and devotion of their soldiers were deserving of the admiration they secured from all stu-

dents of the war, and most of all from their Federal antagonists.

The appreciation given by such a student as Leslie Stephen, or by a Federal veteran like the writer of this paper, to the characters and to the brilliant campaigns of leaders like Lee and Jackson, could not, however, prevent either student or veteran from believing that it was to the advantage of the whole country and of the world at large that the cause of the South should fail—a belief that is held today by not a few of the Confederate veterans themselves. Stephen and others of his group in England were indignant, not that England should favor the cause of the South, and should rejoice at the prospect of the destruction of the Republic, but that responsible leaders of opinion, like the *Times*, *Punch*, and the *Saturday Review*, should utilize in support of their contentions misstatements of fact, falsifications of the record of events, and vilifications of the characters of the Northern leaders. Stephen and his friends were in a position to realize how widespread was the influence of these journals and how serious was the mischief brought about by them to the cause of the North and to a right understanding in England and on the Continent of the great issues at stake; and they felt keenly the serious injury caused to the future relations between England and the United States. It has required the lifetime of a generation

to outgrow the cleavage between the two nations due to the malicious mischief of Delane and his friends.

The issues of 1861 are now matters of ancient history. The relations of England and the United States, bound together as they are by increasing common interests and purposes, are closer and more satisfactory than had before been thought possible. There is no more reason today for bitterness or excitement on the ground of the foolish utterances concerning Lincoln and the Civil War, than in regard to abusive language used a century earlier concerning Washington and the other leaders of the Revolution. I had thought, therefore, that the Americans of the present generation might be interested in having brought before them as a matter of history some specimens of the comments of the *Times* on the events of 1861-65 as preserved by that loyal friend of our country, Leslie Stephen. I think that they will agree with Stephen that the great English journal made a sad misuse of its responsibility, and that England was badly served by John Delane.

Stephen says that "the *Times* was during the years in question supposed to be in possession of a political knowledge profounder than the knowledge of any private individual, if not than the knowledge of statesmen, and that the public acquiesced in the right arrogated by the *Times* of speaking in the name of the English people." The authority thus ascribed



in England was not unnaturally accepted in America, and the Americans understood that “the *Times* was the authorized mouthpiece of English sentiment, and that it expressed the mature opinions of the most educated and reflective minds of England.” “Finding in the *Times*,” says Stephen, “a complete perversion of matters transatlantic, the American naturally attributed such aversion to malice rather than to ignorance. He could not believe that such pretended wisdom covered so much emptiness; and he attributed to wilful falsehood what was at worst a desire to flatter its readers.”

The *Times* undertook from the outset to inform and guide English and Continental opinion in regard to the conditions of the war. It begins with some rather noteworthy prophecies.

Nov. 26, 1860:

“It is evident, on the smallest reflection, that the South, even if united, could never resist for three months the greatly preponderating strength of the North.”

May 9, 1861:

“The reduction of the seceding States is an almost inconceivable idea.”

The character of the philosophic bystander seeing things more clearly than was given to the foolish and

pig-headed Northerners who persisted in going their own way, was perhaps that in which the *Times* most delighted to appear.

Aug. 27, 1861, it appears in this character, modified by a stronger dash of the profound philosopher. England, it says, might as well attempt to conquer France, or, indeed, better; for the Northerners are not agreed amongst themselves. The only parallel in history is the French invasion of Russia, but Napoleon had far greater resources than the North, and the South is far stronger than Russia. The *Times* never could learn, though incessantly burning its fingers, to keep clear of these dangerous historical parallels. May 3, 1864: "The present prospects of the Confederates in this fourth year of the war are brighter than ever before."

Sept. 14, 1864:

"The great fact that we asserted from the first is now [six months before the end of the war] placed beyond the reach of controversy. We said that the North could never subdue the South, and the North has now proclaimed the same conclusion."

March 6, 1865: Sherman's

"unexampled successes expose him to a serious embarrassment. . . . The Federals have really made but little progress towards the conclusion of the war."

April 19, 1865:

“The catastrophe seems complete,” it is now admitted, “and is calculated to impress people with the feeling that the work is accomplished, and that the Civil War is really at an end.”

In the first months of the war, the *Times* accepted as well founded the Northern contention in regard to the main issues, including slavery. In January, 1861, it says:

“We cannot disguise from ourselves that there is a right and wrong in this question, and that the right belongs to the States of the North. . . . The North is for freedom of discussion and the South resists freedom of discussion with the tar brush and pine faggot.”

Later in the month, it takes still stronger ground: “South Carolina has as much right to secede from the nation called the United States as Lancashire from England.” By March 12th, it has found out that “protection is as much the cause of the war as slavery.” It inclines to the South, because it has heard that the South is for free trade. Yet on June 26th it refers to the uprising of the Northern people after the fall of Fort Sumter as simply “an expression of wounded vanity.” September 19, 1862: “Slavery is no longer a point at issue, and will not be interfered with, after peace is restored.”

October 7, 1862:

“We are in Europe thoroughly convinced that the death of slavery must follow as necessarily upon the success of the Confederates in this war, as the dispersion of darkness upon the rising sun.”

March 26, 1863, appeared an elaborate article, in which it is proved that, if the war for the Union fails, the South will become a great slave empire. The *Times* had now taken the position that the South was fighting for slavery, and that slavery was a good thing, and that the South would, therefore, win.

October 14, 1862: The Emancipation Proclamation is an incitement to assassination. “In truth, it is nothing else, and can mean nothing else.”

October 21, 1862: “Is the name of Lincoln ultimately to be classed in the catalogue of monsters, wholesale assassins, and butchers of their kind?”

January 19, 1863: “The whole affair is a piece of hypocrisy intended for foreign consumption.”

The American correspondents of the *Times* were not much more successful than the “leader” writers in the attempt to present an accurate or trustworthy account of events and of conditions, or in the ability to avoid abusive and malevolent statements. The letters present one long effort on the part of these correspondents to shut their own eyes and the eyes of their countrymen to the existence of any heroic

qualities whatsoever in the Northern people. Every patriotic action is explained as having originated in corruption or selfishness. Scandal after scandal is raked up and exhibited as an average specimen of American affairs. If the writers were to be believed, the whole political and social machinery was rotten at the core and was worked by the most degraded motives; America is peopled by an unprincipled mob, sprinkled with charlatans and hypocrites, and governed by pettifogging attorneys. The Yankees had

“hired other men to fight because they had no adequate loyalty of their own, and were prepared to abandon their liberty because they were wanting in courage.”

It is impossible that these letters could have been brought into print in the *Times* during the years in question except in accordance with the general policy, if not the specific instructions, of the manager Delane. They constituted the raw material out of which were manufactured a large portion of the “leaders”; and this was the more serious, because, as said, their statements eked out a good many hints left judiciously vague in the leading articles.

July 24, 1861, the *Times* discovered that the “volunteer force was becoming a standing army and as such dangerous to liberty.” On August 12, 1861, it announced that a military dictator was not im-

## 176 Some Memories of the Civil War

probable before twelve months were over. January 29, 1862, it informed us that "the clank of the sabre was already heard in the halls of the Legislature."

May 27, 1863, America was

"about to offer the last vestige of her liberties at the shrine of that Moloch of slaughter and devastation [a playful term for Mr. Lincoln] which they have set up to reign over them."

November 22, 1864:

"Future historians will probably date from the second presidency of Mr. Lincoln, the period when the American Constitution was thoroughly abrogated, and had entered into that transition state through which republics pass on their way from democracy to tyranny."

In regard to the matter of the foreign element in the army of the Northern States, the statements of the *Times* are varied and curious. Having repeatedly asserted that the Northern forces consisted of "not very respectable" natives, reinforced by "myriads of German and Irish mercenaries"—"wretched emigrants drugged with whiskey," when pressed into the service, and kept from desertion by the fear of being shot, if they "skedaddled,"—it at last admitted that scarcely a family in New England lacked representation in the army, and that eighty per cent of the soldiers were native Americans!

The military criticisms of the *Times* were no more fortunate than its reports of general conditions. Even as late as April 18, 1865, after the evacuation of Richmond by Lee, its correspondent remains faithful to his hopes. He writes that the "closing victory was rather theatrical than substantial," and when it took place that "Lee was retreating on a pre-concerted plan." The last utterance of this logical correspondent was an attempt to prove that "Texas might still hold out for years." This letter was written after the last Texas general had surrendered!

On December 31, 1863, after speaking of the "foolish vituperation of England," which "had been fashionable with the American press," the *Times* added, with superlative calmness:

"The entire absence of retaliation on the English side can scarcely be claimed as a merit; the spectator is naturally calmer than the combatant, nor is he tempted to echo his incoherent cries."

It is doubtless the case that in the New York *Herald* and other American papers of the day there was plenty of unguarded and even abusive language in regard to England. No one paper of this group, however, could properly be referred to as an organ of public opinion, or as a shaper of public opinion, in the sense in which such description could be applied to the *Times*.

It may also be admitted that the provocation for sharp language from this side of the water was pretty serious. In September, 1862, the *Times* had taken the ground that the pretext made by the North that the war was an anti-slavery war was a mere pretext to blind foreigners; so far as a desire for emancipation meant anything, it meant to cover designs of diabolical malignity; it was intended to lead to the organization of "a series of Cawnpores," or to "the total extirpation of every white male in the South." "The suggestion of emancipation was introduced into the war as an afterthought." It served as "a thin superficial varnish to vulgar, and sometimes to atrocious, motives."

"In pursuing a wild will-o'-the-wisp, the Northern armies, utterly unable to conquer the South, overmatched in statesmanship, generalship and courage, had made an easy conquest of their countrymen's liberties."

"The free, self-governing nation of English blood had become the humble slave of a despotism at once oppressive and ridiculous. Mob law had suppressed all that was noble and exalted in the nation, and was leading them to a fearful abyss of bankruptcy and ruin."

Such as the war was, the North would not fight in it themselves. They "scraped together the refuse of Europe and stole the Southern negroes." "Every



boast which they had ever made was proved to be empty"; every taunt which they had aimed at Europe might be retorted upon themselves. "The republic had rotted into the Empire and the gangrene had burst." This language, paraphrased by Stephen from a series of *Times* leaders, will recall to us some of the provocation which served as the texts for the fierce articles of the elder Bennett and of other American editors of the time. The space available for this article will not permit further citations from the Stephen pamphlet. The monograph constitutes a sufficiently valuable addition to the history of the time to deserve reprinting in full.

The historian Freeman was on the whole friendly to the cause of the North, but, misled by the information and authority of the *Times*, he had arrived at the conclusion that the national existence of the United States had come to an end. He brought into print, at the close of 1861, a historical study, the title page of which carried the following wording:

A HISTORY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE TO THE DISRUPTION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC.

In the second edition of the book, printed some years later, the wording of the title was altered.

Delane was typical of a certain group of Englishmen of his generation. He was not a believer in

representative government—that is, in a government selected by the people at large and representing the ideas and the interest of the people. His idea of a well-ordered state was of a state controlled by a close corporation of autocrats. He shared the admiration of his friend Palmerston for Louis Napoleon, and was not repelled by the governing methods that had been found necessary by that successful conspirator. Delane had no sympathy with, and practically no understanding of, ideals, and he distrusted and disliked men who were willing to fight for ideals, and who held that only through such fighting could there be progress for humanity. He was honestly incapable of appreciating the point of view of men like Bright and Cobden, and had nothing but sneers for their methods and aspirations; and he had no sympathy with, and no appreciation of, the best of the great legislative undertakings of Gladstone, those which have stood the test of later history.

Delane seems to have had no objection to slavery, and he distinctly approved of government by class domination. At the time when that wonderful epic of the defense of Rome was being enacted by Garibaldi and his associates, men willing to give their lives for their ideals, Delane expresses the hope that “some well-directed bullet will relieve Italy and Europe from that nuisance of a Garibaldi.”

Englishmen of Delane’s generation (who, irrespec-

tive of political preferences or prejudices, were doubtless desirous of securing the best return for their investments) had good reason for complaint against the *Times* for its bad counsel in regard to American securities. It was largely on the ground of the American information given by the *Times* and of the anti-Northern views emphasized in its correspondence and in its leaders that Englishmen refused to purchase either the seven-thirty or the five-twenty bonds, and lost the profit that they would have secured through such purchase. The largest investments in these Civil War securities were made by the Hollanders, who secured a very good return indeed on their outlay. A certain group of English investors might also have debited to the *Times* the very serious losses incurred by them through their ill-advised faith in the value of the Confederate cotton bonds.

Delane was a man of exceptional capacity, and he was for years the trusted counsellor of Palmerston and of other statesmen of Palmerston's group. The Memoir makes it clear that Lord Palmerston depended very largely upon Delane for information and counsel on American affairs during the years of the Civil War. Under Delane's management, the *Times* became the greatest journal not only of England, but of Europe, and, as before stated, its influence was for a long series of years of first importance in shaping public opinion, or at least the opinion

of the ruling classes, in Great Britain and on the Continent. The responsibility that thus came upon the director of the paper was great, and it is my contention that this responsibility was in large part badly used. The *Times* did much to bring about an unworthy standard of thought and of action for the Englishmen who accepted its guidance, and it was responsible for much of the unsatisfactory relations between Great Britain and the rest of the world; while (as an American with a loyal affection for Great Britain may properly remember) it was chiefly responsible for the bitterness between Great Britain and the United States, a bitterness which it has taken a generation to outgrow. In the use made by him of his influence and of his exceptional opportunities, England, and the world at large, were badly served by John Delane.

In 1918, I was sitting in the editorial office of the *Times* as the guest of the editor of that day, Mr. D. Mr. D. was later freed for a year or two from editorial responsibilities, but as I am told is at this time (October, 1923) again in charge of the great paper, the control of which now rests with Mr. Astor and Mr. Walter. I took the opportunity of asking Mr. D. whether the editor, or the proprietor (at that time Lord Northcliffe) felt any responsibility in regard to the action of the paper in earlier years, for instance, during the time of our Civil War, or would

find ground for annoyance at any criticism concerning the policy and the utterances of the *Times* before it came under its present management.

“There would not be the slightest ground, Major, for question on the part of either editor or proprietor in regard to criticisms of the management or of the influence of the paper in these earlier days. By the way,” he added, “you are at this time sitting in the chair of John Delane.”

“Then,” I rejoined, “here in the office of the London *Times*, at the invitation of the present editor, and sitting in the chair of the editor who during four years utilized the *Times* to do all that seemed to be practicable to break up the Republic, I give myself the satisfaction of saying, ‘Damn John Delane.’” “I find no ground for objection,” said Mr. D.

## THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK

*An Address First Delivered in 1899. (The Account is Based on Personal Experience.)*

THE time of which I am speaking covers the weeks of October, 1864. The war had been going on for a little more than three years and, in looking at the field of operations in the Eastern States, it would appear as if the cause of the North and of Nationality had made but little progress. The armies were fighting over very nearly the same territory as that which had been in contest during the first battle months of 1861. The sound of the Rebel guns could still from time to time be heard at the Capitol in Washington. The lines of defense for Richmond and for the granaries back of Richmond appeared to be unbroken and almost unbreakable.

Taking the Confederacy as a whole, however, larger progress had been made than could be measured by the situation in Virginia. The Southwestern States of the Confederacy had been definitely severed from their eastern allies by the capture of the line of the Mississippi which, after the fall of Vicksburg and

of Port Hudson in 1863, was kept open and patrolled by the Federal gunboats. In the far South, the Federal troops held not only the great city of New Orleans but fortified points along the Gulf coast which shut in that portion of the Confederacy from any communication from the outer world. On the Atlantic coast, while the cities of Savannah and Charleston and Wilmington were still under the Rebel flag, they were so closely environed by the troops of the Union and their harbors were so closely watched by vessels of the blockading fleet that they could not be utilized as ports for the Confederacy. In the middle South, Sherman had brought to a brilliant culmination his aggressive march from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and after occupying the latter city, the virtual centre of the Confederacy, he was preparing for the final march to the sea which was at once to demonstrate the lack of reserve force on the part of the Confederacy, and through the destruction of railroads and of granaries, to render impracticable the securing for the Southern armies in Virginia either reinforcements or resources from the territory to the South. And finally, while to the north of Sherman's force General Hood was threatening fresh invasion of the Border States and was collecting troops for his final spirited but futile campaign against Nashville, General Thomas was on his part organizing from the reserve troops the army

which a few weeks later was to complete in front of the lines of Nashville the discomfiture of the last Western army of the Confederacy. The fight made by the South had been magnificent, but in October, 1864, it was drawing nearer to its close than was realized by the leaders on either side.

In Virginia itself the situation was in substance as follows. Lee was holding lines devised under his own direction by the best engineering skill of the Confederacy, lines which protected Petersburg and Richmond and the two lines of communication, one southward by the Weldon road and the other southwestward by the way of Danville. The very considerable difference between the numbers of the defending forces and of those controlled by Grant was largely offset by the enormous strength of these earthworks, themselves the result of three years experimenting and campaigning. In the Shenandoah Valley, General Early, a skilled West Pointer who united with military science, enormous persistency, aggressiveness, and unwillingness to admit defeat, maintained in the field an army of veterans which while also smaller than that of its opponent, possessed the very material advantage of a thorough knowledge of the country, the sympathy, aid and information given by the inhabitants, and the short interior lines across the State, communicating with Lee's headquarters.

It was the task of General Sheridan at once to



cover Washington, concerning which after Early's brilliant raid in July of the same year, the authorities were still ready to be nervous, to prevent the troops of Early from being transferred *en masse* to Lee's army where they might easily have been utilized to secure a preponderance of force at one end or the other of the Rebel lines, and also to prevent so far as practicable the transfer of food from the Shenandoah Valley or through the Shenandoah from the territory to the South and West, to the commissariat at Richmond. Sheridan also, of course, had his communications with Grant with the telegraphic lines going from Winchester by way of Washington along the line of the Potomac to the headquarters on the James. These lines, however, immediately to the north of Winchester were continually being cut by the enterprising troops of Colonel Mosby. In fact Mosby's operations were by no means limited to the cutting of telegraph wires, but included the cutting off of commissary and ammunition trains and from time to time the capture in toto of the railroad trains which were on their way from Washington to Harpers Ferry or to Martinsburg. While, if the wires were unbroken, it was possible to give information in a few hours time between Winchester and the James River, the time required for the movement of troops along the line of the Potomac was two to three times as long as that

needed for a similar transfer between the army of Early and that of his chief.

The command of the veteran troops in the Valley had been assumed by General Sheridan in August, 1864. The territory was for him new and he had to depend upon others for direct knowledge concerning the topography and the conditions. The three years had witnessed a series of contests for the control of the great Valley road, contests which had in great part at least resulted in favor of the Confederates. A number of Federal commanders had been outmanœuvred and had been driven either northward or westward by the better generalship and the better knowledge of the territory possessed by Rebel leaders like Ewell and Jackson. Sheridan's first headquarters were established at Charleston between Winchester and Harpers Ferry. Early, with somewhat of an over-confidence in regard to his superiority, not in men but in management, had rashly scattered his own forces along the line between Winchester and Martinsburg. Early was attempting to maintain some control over the line of the Potomac and Chesapeake railroad and kept always in threat the plan for a further raid across the Potomac into Maryland. Threats and plans of this kind which might have been safe with Milroy, with Sigel, or with Fremont could not, however, be attempted safely with a man of Sheridan's force and resourcefulness.

On the nineteenth of September, 1864, he moved his force against the Rebel lines about Winchester and in the course of a few hours fighting forced Early out of his position along the Pike and drove him southward along the line of hills about Strasburg. Following up his advantage with a prompt energy to which, on this particular field of operations, the Confederates had not been accustomed, the attack was renewed five days later at a point called Fisher's Hill four miles to the south of Cedar Creek. There, Early's troops, while occupying a position of considerable strength, were again routed and driven southwestward along the Pike. At that battle it was the good fortune of my own battalion, in working its way up the slope, to run over and to take possession of three field guns. After Fisher's Hill, there was for a time a lull in the active operations. Sheridan fell back two or three miles in order to place his army in what was believed to be a satisfactory position to hold, a position which for a large portion of its course ran along the northern bank of Cedar Creek. At this point, the Valley narrows to a width of about six miles. Cedar Creek, having its rise in the mountains westward, the Shenandoah range proper, makes its way eastward and falls into the north fork of the Shenandoah River under the cliffs of Massanutten Mountain which is an outlying spur of the Great Blue Ridge that forms the eastern boundary of the Valley. The left flank of

the army as placed by Sheridan on the 15th of October rested against the flank of Massanutten which appeared to present an effective protection against any attack from that direction. This portion of the line was placed in charge of General Crook with the troops of the 8th corps. The right flank, four or five miles further to the west, was held by the 6th corps and as the country there was comparatively open, the position of the infantry was protected by almost the entire force of the cavalry of the army, at that time commanded by Torbert. The central position on the direct line of the Creek, overlooking the turnpike and commanding the bridge across Cedar Creek, was held by the 19th corps to which my own battalion was attached and which was under the command of General Emory. It may be inquired why it seemed desirable when the Confederate army had in two battles been so thoroughly defeated, to give attention to the selection of a defensive position for our army. Sheridan knew, however, that he was dealing with an old soldier and with tried troops and was not intending to take any chances. He had also received instructions, after reporting his satisfactory successes at Winchester and at Fisher's Hill, to place his army in a position in which he should feel free to leave it in a few days. General Grant proposed to meet him in Washington, there to decide how Sheridan's troops could best be further employed. Before

this appointment had been arranged, Grant had sent orders recalling to the army of the Potomac (from which it had been detached a few weeks before) the 6th corps which constituted about two-fifths of Sheridan's force. The 6th corps had actually started by daylight on its march towards the Potomac and its movement had, of course, been duly noted by the Confederate signal posts which occupied the crest of Massanutten Mountain. When Sheridan received his own instructions to report to Washington, riding swiftly up the Valley, he overtook the 6th corps in the course of the afternoon. While still having no direct apprehension of attack, it seemed to him wiser not to permit his army to be diminished while he himself was to be absent. He, therefore, directed the 6th corps to retrace its march and again to take position on the right of our line. It happened that the march backward was made in the evening and appears not to have attracted the attention of the Confederate signal officers. This detail exerted a very material influence on the course of the battle that followed. On the morning of the 19th of October the situation was then in substance as follows. Sheridan, having completed his arrangements in Washington, arrangements which involved the transfer of the larger portion of his army to the banks of the James River, had journeyed on his way back to the front as far as the town of Winchester. There

he had spent the night, having certain business to care for in connection with the transportation officers whose headquarters were at that time in Winchester. Sheridan's army occupied a line extending across the Valley from fifteen to eighteen miles south of Winchester. The 6th corps had quietly taken its place in its old cantonments and as it appeared afterwards from Early's reports, its return (although it had been in place for two days or more) had not been noticed and Early's attack was conducted on the assumption that he had little more than one half of Sheridan's army to deal with. Immediately after the detachment of the 6th corps, and the departure of Sheridan for Washington, Early had sent an urgent message to Lee to the effect that although driven back, he was not prepared to be discouraged. His troops were well in hand and were ready for further service. The Yankees were, under the circumstances, not dreaming of the possibility of an attack. If Lee would lend him for the purpose two or three divisions of fresh troops, Early expected to be able in Sheridan's absence to strike a decisive blow against the diminished army. Lee had great faith in the fighting capacity of the tough old veteran. Troops taken from Longstreet's corps and led by an able commander, General Kershaw, were hurried across from Richmond to the nearest point that could be reached by railroad and were then marched through Manassas Gap coming into the

south of Front Royal under the shadow of Massanutten Mountain. Through the night of the 18th of October, some of us lay awake in our lines watching through the clear October sky the flash-lights of the signals from the Rebel stations on Massanutten and wondering what new plans were in train. These flash-lights carried the instructions directing the march of Longstreet's troops. At a little after twelve on the night of the 18th, General Gordon (later Senator from Georgia) moved out from the Rebel right with a body of picked troops. The column wound its way in single file up the flanks of Massanutten Mountain. Care was taken to prevent alarm through the noise of the march and for this purpose the men had left behind their bayonets and canteens. Creeping down in the dusk of the early morning, after a march of three or four hours, Gordon's advance found its way in behind the pickets of Crook's corps, striking these pickets between their line and that of the camp. Many of the pickets were captured without the firing of a single gun, but a few managed, while not able to make a defense, at least to give the alarm by the firing of their pieces. The alarm came too late to be effective. Crook's men were sleeping in no formal camp but in part under shelter tents and in part under the cover of hastily constructed shrub huts or under the lee of logs. Attacked in this manner in the dark, from a quarter

from which no enemy could be expected (the mountain had in fact been pronounced by our scouts as inaccessible for any organized force), they found it impossible, veterans as they were, to make more than a scattered defense. They refused to surrender but broke through the trees and fields making their way as best they could towards the Pike northwestward. Gordon speedily found himself, with comparatively small loss, in possession of the tents, wagons, ammunition supplies, and above all of the field guns which there had not been time to spike. The position occupied by the 8th corps formed a ridge sloping gradually down towards the Pike. On the west side of the Pike the land sloped up again in fields with an elevation that was hardly sufficient to be called a ridge. At the foot of this slope passed the water of Cedar Creek, a stream of no great importance as far as depth was concerned, but which in connection with the steep and overgrown banks, formed a definite obstacle against the passage of troops in any organized formation, and was, of course, entirely impassable for wagons or for artillery. The line of the 19th corps which occupied this slope and of the 6th corps extending to the right and westward, was faced to the south, the only direction from which an attack could possibly be anticipated. My own battalion happened to be placed on the extreme left of the 19th corps, that is to say with its edge or left



files towards the Pike. We had constructed on our front a slight line of earthwork consisting of a ditch a foot deep with possibly a foot or more of earth on the southern edge. Aroused as we were in the darkness of the foggy morning by heavy volleys close by, we were for the moment confused as to the precise direction from which the firing came. It is never easy in a fog to make any trustworthy location of the direction of sound. It is particularly difficult to do this when you have been awakened out of a sleep and are hurried with the feeling that something, you do not know what, has got to be done very promptly. My battalion was at that time commanded by the major, the colonel and lieutenant-colonel both being prisoners. I was, as adjutant, the executive officer under the major. My chief had the day preceding sprained his foot so that he could not walk. He had, however, not turned over the command of the battalion to the senior captain and was, therefore, nominally still in authority. As a fact, the only orders issued that morning to the men, at least during these first hours, came from the adjutant. We tumbled into our little line of entrenchment, the battalions on our right following our lead, and peered through the darkness southward in order to get some inkling as to what next was to be done. In the course of a few moments the volleying on our left ceased and in place of the musketry fire there came the heavier

sound of artillery, and round shot, coming directly towards us from the position held as we had supposed by our own troops, bowled along our ditch knocking our men over as if they were so many nine-pins. Whatever it was that had happened on the east, it was evident that that ditch, facing southward, was no place for us. We tumbled out again as promptly as might be and, facing to the rear, we made a wheel to the right forming a line that looked south-eastward over the Pike. It really did not look anywhere very distinctly because the fog and the darkness still covered everything, although there was now from time to time through the fog the occasional flash of the cannon or of the muskets. As the continuance of the firing from the east made it evident that it was from this direction that the attack was coming, the rest of the brigade faced and wheeled as our battalion had done and formed on our left, making a thin line of defense against the expected onset.

Now, what we succeeded in doing with our brigade was precisely what had to be done, and what in the course of time was done, with the whole army. This army was, in Sheridan's absence, in command of General Wright of the 6th corps. Wright was a trained soldier and a sound commander. He lacked initiative, and he had never had any experience in command of detached operations. He kept his head,

however, and in the course of time got the army where he needed to have it. The movement comprised a facing to the rear and a great right wheel which should in the end bring the line facing to the south-east in such position as to control the Pike. We had in my battalion some pretty definite impression as to the nature of this wheeling operation because for a brief spell we were the pivot. This pivot was, however, continually being shot away and pushed back so that when the wheel was completed, while the desired position of the line had been secured, the fighting line was six miles north of the point at which the army had originally been placed.

This battle, as was the case with nearly every battle in the Valley campaigns, was fought for the possession of the Pike. It was Early's intention, after crumbling up the 8th corps on the left, to push his own army across the Pike and to force the Yankees back westward against the Shenandoah mountains away from their own base of supplies and lines of connection with the North. It was the intention of our commanders that that turnpike should be held, and held it was.

At the hour of which I am now speaking, however, it appeared as if the control of the road, as well as the possession of camps and stores, was rapidly passing into the hands of the Rebels. They pushed across the Pike, working northward as well as westward.

The position held by our own brigade proved to be too far advanced and was enfiladed with the risk of being cut off altogether. We had a small field battery connected with the brigade which, as the fog lifted, had kept up a persistent though not very effectual fire upon the lines on the opposite slope. The horses were, however, soon killed or disabled and in fear of losing the guns, the artillerymen had, under the instructions of their captain, dragged in behind the infantry all the guns but one. This remained in the field a few hundred feet in advance of our battalion and unfortunately there had not been time to spike it. The colonel commanding the brigade, seeing the grey lines coming up over the slope, called for some volunteers to run out and drag in that gun which otherwise was going to be used point blank against our own men. Some of us started across the field but when we got to the gun there were not enough left to handle it. It takes a good many men to pull a heavy fieldpiece across rough turf. The position was an awkward one because it was being covered by fire from both directions. The brigade commander, Colonel Dan Macauley, was shot through the chest the moment after giving his word about the gun and before he was able to recognize that the time had come for withdrawing his entire line. The Grey-coats had in fact worked so far to the northward that the force was nearly cut off. The men of the brigade

recognized the situation and began to fall back westward and northward a few minutes after our group had gone forwards. The grey line came in between and we were cut off. The group with me had, under my directions, lain down flat on their faces, in order to lessen the mark for the fire the worst of which was in fact coming from our own line. In a few minutes, the second line of the Rebel advance marched over us. We were sent to the rear with the other prisoners and my personal experience of the battle of Cedar Creek came to an end. The record of what happened later in the day when the army had been deprived of my own all valuable services, I have, however, been able to put together from the later accounts. By half past one or two o'clock, our troops, more or less scattered but never demoralized and never routed, had gotten themselves again together in a fairly effective and well connected line in front of the village of Middletown. The cavalry had been brought over from the extreme right and helping enormously in the task of getting possession of the Pike, had been placed on the left. The first brigade that got across the Pike, commanded by Charles Russell Lowell (nephew of the poet), had in fact pushed forward with unwise impetuosity and after badly shaking up one of Kershaw's brigades, had come under a heavy fire from our own captured guns, which with other serious losses killed the commander, General Lowell.

Notwithstanding this temporary success, Kershaw's division, well managed as it was, was unable to effect a lodgment in the village of Middletown. His last attack had been repelled decisively and our troops finally found themselves in a position that they could hold. Our losses were, however, serious. All of the artillery of the 8th corps had disappeared and with this the wagons and supplies of all kinds. The 8th corps itself had lost its organization and while Crook and his brigade commanders succeeded with various groups of men in doing through the day persistent fighting, this fighting had to be carried on largely under the flags and under the direction of the commanders of our 19th corps into the ranks of which the scattered 8th corps men had been received. The 19th corps had itself lost, in addition to all of its camp equipage and a large portion of its wagons, possibly one third of its artillery. The losses in men had also been heavy partly because surprised as we had been in the fog, we had delayed too long to recognize the fact that we were outflanked and had fought too long in an impossible position. Of prisoners, about 1300 had been taken. The 6th corps was still substantially intact and the cavalry had only just begun to fight. If such a state of things had occurred in the first year of the war there would on this afternoon have been no army left to fight. The troops would have been not only beaten but

demoralized. With these veterans there was no demoralization.

The success of the Confederates had not been secured without heavy sacrifice. They had been severely pummelled in their first attack on the centre of our position and in pressing their early advantages too keenly, not a few of their more enterprising commands had found themselves encompassed by our own troops and, unwilling to fall back from what they felt to be a victory, had suffered heavily. Their attack had in fact in a measure got so to speak out of hand. The field of operations was large and the different portions could not be kept in view by the Rebel commander or his staff officers. As a result, the attack had been pressed intermittently and at some points of the line the troops engaged had pressed forward so far in advance of their supports that they were roughly handled. At other points the advance had not been kept up. The soldiers, tired out with a tramp that for many of them had lasted through the greater part of the night, had been unable to resist the attractions of the Federal tents and wagons. They had taken possession of equipments and of food and in some cases also had succeeded in finding whiskey. This broken condition of the Rebel line, and the fatigue of a considerable portion of it, furthered, of course, the work of the Federal commander in getting his own

troops into satisfactory position. The line of defense that had, as stated, been taken up about one o'clock, it proved possible to hold and to defend. General Wright now felt that he had his army well in hand. He did not propose to be driven a step further northward. On the other hand it is only fair to say that neither the General nor his men had thought of the possibility of recovering during the hours that remained of a short October day, the ground and the material that had been lost. They were in fact looking forward to a renewal of the battle on the day following.

Sheridan had been awakened on that eventful morning by the sound of musketry in the distance (a distance of about eighteen miles). His first impression was that his own men were carrying forward a reconnaissance to the left of their picket line. His experienced ear, however, soon detected that the sound of the firing was approaching northward and that instead of a reconnaissance it meant an attack. Then came the first fire of the field artillery also from the south and also coming nearer. It was evident that his troops were being driven back. Mounting his horse, which the orderly had in readiness, and with no thought of breakfast, he dashed down the Pike, followed by such members of his staff as had also been able to get themselves in readiness. Better mounted than his aids, he soon outrode them and found himself for a time alone on the Pike.



Shortly, however, the Pike itself began to be filled with retreating men. It is to be borne in mind that the fringe in the rear of any battle, even of a successful battle, always carries with it the air of discouragement if not of disaster. The first men to retreat are the sutlers and other non-combatants who are closely followed by the negro servants of the officers whose duties ought to keep them at the front but who (at least until they got into uniform) had a great aversion to being anywhere near shooting. These men have probably scattered with the first volleys, and they bring with them all the exaggerated rumors of the front. If their words were to be believed, whole commands had been annihilated and there could be no possibility of maintaining any position from which they had escaped. Following these first camp loafers, come the straggling groups of the wounded. These are not usually so demoralized, but it is natural that they also should take an unhopeful view of the progress of the battle.

Such groups are frequently followed by straggling files of panic-struck soldiers who have no business to be in the rear at all but who happen to have been attacked in such a fashion as to have lost control of themselves and to have fallen into a condition of panic such as sometimes comes to the bravest and which it is very difficult to throw aside at least until after a night of sleep.

There was no personal risk involved in Sheridan's ride. It did not constitute an act of daring. The eighteen miles of road rapidly covered by his powerful horse was hardly at any one point within reach of the fire of the enemy. The exceptional thing about the ride was the condition of mind and of spirit possessed by the rider when he reached his army. It would for most men have been impossible, aroused suddenly by the sound of a battle coming the wrong way, making his way to the front with visions of unexplained disaster, hearing as he went the tales of defeat and seeing groups of men who spoke even of rout, to preserve an undaunted spirit and even while he rode to be framing plans for immediate action. Sheridan knew that the stragglers through whom he was pushing his horse did not constitute his army but he could not know what had really happened to that army. When, however, shortly after Wright's position at Middletown had been formed and the last of Kershaw's assaults had been repelled, Sheridan found himself again within touch of troops with rifles in their hands, troops facing southwards and prepared to do their duty as marked out for them, there was for him, the commander, no hesitancy or vacillation. He assumed at once not only that the army was not really defeated but that the day need not go down upon the beginnings of defeat. He rode along the fields in front of the lines partly in order to gain some

impression as to the forces remaining available and partly, at the suggestion of one of the officers who was acting as temporary aid, in order that the men might know of his return. The word was rapidly passed along from battalion to battalion, "Sheridan is here." The yells and cheers from those tired-out but not demoralized soldiers were so impetuous that Kershaw's men, a field or two distant, were convinced that reinforcements had arrived and began to consider their own lines of retreat. There was a reinforcement but it comprised but a single man. The staff officers had been in part distanced in Sheridan's hurried dashing forward while some who had made their way up had been ordered back for the purpose of getting control of such of the able-bodied stragglers as might still be made available for action. In the course of an hour or so, these officers came to the front bringing with them one or two thousand men ready for action and under the new inspiring, eager to redeem their panic of the morning. Among the first of the officers to greet the commander as he dashed from the road into the nearest field occupied by his own troops was Rutherford B. Hayes, later President of the United States, at that time commanding a brigade in Crook's corps. Hayes had managed to get out of the ruins of Crook's camp some handfuls of men whom he had kept together through the long morning and with whom he had done good service in holding

on to the line of the Pike. Another who looked up from the ditch where he held together the remnants of the 23rd Ohio also bore a name that has since become familiar. It was Major William McKinley.

When Sheridan had assured himself that his lines were in touch, were facing the right way and were, under the new word of encouragement, ready for action, the word was given to the group of improvised aids to bring forward some brigade guidons. The little triangular flags placed one field in front of the line the men had been holding gave the instructions by which the new line of advance was indicated. The men fell forward with a will and after crossing the first field were again in touch with, or at least within volley range of, the enemy. Kershaw's men delivered one hasty volley in return and then fell back. They were pressed from field to field but as they retreated they were naturally strengthened by groups of their own stragglers and also by such forces as had for the moment been held in reserve and who pressed forward at the sound of fresh firing. These so-called reserves were, however, themselves very exhausted. They comprised in large part the troops whom Gordon had led in the early morning over the mountain flank and who had borne the brunt of the first attack. Such rest as they had secured in the intervals of the morning had hardly been sufficient

to make them again ready for action. In any case, the lines were not strong enough to withstand the determined onset of the 6th and 19th corps. Our men pushed forward with increasing energy as if conscious of the fact that but few hours of daylight remained within which again to win their half lost battle. Fighting more or less irregularly over the six miles of fields through which they had been driven in the morning, it happened to some commands, including my own regiment, to find themselves at the end of the day's work again in the position in which they had slept the night before. My men buried their own dead that night in their own camp. By the time the afternoon sun was being hidden by the masses of the westward mountains, it had been made clear to Early and his associates that they were not going to be able to maintain their ground that night. Orders were hastily given for the marching off of the prisoners who had through the morning been held in some fields just south of the bridge, and also for pushing southward the column of captured commissary and ammunition wagons. With these went a little later, when it was evident that no positions could be defended, the field batteries that had been captured from us earlier in the day, and finally even the few guns that the Rebels had themselves brought north of the Cedar Creek bridge. A mile to the south of this bridge, the Pike crossed over another structure less

solidly built which spanned a smaller stream, also a tributary of the Shenandoah.

A group of Torbert's cavalry, led by a commander whose name at this time escapes me, had made their way round the right of our line and to the left of the retreating Confederate force, and had placed itself in a shrub-grown field to the left of the Pike from which they had a commanding fire on the bridge. When the first wagons reached the bridge, the cavalymen, who were fortunate enough to carry breech-loading carbines (all our infantry fighting through the war was done with muzzle-loading rifles), began a prompt firing not at the drivers but at the mules who were easily hit and easily disabled. The first wagons were stopped and the teamsters, panic-struck at the idea that the Yankees had got to the south of the bridge and were cutting off their line of retreat, scattered left and right through the fields. Other wagons followed, the quartermasters behind urging them forward in order to clear the road. More mules were killed and finally with the weight of the tangled mass, the bridge broke down.

For the rest of the day nothing on wheels got further down the Pike. The water in the stream was inconsiderable but the steep wooded banks were impassable for either wagons or artillery. As a result of this blocking of the road, due partly to individual enterprise and partly to good fortune, Sheridan was

able to report in his bulletin the next day the recapture of all the wagons and of all the guns lost in the morning and the capture of every piece of artillery that the Rebels had ventured to bring north of Cedar Creek. He was not able to include in this same bulletin that he had gotten possession again of his prisoners. Prisoners unfortunately did not need bridges in order to be pushed into an enforced retreat. The column had been started down the road in advance even of the wagon trains but some portion of it which had been delayed while the wagons should pass, had later been forced down the banks and through the water and up again on to the Pike.

This column of prisoners, comprising about 1300 men, and fairly well guarded by men who knew how to shoot quickly, could not be overtaken even by our cavalry whose horses were exhausted. It marched through the long night and for two succeeding days and nights until at Staunton it reached the line of railroad leading to Richmond. In the course of the afternoon and while it was still light enough to identify faces, it was my fortune, as I was being marched off the Pike, to pass General Early and his staff. I knew Early's face from description and from his photographs. He looked fagged as he rode past, possibly only from fatigue although it was well-known that when he was tired he would drink. He was swearing vigorously and, discouraged prisoner

that I was, I could not but sympathize with his irritation although I did not then know (nor for some months later) the extent of his disappointment. He had successfully executed in face of enormous difficulties one of the most brilliant attacks of the whole war's history. He had taken troops of men who had been within the weeks immediately preceding thoroughly beaten and, assailing larger forces, had so managed his onset that, at the point of attack, he had been much stronger than the defense. Our line, facing the wrong way, had been crumpled up like a line of cards set on edge. Veterans who had seen three years service had been driven from chosen positions in part entrenched and some of these veterans had lost their organizations and appeared to have lost for the time the power of fighting. The battle of the early morning had been in part won with artillery captured on the field. All that could be done by wise and ingenious planning on the part of the leaders and by plucky and persistent fighting from the men had been done and yet in place of a final victory, Early had to face a great disaster. By the close of the day his army was not merely driven back but was scattered. The men had so far lost their organization that in place of retreating along the road in an orderly body of brigades or regiments, they were scattered over miles of fields and marching sometimes without their muskets. Too much had



been attempted by Early with the force at his command. He had underrated the defensive power of the Northern troops. His chief mistake, however, had been to fail to estimate at its true value the fighting capacity of General Sheridan. His previous experience had been largely against commanders who when outmanœuvred or once beaten would stay beaten for some little time until they could refit and reorganize. The idea that a battle could be won again on the same day on which it was lost, and without the aid of any fresh troops, was a novelty to Early and is in fact a novelty in the history of war. It is this that stands to the credit of General Sheridan. It was the undaunted spirit which at the end of his own morning's gallop left his head still clear to reform his lines and to push forward the recovery of the lost battlefield that has left noteworthy in the history of the war the Battle of Sheridan's Ride.

I may add a few words in regard to my personal experiences in this battle.

My battalion had been placed, as is stated earlier in this paper, at the extreme left of the brigade which constituted the left of the line of the Nineteenth Corps. From our position, the ground sloped southward to Cedar Creek and eastward to the line of the Pike. On the other side of the Pike, occupying a slope that formed the beginning of the rise of Massanutten Mountain, was, or had been, the position of the

Eighth Corps. When the men of the Eighth Corps had been driven from their bivouac, the full force of Gordon's attack came from the east across the Pike upon the flank of the Nineteenth Corps, the line of which was extended facing to the south. We did succeed in getting our brigade faced eastward, but were promptly driven back from the position we were trying to hold. It was just before the line fell back that our brigade commander, Colonel Daniel Macauley, then commanding the Eleventh Indiana, called for volunteers to bring in a gun remaining on the crest of the slope that our brigade had been supporting. The other guns had, under the pressure of fire, been withdrawn. As before explained, I found, when the group of men whom I had led forward got to the place, there were not enough of us to move the gun. The position was an uncomfortable one because we were being fired upon from both sides. We laid ourselves down, either under my orders, or from natural instinct, hugging the ground as closely as possible and listening to the zip zip of bullets over our backs.

I remember the feeling that I had was that I was about as big as an elephant. A line of the "butter-nuts" had worked in to the north of us so that we were entirely cut off. I hid my sword in a cleft of the rocks in the hope that the ground might be recovered by our troops. We still felt that the Rebel

advance could be but temporary and that Sheridan's army could not be defeated. The sword had been a present to me from the company commanders when I received my commission as Adjutant, and I was in hope that it might be preserved. The ground was recovered in the evening by my own brigade, but the sword had disappeared, and although it bears my name in addition to the names of the ten company commanders, it has never since turned up. I should be glad to hand over a liberal honorarium to anybody in the South in whose hands the weapon may now be resting.

The second line of the "butternuts" ran over us a few minutes later and, properly enough, took possession of our rifles. We stood up as we admitted ourselves to be prisoners. Before the Rebs reached us, I had taken my pistol out of its holster with the intention of throwing it away. I decided, however, to throw away only the cylinder and had placed the pistol back in the holster. The first Rebel who came into touch with me naturally went for the holster. As long as he held the pistol butt end on, he was happy with his acquisition, but when he turned it round lengthwise and saw the gap where the cylinder ought to have been, he was quite an indignant trooper. He had, I think, found in the camp of the Eighth Corps one of the whiskey canteens, for he was certainly excited. He drew up his musket and

threatened to blow my damned Yankee brains out if I did not find that cylinder. I had given the article a miscellaneous chuck and could not have found it if I wanted to and, naturally, I was not particularly anxious to make the pistol an effective weapon for the rebel. Fortunately for me, one of the rebel officers was within reach. The rifle was knocked down by the officer; the man was sent to the front where he belonged, and I was placed in the rear, where came to be gathered together in all some thirteen hundred prisoners.

Our part in the action had begun about half-past five, and there had been no time since for breakfast. The rebels did not seem to be interested when the noon hour came along in giving any facilities for lunch. They were in fact at that time pretty busy with their battle. We found ourselves, therefore, fairly hungry, and I may admit to a real feeling of relief when in the middle of the afternoon one of my men brought me a piece of the brigade dog. The dog had foolishly allowed himself to be included among the prisoners, and his loyalty to the brigade under the pressure of hunger had cost him his life. The chunks of dog, cooked, or at least smoked, or charred, over a hastily made camp fire, were, however, of decided importance in lessening our hunger and in preparing us for the long line of march that was to follow.

Early in the afternoon, we, the prisoners, had the

opportunity of noting the preparations for retreat. First were sent off the camp wagons that had been captured from the Eighth Corps, to which were added some that the men of the Nineteenth Corps had not been able to remove. Then followed the guns of the captured artillery. As before explained, however, the train of wagons and guns did not go far southward. The bridge over the second creek was blocked, partly in connection with the clever work of a part of our cavalry squadron, and after the killing of some wagon mules, finally broke down altogether. When the infantry came to retreat, it had to divide left and right of the road going through the creek and the retreating was so general and so hurried that many of the men did not take pains to march by column on the road, but continued straggling southward through the fields. Our group of prisoners was ordered into column early in the afternoon and started on the road southward. We learned later that after our morning position had been recaptured, some cavalry squadrons were sent by Sheridan to attempt to recover the prisoners. The horses were wearied and could not do their best work. The prisoners were also tired, but under the pressure of bayonets from behind, we were forced forward in quick marching time over the hours of the afternoon and evening. Before the column was started southward, we had been formed in line and thoroughly

“inspected,” with the result of the appropriation of money, blankets, overcoats, and in many cases shoes.

I was interested in the case of a young staff officer of the Sixth Corps, Vanderweyde, who afterwards became my chum in prison. He had small feet, with which he was naturally pleased, and as he had enjoyed the privilege of a horse, he had indulged himself in patent leather boots. I remember in fact the Lieutenant being chaffed more than once as these “pretty boots” passed through our camp. In this case, however, he had the laugh upon some of his old-time chaffers. The rebel quartermaster, or the soldier working under his instructions, after Vanderweyde had, under orders, given up his boots, tried three times to put them on, but the boots were too small, and the Rebel indignantly chucked them back; “here you damned Yankee, you can keep your infernal little boots.” Vanderweyde was one of the few men who on the march and later in the prison retained a comfortable covering for his feet. When I saw that shoes were being appropriated, I took my knife and cut the uppers of mine, so that they did not look attractive. I judged, however, that the soles would hold together, at least until we had finished the march that I knew was before us. When the quartermaster, after appropriating my rubber blanket and overcoat, looked at my shoes, he decided that they were not worth taking, and I was fortunate

enough to have them on my feet at least until we reached Richmond. Later in the evening, as we were tramping along the road, I came into touch with Vanderweyde. He told me of a farmhouse, not far from the road, where he had a girl friend. He suggested that we should, at some convenient moment, make a bolt from the road across the field with the idea of being hidden by the friendly girl somewhere on the farm until the rebel column had passed. We were both convinced by the hurry and disorder of the march that the whole army was now in retreat and that if we could once get out into the darkness, we could get into touch again with our own troops.

My friend knew the ground, and at a point near where we were passing there was a big ditch, which he described as a dry ditch. We made a bolt for the field. Two sentries fired, but in the dusk and hurry, the shooting was of no particular importance. We found our way to the ditch and tumbled in, and the guards, having no time to look after two stray prisoners, went on with their column. The ditch, unfortunately, in place of being dry had some inches of water in which we had to lie quietly awaiting patiently until the noise of the tramping on the road should come to an end. Unfortunately, the marching was, as above stated, not confined to the road. Men were straggling across the fields on both sides, and in some cases were asleep as they marched.

Some of these sleepy stragglers fell into our ditch on top of us. They said things, and so did we; and then we were pushed or booted back into the road, and then pushed forward until we found ourselves again in the column of prisoners, wet, muddy, cross, and more tired than ever.

That march continued for some days, and for a large portion of the nights, but we finally reached at the bottom of the valley the town of Staunton. I remember that in the early morning, the prisoners were grouped in a little square in front of the village hotel. Within the hotel, we could hear the cheerful noises connected with the getting of breakfast for the rebel officers, and we even thought we could smell the ham and eggs from the kitchen. That food was, however, for our "betters." When their breakfast was over, the rebel commissary came to the little piazza of the hotel with colored men carrying some boxes of hard tack that had been captured from one of the Eighth Corps commissary wagons. These boxes were thrown bodily from the piazza into the little square, with the expectation that they would break as they fell. The rebel officers wanted to have the pleasure of seeing the Yankees scramble for their hard tack. Our officers, however, soon got control of the business, and we were able to show our captors that Yankees, even very hungry Yankees, could behave as gentlemen. We at once appointed a



commissary pro tem., who took charge of the piles of hard-tack and saw to it that this was divided as equitably as possible. This was the more important, as in any case there was not enough to go around with any satisfaction. At Staunton we were put into box cars and taken on to Richmond. The journey was fatiguing, because the single track of the railroad was in bad condition and the prisoners' train was sided from time to time to get out of the way of trains bringing provisions and munitions from the southwest. At Richmond, the groups of prisoners were divided, the enlisted men being sent to Belle Isle and the officers being taken to the old ship chandlery establishment of William Libby and Son. On arriving at Libby, we were again thoroughly searched,—it would be fairer to say, ransacked,—and it was in very few cases that money or pocket-knives that had been successfully hidden at the time of the first examination escaped the eyes of the thoroughly experienced appropriators in Libby Prison.

The Battle of Cedar Creek, which brought fresh prestige to General Sheridan, had the result of securing a winter's imprisonment for myself, but I still think that the battle was worth while.

## AN INCIDENT OF THE CIVIL WAR

### GRANT IN THE WILDERNESS

*A Talk Before the Security League, Feb., 1918*

IN May, 1864, the army of General Grant, which had for eight days been in constant conflict, emerged from the wilderness into the comparatively open country on the east. Between Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor, there came a fork in the road. The left fork led northeastward to the Potomac, while the right fork was directed southeast towards the entrenchments of Richmond and Petersburg.

The preceding eight days, and a large part of the nights had, as said, been spent in constant battling. There had been little sleep for the troops on either side of the line, and for a large part of the time there had been interruption with the rations. Both armies had suffered heavy losses and the men were, naturally and properly, exhausted. In the previous campaigns of the armies of the Potomac when, after some days of fighting, no substantial gain had been made, it had been the practice to withdraw the troops from

the fighting line to some base line where rest and recuperation could be secured.

The army was marching left in front in its constant endeavor to get in between the right of Lee's line and Lee's base at Richmond, but the stubborn soldiers of the army of northern Virginia, under the lead of their resourceful commander, had, through the preceding eight days, been able, with the advantage of interior lines and of entrenchments, to keep themselves between our troops and the approaches to Richmond.

As the first brigade debouched from the wilderness to the high road, no one but the commander and his adjutant, or chief of staff, knew what were the orders for the direction of the column.

The road to the left led, as said, to rest and safety, at least for the moment, from the battle risks which had been so continuous.

The road to the right meant a continuation of these risks, more fatigue, more broken nights and toilsome days. The troops might well have looked with eagerness for a chance for a break in their tremendous exertions.

When, however, the brigade guidons were, under the direction of the commander, thrown forward on the road leading to the right—the road that meant further fighting, further fatigue, continued peril—a shout of approval went up from the boys of the first

brigade which rolled backward through the column for the thirty miles of its extension to the westward. Through all the divisions went the word, "We are going on to Richmond." "There is to be no break in the campaign." The boys accepted with full approval the policy of their persistent and forceful commander which was, as he reported to the President, "to fight it out on this line if it took all summer."

They were all eager for the end of the war, but they realized that the best and most economical way of bringing the struggle to a close was to continue the fighting, to permit no discouragement and no avoidable delays. That yell through the thirty-mile column of Grant's troops could be heard (armies were nearer together then than they are today), and was heard, through the ranks of the army of northern Virginia. It was a shout that spelt the death knell of the Confederacy. We all realized that if there was with the armies, and with the citizens behind the armies, patience and persistence, we were bound to win out. Grant's policy meant patient persistent untiring effort for the army, and the army accepted the decision with approval and with enthusiasm. The spirit of Grant and of his army, expressing as it did the patient courage of the President, the great Captain, infused itself into the souls of the whole people. If the North would hold firm to its purpose,

the Republic could be saved. It was clear after this campaign that the North was to hold firm. There were still months of fighting before the decision of Appomattox, but the result was really clear when the guidon flag turned into the road that led to the right. This holding to the right was evidence that there was to be no discouragement, no break in the efforts until the task was accomplished.

The condition of the fight today between the allies, who are protecting civilization against the assaults of a barbarism organized by the science of the twentieth century, is in certain ways similar to that in our Civil War after the defeat of Chancellorsville, in May, 1863, or after the checks in the Wilderness and at Cold Harbor in May and June, 1864. The fighting has gone on for three years and the results appear to be still in doubt.

The well-organized forces of the Huns hold their own and a good deal more than their own. The losses in life and in treasure, and in the savings of the world, have been enormous. The people who are banded together in this fight for liberty against imperialism must, however, not permit themselves to be discouraged or to stay their efforts. If they maintain with full persistency and strength of will the campaigns that they have in train, it is certain that with the righteous cause and with the largest resources, they must in the end prevail. The world's

war has now resolved itself into an issue of will-power. The peoples who are fighting for the liberty of the world must be able to show an assured purpose and conviction and to back up that conviction with action in such fashion that the forces which have attempted to secure the domination of Europe and of the world shall be driven back. It is clear that they have already failed in their original purpose. They must be so overcome that a repetition of a war of aggression shall be impossible. This struggle is a war against war, and it must be so continued and so completed that we shall have at the settlement an assured peace, a peace with justice, a peace that will maintain throughout the world the right of men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

## GENERAL GRANT

*Address Delivered in Marietta, Ohio, April 27, 1922,  
the One Hundredth Anniversary of the birth of Ulysses S. Grant  
(and repeated on other occasions)*

FELLOW AMERICANS:—

We have come together today to honor the memory of a man who, in certain ways, may be described as a typical American, and to record our appreciation of the service that this average man was able to render to his country.

If at the beginning of the Civil War, there had been occasion to arrive at some estimate of the position that had been secured by Ulysses S. Grant in the community and in the opinion of his fellow men, it is probable that he would hardly have been rated as high as an "average man." His success in life had been so inconsiderable that there would have been warrant for the conclusion that his ability, and the character back of the ability, were somewhat below a respectable average. Our special ground for interest in the life of this American, who rendered such great service to his country, is the fact that by sheer force and will-power, he succeeded, after he had

reached middle life, in making effective a career that up to that time had been curiously futile. General Grant is not to be placed among the great men of the world, or even of America, but he secured well-deserved distinction and, if only on the ground above specified, his life is well worth consideration.

He was born in the little town of Point Pleasant, Ohio, on the 27th of April, 1822. He was, therefore, some thirteen years younger than Abraham Lincoln under whom he was to have the privilege of serving. He died on the 23rd of July, 1885, and at the outbreak of the Civil War he was, therefore, nearly forty years of age. Two-thirds of his life and twenty of his years of maturity had passed, and he had little, or nothing, to show in the way of accomplishment. The great catastrophe of the Civil War gave to Grant, as it gave to Lee and to other men of varied capacities and characters, the opportunity of their lives, and the greater number of these men, each in his own way, utilized this opportunity to show what he could do. Young Grant had accomplished but little in the way of school study, but through the fortunate sympathy of a friend of his Father's, he had secured an appointment to the Military Academy at West Point and, somewhat to his own surprise, had found himself able to pass the preliminary examination. He also succeeded, as has been found by many cadets to be the more difficult test of the two, in passing the exami-



nation at the end of the first year which enabled him to retain his place as cadet. His career as a cadet, was not brilliant, but may be called respectable. The young man seems to have accepted the discipline and to have had, during his four years, very little friction with the authorities. His record as a student was but moderate and when, in 1843, he was graduated, his position in a class of thirty-nine was that of number twenty-one. In Grant's class, and in the other classes of the Academy during these years, were a number of the young soldiers who later came into leadership and who in a number of cases secured distinction either in the Confederate or the Federal army.

I have been interested in noting in memoirs written up after the war by our Federal Generals, the number of references made to the temperaments of these West Pointers and to the probable action, based upon temperament, of their opponents in the field; a calculation based upon their memory of these men when they were young cadets. Sherman, for instance, writes, in substance (I am not undertaking to quote the exact words): "I was enormously relieved when Jefferson Davis, in this instance acting as a useful friend of our cause, relieved my persistent and capable antagonist Joseph E. Johnston, and replaced him with General Hood. I had remembered Johnston in West Point days, and had great confidence

in his thinking power and persistent will and in his capacity for leadership; and I knew my Hood and believed that I was competent to offset any campaign plans that Hood might put into shape."

In 1846, there came to young Grant with the Mexican War, an opportunity for distinction. He had found his way to the front as a Lieutenant and took an active part in the engagements at Palo Alto, Monterey, Cerro Gordo, Molinos del Rey, and Chapultepec. An incident in the last-named battle gives an indication of the young soldier's enterprise, resourcefulness, and courage.

The right of the American force was threatened with a flank attack by the Mexicans, whose lines extended considerably beyond the American position. Grant had noticed a church tower in a village to the right and somewhat in advance of our front, that is to say nearer to the Mexican lines. He hurried forward with a group of men and a small fieldpiece and, under Grant's instruction, this fieldpiece was, with the aid of a coil of rope, pulled up to the top of the tower. The Americans were then in a position to put in a dropping fire upon the advancing Mexican line, a fire that appeared to come from the clouds. The Mexicans, who could easily have captured Grant's little group, were surprised and disconcerted and halted their advance; the American right was strengthened and the threatened outflanking was

blocked. For this act and for other good service, Grant's name came into one or more of the dispatches and with full commendation.

After the close of the Mexican campaign, Grant did not find the army interesting.

In 1848, when he had secured a Lieutenant's commission, he married, but the salary as a Lieutenant proved to be insufficient to make satisfactory provision for wife and for a couple of children who arrived in due course.

In 1854, as a result of some trouble with his commanding officer (he was at the time stationed in San Francisco), he resigned from the army. The accounts of the trouble are conflicting, but it is probable that the young officer, as was not uncommon with the officers of his generation, allowed himself on some convivial occasion to indulge in an over-supply of whiskey. The resignation due to such a cause constituted, of course, a shadow on the young man's life. Many officers and thousands of good citizens in those years permitted themselves from time to time to be overcome through an occasional conviviality which destroyed for a time their self-control. There seems to have been, however, an undue measure of criticism brought upon Grant in connection with this offense, a criticism which tended to embitter his later years. It was doubtless the case that he did not find it at the time easy to resist the temptation of drink.

It is also clear, however, that he was able to fight against the tendency and at all critical times to retain full control of his faculties, and in his later years he was able to fight off altogether the desire for drink. This fact gives evidence of the will-power and moral force of the man.

The seven years that followed Grant's resignation were years of disappointment, failure, and anxiety. He had a wife and children to support, and he did not succeed in getting hold of any occupation for which he was fitted, or from which he was able to secure a satisfactory income. He did some work with his father in business, but there seemed to be little prospect that he could make a success as a trader. Then there came, as said, in 1861, in connection with serious trouble and anxiety for the country, opportunity for young Grant, as for other soldiers, and for many patriotic citizens. He made prompt application for a return to service in the regular army, but he found himself antagonized by the prejudices of certain of his superiors, prejudices which could not be overcome even by the record of his brilliant service in Mexico. He then made application for service to the authorities of the State of Illinois, in which he was at the time a resident, and in August, 1861, went into the field as Colonel of the 21st Illinois. The volunteer regiments of that day (I am speaking from personal experience) presented a curious medley. The men

were patriotic, and represented a much higher average of intelligence than could be found in the ranks of any of the European armies of the day. They were ready, for the maintenance of the Republic, to give up their homes and their business and to take the fatigue and risks of campaigns, of which most of them were cheerfully ignorant, and, if necessary, to accept the final sacrifice. Most of them were quite unwilling to accept with any satisfactory promptness the necessary restrictions of camp discipline. A number of the states permitted the practice, which was found to be very unsatisfactory in its results, of allowing the men to elect their own company officers. Young Grant found on his hands a group of young men whose courage and patriotism could not be brought into question, but who were very unwilling to carry out the first duty of the soldier, namely that of obedience. He succeeded, after some friction (in one case at least there came to be a camp riot) in getting his regiment into a satisfactory condition of discipline so that it compared favorably with any other regiment with which it came to be associated. In a few weeks after the completion of its organization, Grant received permission to move his command to the line of the Ohio, and then, at his own instance, took possession of the town of Paducah in Kentucky. The position was one which controlled the passage of the river. The transaction gave immediate

evidence that he had the instinct of a commander. His responsibilities were promptly increased, so that in February of 1862 he found himself in command of an army which, as far as numbers were concerned, might be called a real army, but which was woefully lacking in discipline, and even the senior officers of which carried into the field a plentiful lack of experience.

Grant had pressed upon the authorities in Washington the importance of opening up the Mississippi and had made clear that the first steps toward this undertaking must be to secure control of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. This plan called for the reduction of Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. He had available but a small supply of field artillery, and he realized that his guns were too small to have any effect upon properly constructed entrenchments. He made application for mortars which could be utilized for the throwing of shell into the entrenched enclosure, and, after a considerable delay, mortars and mortar beds were delivered to him at Cairo, which had been made the base of his little army. The story of the construction of the mortar beds is given in an earlier paper in this volume. Wearied with waiting, and doubtful whether the mortars could be delivered in time for his operations, Grant moved forward and was able, without serious fighting, to get possession

of Fort Henry. Fort Donelson, some miles to the east, proved a more serious undertaking. Within the entrenchments, General Floyd, who was in command, with General Buckner as his senior subordinate, had about 16,000 men and a full supply of guns and ammunition. The weather was bleak, and the men of the attacking force suffered from the cold. A first and a second assault were repulsed and the prospect of securing the Fort looked dark. Then, up the river, came three schooners of the mortar fleet. When the first shell was thrown from the deck of the schooner into the enclosure of the Fort, General Buckner, a trained soldier (who ought himself to have been the senior commander) reported to General Floyd, who was a civilian with no army training, that the Fort could not be held. Floyd, in order to avoid the responsibility of surrendering, and also for the purpose of keeping himself out of the hands of the Yankees who had good reason to hold Floyd responsible for malfeasance, turns over the command to Buckner and slips away into the darkness. He is no more heard of in the course of the war. The terms of surrender offered by Grant to Buckner could not be softened by the fact that they had been classmates in West Point. The "unconditional surrender" called for fitted in with the initials of Grant's name, and will hereafter always be connected with that name. The capture of this impor-

tant position opening the way to the Mississippi Valley, and of fifteen thousand troops representing an important portion of the Western Confederate Army, constituted the first substantial success of our Union Army and brought to Grant a national reputation. This reputation was, however, brought into serious peril a few months later by the battle of Shiloh or Pittsburgh Landing. The strongest defender of General Grant must admit that on the first day his army was badly placed and badly handled. With apparent confidence that no Rebel force was within reach, and that there could be no risk of attack, the army was encamped with the river at its back and with no protection of entrenchments. At the positions occupied, there appears to have been no adequate system of picket lines and there was certainly no attempt at scouting in the direction from which an attack, if any were to be made, might be expected. The Confederate Army that was within reach, and very much nearer than Grant had thought possible, had as its leaders two trained and experienced soldiers, Albert Sidney Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard. These men were older than Grant and had had a much better record in the Academy. There was the very general belief in army circles that Sidney Johnston was one of the most brilliant of the commanders that came into the Confederate service and that had he lived, he would have come out of the



war second in reputation only to Lee. Grant's army was, during the long hours of the first day, driven back until by nightfall large groups were crowded under the cliffs at the river side. The division of General Prentiss on the left was taken absolutely by surprise on this Sunday morning when the men, instead of thinking of attack, were actually preparing for a church service; and after a plucky fight Prentiss was compelled to surrender. When darkness came, the field was in the possession of the Confederates and they confidently expected, with the coming of daylight, to push into the river the Federals who did not prefer to surrender. The Confederates had, however, suffered a serious loss through the death of General Sidney Johnston.

It was at the end of this discouraging day, a day which had brought defeat upon the Army, and which might it seemed possibly end the military career of its commander, that Grant's character came into evidence. With obstinacy and persistent optimism, he refused to admit that he was beaten. "We have been driven back," he said, "but tomorrow we shall reoccupy the ground. It is merely a question of having the boys understand what they have got to do. We shall have the aid of Buell's men who will be fresh and ready for the fight and our boys will take heart again." Through the night Buell was landing his reinforcements, and with the first hours

of daylight Grant's line went forward upon the Confederates who, in their turn, were surprised. Beauregard's forces were driven back in confusion and a number of prisoners were taken. Some of the guns that had been taken were recaptured. The second day at Pittsburgh Landing was accepted as making good the blunders of the first action. President Lincoln and others came to realize that here was a commander who, while like all commanders, capable of making a mistake, had the will-power and the pluck to retrieve a blunder.

There is not time in such an address to do more than touch upon the chief events of the war in connection with which Grant had responsibilities. Such chief events may be specified as the campaign of Vicksburg, the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and the persistent campaigns through Virginia which, after various checks and disappointments, resulted finally in the destruction of Lee's army, and brought the war to a close.

Vicksburg presents another example of preliminary failure followed by persistent efforts resulting in success.

The campaign against Vicksburg of 1862, for which Grant accepted the full responsibility, resulted in serious loss of men and a full measure of disappointment. This failure gave text for the old-time antagonism to Grant to reassert itself in Washington

with certain groups of the army leaders and with the general public. Regardless of such criticisms, Grant pushed on doggedly with reshaped plans and he finally succeeded in landing the army south of Vicksburg, an advance from the north having proved impracticable.

General Joseph E. Johnston, who will probably take rank as next to Lee the ablest General of the Confederacy, was trying to keep in touch with the army of General Pemberton. Before Vicksburg could be invested, it was necessary to separate these two forces. Grant moves directly eastward from the Mississippi, occupies after the battle of Raymond the City of Jackson, and in the battle of Champion Hill succeeds in separating the two divisions of Confederate forces. Johnston's army is thrown eastward and is not able to give any further co-operation to General Pemberton. Pemberton, with some thirty thousand men, is pushed westward and has no resource except to place his troops behind the entrenchments at Vicksburg; and it is then only a question of time when his force will have to surrender. This surrender comes with a certain dramatic force on the fourth of July, 1863, and it is on this same historic and satisfactory fourth of July that Lee's defeated army retreats from Gettysburg. The backbone of the Rebellion has been broken.

Grant's first question to Pemberton when the pre-

liminaries of the surrender had been completed was "What rations do your men need?"

In November, 1863, Grant takes command of the armies in Chattanooga, relieving General Rosecrans, who had endured a crushing defeat at Chickamauga. He finds an army made up of sturdy veterans, but discouraged through the stupid management of the campaign. It is also very hungry. The troops are a long way from their base at Nashville and the Confederates have made it very difficult to get supplies to the front. Grant succeeds in opening the Tennessee River so as to restore the connections and the troops are again fed. As soon as their hunger has been satisfied, they are moved forward, and very much to the surprise and to the discomfiture of General Bragg, they push the Confederate forces from well-selected and well-entrenched positions on Look-out Mountain and Missionary Ridge.

Grant's success in this campaign brings serious discouragement upon the Confederate Army of the West and leaves that army in bad shape for Sherman's operations a year later.

President Lincoln had during these years been looking for a commander who could be trusted not merely to win a battle or to keep his army intact, but to push forward an aggressive campaign. He decided that for this responsibility U. S. Grant was the right man and in March, 1864, the officer

who ten years before the army had dismissed as a failure, receives the commission of Lieutenant-General and is placed in command of all the forces of the United States. It is at Grant's instance that his trusted comrade, William T. Sherman, is placed in command of the armies of the West.

When Grant came to Washington to take over these large responsibilities, he registers himself at the hotel of the day simply "U. S. Grant and son." This modest presentation of himself in the capital in which he was now to assume command of the armies of the United States, is in line with his word on his first meeting with President Lincoln: "This is no time, Mr. President, for show business."

During the months from March to June in 1864, Grant leads the Army of the Potomac, the battered veterans of which are sadly familiar with the Virginia campaigning region, through a series of sturdy fights, to the James River and to the lines in front of Petersburg. On the eighth of May, after more than a week of incessant fighting and continued marching, with little sleep and with diminished rations, the head of the army emerged from the tangled and much fought over region known as the "Wilderness," and came upon the fork of two lines of roads. The road to the northeast meant that the troops would march back to some camping place on the Potomac where they could secure the rest that seemed to be so much

needed and where there would be some interval of relief from continued fighting. The road to the southeast led to the positions in front of Petersburg and of Richmond, and if that were to be the line of march, it meant that the fighting was to continue. Grant had already sent word to Lincoln that he would "fight it out on those lines (lines of advance) if it took all summer." When the guidon flags which directed the march of the advance brigade were turned by the Adjutant to the southeastern road, a shout of approval went up from the brigade, and this shout was repeated from command to command through a column thirty miles in length. The men realized that they had now a commander who would fight and who would not be discouraged by delays or rebuffs. His duty was to fight the war through. The more persistent the assaults, the quicker would come the end with victory. It was only through the sacrifices of men that must result from fierce fighting that the war could be won and lives could be saved. The yell of approval that came up from the men in Grant's army as the advance to Richmond was taken up could be heard by the soldiers of the army of Northern Virginia. It was the death-knell of the Confederacy. They also had had full share of fighting and long fatigue, but for Lee and his men the realization that they had now to do with a leader whose will could not be weakened and who would push

the struggle to its logical conclusion meant, at least with the thinking men among the Confederate leaders, the certainty that the Confederacy was doomed.

On the second of April, 1865, the breaking of Lee's line by the forces under Sheridan at the Battle of Five Forks indicated the beginning of the end, and the surrender on the ninth at Appomattox brought to the country, after four years of the burdens of war, the final peace. The quiet sturdy soldier had, without the brilliancy of genius, but with the force that comes from the sturdiness of will-power and with the persistent efforts of devoted and unselfish patriotism, rendered to his country the greatest possible service.

Grant had not been brought up in what are called cultivated circles. He had secured in the Military Academy the education of a gentleman, but his associations after graduation had not been with refined circles. He showed, however, whenever there was occasion for a test, the gentleman's nature. His refusal to accept the sword tendered by General Lee, his word that all the officers of the surrendered army should retain their side arms, his further prompt acceptance of Lee's suggestion that the cavalry and the artillery men who owned their horses would find these horses useful for farm work, had constituted an evidence of the niceness of nature of the man.

A further example of fine nature was given a few weeks later in his relations with General Sherman.

Under the capable leadership of Sherman, his army had fought its way through from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and after the capture of Atlanta, had marched with less fighting, but with not a few obstacles to overcome, to Savannah and from Savannah northward through Columbia to North Carolina. The Battle of Bentonville, fought on the nineteenth of March, sealed the fate of the army of General Joseph Johnston, and the surrender of this army was made on the 26th of April at Durham Station in North Carolina. My own battalion was at that time stationed, with the other troops under General Terry, at Durham Station. I had finished my service in Virginia prisons on the first of March, and had been able to report for duty at the front. I may mention here that very few of the men who were in prison during the last winter of the war were passed by the surgeons as fit for further field service.

Sherman was a brilliant General and something of a scholar, but like his friend Grant, he was a simple-hearted man whose experience with the affairs of the world had been limited. General Johnston, accepting the necessity for surrender, calls upon General Sherman, accompanied by Mr. Reagan, late Postmaster General of the Confederacy. Reagan takes the ground that he is all that is left, or at least all that is within reach, of the Government of the Confeder-



acy. At this first conference, he takes into his own hands the matter of the terms of surrender. He works out a set of conditions which involved, in addition to the surrender of the army, what was practically a treaty of peace between the states lately in revolt and the United States. Sherman gives a preliminary consent to a surrender on these terms but explains to Johnston and to Reagan that a document of this kind must be submitted to Washington for approval. At the time this report from Sherman reached President Andrew Johnson, General Grant was in Washington. The Army of the Potomac had had its enthusiastic reception and the march past in the capital. Stanton and Johnson are indignant with Sherman for allowing himself to go outside of his responsibilities as a commander of troops and to undertake to assume authority for political action. Stanton proposed that Grant should at once proceed to North Carolina and, superseding Sherman, should take into his own hands the matter of the surrender. Grant, who did not like Stanton, speaking over his head to the President said, in substance:

“I am quite ready, Mr. President, to go as your messenger with any instructions to General Sherman that you may decide upon. I must decline, however, to supersede General Sherman in the command of the army in North Carolina. This is Sherman’s army. Its successes have been won under Sherman’s leader-

ship, and the General must not be brought into mortification in the face of his troops."

Grant was too big a man at that time to have his counsel or decisions gainsaid. He went to North Carolina as a messenger. We boys in the camp were never permitted to know of his visit. He arrived within some miles of Durham Station in the afternoon, but waited until dark for his call upon Sherman. Sherman, in greeting him, said in substance: "I suppose, General Grant, you have come to relieve me?"

"Not at all," said Grant, "do you not see that I have come without my sword? I am simply a messenger bearing instructions from the President. You are to cancel this conditional arrangement with Postmaster Reagan. You are to tell General Johnston to come to you with a staff officer only and with no civilian. You are to accept the surrender of Johnston's army with the terms that were put into force at Appomattox. I shall myself return at once to Washington."

And the Lieutenant-General then slipped away into the darkness.

How many of our American Generals would have put to one side the opportunity for taking the surrender of both the great armies and thus of enjoying the glory of bringing the war to a close? Sherman

realized the nature of Grant's consideration for his old comrade and in his memoirs he makes full acknowledgment.

The war is at an end, but Grant, modest man as he is, cannot escape being in the public eye. He is obliged to accept, in 1868, the nomination for the presidency which had been tendered in 1864. The election is a foregone conclusion. His inaugural as President contains the words now historic, "Let us have peace." These words are properly recorded on the Grant monument in Riverside Drive. The friends and admirers of Grant and his old soldiers who belong, of course, in the circle, are obliged to admit that as a President he was not a success. His nature was too simple and too unsuspecting to guard him properly against the influence of unpatriotic and selfish citizens who wanted to utilize, and who in too many cases were able to utilize, the power of the President for their own enrichment. Both his first and second administrations were shadowed through the fraudulent behavior of men for whose appointments Grant was responsible. The good General's unwillingness to believe that any man in whom he had trusted could have betrayed his confidence, caused him to maintain the defense of unworthy subordinates like Bellamy and Shepherd. His judgment in the selection of men for army service had been shown to be good, but he had had no experi-

ence in administrative work which gave him the ability to make equally wise selections for the posts subject to the presidential appointment.

I was myself a member of the Committee of New York Independents who did what was practicable at the Chicago Convention of 1880 to prevent the nomination of Grant for a third term.

In retiring from the White House, Grant made his home in New York and looked for a business opening for his two sons. Here again the simple nature of the good General was imposed upon. A clever and unscrupulous Wall Street manipulator, Ferdinand Ward, got hold of the General, and persuaded him to invest his little capital, and some further funds that he borrowed from friends, in what Ward insisted was a most promising business undertaking. The two sons were taken in by Ward as partners in the newly constituted firm of Grant & Ward. Speculations carried on in South America used up, in not many months' time, the capital of the concern and brought it into bankruptcy. Ward had not only indulged in speculation, but he had secured, largely with the aid of the name of Grant, funds from various clients which had never been invested at all. Ward was indicted for the misappropriation of funds. It was important to do what might be practicable to prevent any shadow of Ward's frauds from resting upon General Grant. At the time of the failure of

Grant & Ward, I happened to be foreman of the Grand Jury. I found that a certain Mr. Fish, President of the Marine Bank, had had a part in the fraudulent transactions of Ward, and that the Marine Bank had been utilized in connection with some of the so-called blind pool investments. The Marine Bank, which was brought into failure, was a depository for the City's money and this fact gave me a pretext for an investigation by the Grand Jury into the affairs of Grant & Ward. As a result of this investigation, I was able to make a presentment signed by the twenty-three members of the jury, which cleared General Grant absolutely from any responsibility for, or any knowledge of, Ward's fraudulent transactions. I may say that in this undertaking, which was in itself difficult, I was very much helped by the frankness of Ward himself who proved an excellent witness. I had succeeded in having his removal to Sing Sing delayed until I could complete his examination, and I found him anxious to do what he could to clear the character of the man whose fortune he had appropriated.

The failure of Grant & Ward left the General, who was now sixty-three years of age, with absolutely no resources, but friends promptly came to the front and under the initiative of men like George W. Childs, of Philadelphia, A. T. Stewart, and others, funds were at once secured that freed the General

from immediate need. His old comrade and old-time opponent, General Buckner, himself a poor man, sent a check for one thousand dollars to Grant with the words: "I have no present use for this money, please accept it, and return the amount at your convenience." The check was not utilized, but the expression of loyal friendship must in this time of misfortune have brought no little cheer to the ruined General.

This Wall Street undertaking had been entered into not because the General had any desire in later years of his life to accumulate property for himself, but partly for the purpose of securing a business position for his two sons. The anxieties and troubles that came upon him as a result of Ward's rascality and of Ward's use of his name undoubtedly weakened Grant's vitality, and his life was brought to a close in 1885 in his sixty-fourth year.

The thought occurred to him that a volume recording his memories of men and events might earn a few dollars and constitute a little property for his wife, and he began, in 1885, the writing of his *Memoirs*. Before the work was completed, there came upon him the illness which after a few months proved fatal. The attack took the form finally of cancer in his throat. He lost the power of speaking beyond a whisper. He felt, however, the importance of completing his *Memoirs*, and he continued the dictation

to his secretaries at a time when every whispered utterance brought agony to his throat. His will-power and persistence were successful at this time, as they had been successful in previous crises of his life. He was able, although confined to his bed, to hold his strength sufficiently long to make it possible to bring to completion the final chapters. These chapters, for clearness of thought and grace of expression, are as good as any in the book, and the book itself is a wonderful piece of work. Grant had never had any literary experience. He doubted, when he came to begin his record, whether he had sufficient ability to write a narrative that was deserving of coming into print. The book gives evidence, however, of a satisfactory mastery of clear, simple, and effective English. It has been frequently compared to the Commentaries of Julius Cæsar. The comparison is sound as far as clearness and precision of statement are concerned, but the Commentaries, with which we were all of us as schoolboys painfully familiar, are the work of a writer who is thinking of himself, who is emphasizing the importance of his own career and who, with reference to his own political advancement, is emphasizing at its highest possible value the service that he has rendered to the State. Grant's autobiographical narrative is characterized, as said, by perfect simplicity and by a charming self-forgetfulness.

During his career there had come upon him a large measure of criticism, much of it unfair, and some of it based upon absolute misstatements. He knew in many cases who were the men who had traduced his character in order to prevent his advancement. In some instances these were rivals who had tried to undermine him in Washington in order that their own opportunities for leadership might be furthered. The two volumes of the Memoirs contain not one single word of animadversion upon any of his army comrades, or upon any citizen or person with whom, during his forty years of mature life, he had come into relations. The book itself is a wonderful revelation of character. It was so accepted by his comrades, while the general public found themselves so much interested in this admirable record of the chief campaigns of the Civil War that they bought of the two volumes hundreds of thousands of copies. I have been told that Grant's widow, to whom he had hoped to leave a "few dollars," received from the book, which was left as her property, in the course of two years, \$500,000.

After his death, therefore, the man continued to speak to his fellow citizens through his record of his life and of his service. A simple-hearted American Citizen who used to the fullest advantage the talents, which properly may be described as quite moderate talents, that the Lord had given to him. The mem-



ory of the man is fully entitled to honor, not only from those who, like myself, had the privilege of serving under him, but from all Americans of later generations who are able to realize how much the service of Ulysses S. Grant had to do with the maintenance of the Republic.

## LETTERS FROM A VIRGINIA PRISON

1864-1865

IN another paper in this volume, I have related the incidents connected with my capture at the Battle of Cedar Creek; and in a volume published some years back under the title of *A Prisoner in Virginia*, I have given a sufficiently comprehensive account of the things that happened to me through the winter. My experiences as a prisoner lasted from October 19, 1864, to the first of March, 1865. I may recall that it seemed a good deal longer. During these months, I wrote from prison, as we were told by the prison adjutant we had permission to write, a number of letters to my Father, and to other members of the family. I think the series must have comprised in all some forty. I knew, from the experience of others, that there was a fair chance that many of these letters would never get through. As a fact, seven out of the number did reach the home address. I have added to the series one letter written from Richmond, where I was on parole distributing supplies to my fellow prisoners, and a second from the

camp of detention in Annapolis. I thought that these letters might be of some service in giving an impression of prison conditions and restrictions. It could, at best, however, only be an impression, because the letters were, under necessary restrictions, sent open and could, therefore, contain nothing that would not meet the approval of, or at least pass muster with, the prison adjutant. A more trustworthy statement of the actual experience is given in the book above referred to.

In several of the letters I had tried the experiment of making reference to certain texts in the Scriptures. I had been able to preserve my pocket Testament, and I thought it probable that the examining officer would not take the time to look up the texts. I had prided myself on being able, through these texts, to give an indication of actual conditions (more particularly in regard to food, clothing, and percentage of deaths among my comrades) that could not be referred to in the open letter. Unfortunately, these text-bearing letters were among those that did not get through. Their miscarriage may possibly have been due to the fact that some one of the examiners did possess familiarity with the Scriptures and thought to block my not very abstruse design. These letters do not, and, as pointed out, could not, explain much, or give any important information. It would certainly, however, be interesting if we could have in print

today specimens of similar letters written, say, from the prison hulks in New York Harbor in 1777. There is, I believe, value in any document that presents an actual experience, and this is the only excuse for preserving in print these very personal communications.

I may add that through the winter there came neither to myself nor, as far as I can recall, to any one of my fellow prisoners, any letters from home. Our Fathers had done what they could to establish communication. Without knowing the details of conditions in the prisons, they realized the service that could be rendered if they could get some funds into the hands of their boys. It proved impossible, however, to induce Mr. Ould, the Confederate Commissioner of Prisons, or, back of Ould, President Davis, to arrange with our authorities for the transmission of such remittances or material. In my volume on *Prison Experiences*, I have made reference to the difference of treatment in this matter accorded to the Confederate prisoners in one of the Northern prisons of which I had personal knowledge, Camp Morton at Indianapolis. The authorities in charge arranged for a bank in which was deposited such money as had been taken from the prisoners. It was, of course, not wise to leave to a prisoner any amount large enough to be utilized to further his escape. The prison authorities announced that

they were ready to receive, from either side of the line, remittances which would be placed to the credit of each prisoner concerned, and the prisoners were allowed to make weekly drafts, for restricted amounts, against their credits. At the very time when from the group of prisoners with which I had been included, our captors were appropriating overcoats, blankets, and shoes, my friend, Captain Sturgis, acting as Quartermaster at Camp Morton, was distributing blankets, overcoats, and shoes to the Confederate prisoners, many of whom were at the time of their capture in a state of comparative destitution. The deaths in the Northern prisons were sadly numerous, but the surgeons reported that while the prisoners suffered, particularly in the further Northern prison camps on the Lakes, from change of climate, the large factor in the mortality was the bad physical condition in which the poor boys were at the time of their capture. Pneumonia comes easily to men who have been over-fatigued and underfed.

G. H. P.

NEW YORK, Jan., 1924.

RICHMOND, VA., Oct. 30, 1864.

At this date I am still like Mrs. Micawber, "doing as well as can be expected," and, like her worthy spouse, "waiting for something to turn up." I now send a delayed letter.

LIBBY PRISON, RICHMOND, VA.,  
Oct. 25th, 1864.

DEAR FATHER AND MOTHER,

Knowing how anxious you must be to hear from me, I write these few lines to-day, although they cannot be forwarded for a week, as there is a probability of my being sent South at a moment's notice. You probably saw my name in the list of "missing" at the battle of Cedar Creek. My regt. was in the first line, on the extreme left of the 19th Corps. We were attacked simultaneously from two sides, and lost heavily. I was the last officer in the line, and I staid too long, for when I came to retreat, I found myself cut off. I escaped unhurt, though a bullet cut a hole through my trousers. I lost all my personal property. We had a hard march of 100 miles to Staunton, and were bro't thence by rail here. We expect to be sent to South Carolina. You can easily understand that I cannot now speak to you of the treatment we have rece'd, or of our present circumstances, and perhaps the less said the better. My health is pretty good, though I was rather broken down by the march. There are forty-eight officers here now. Our amusements are chess, story-telling, and promenading (à la caged lions). I am not allowed to write more. There would be no good I fear in your writing. Give my love to all the little ones. I can trust in God for the result.

Your loving son  
HAVEN.



Libby Prison, Richmond, Va.  
From a photograph taken in 1865





DANVILLE, VA., Nov. 13th, 1864.

DEAR FATHER AND MOTHER,

I wrote to you a fortnight ago from Libby Prison, Richmond. I was moved here 10 or 12 days ago in company with 70 others. The characteristics of prison life here are crowd, hunger, cold and discomfort, but I have thus far preserved my health and spirits better than I should have thought possible. I have found some pleasant companions, and manage to live without "ennui." I have picked up a Spanish grammar and employ my time principally at that and chess. We are eagerly talking over the prospect of an exchange, and trust that now that the excitement of election is over, the claims of our prisoners will not be forgotten. Exchanges are sometimes effected for those who have friends at Hdqrs. The election for President among our officers here stood—Lincoln 276, McClellan 95. There is a possibility that permission will be granted this winter for our government or our friends to send packages to us. What I need most is—underclothes, soap, a comb, a warm jacket, a Testament, an algebra, pencil, paper, pocket knife, miniature slate and pencil and some confederate money (*das letzte könnte in einem stückchen kleider eingenäht werden*). Hard-tack would be acceptable but would be too bulky. It is practicable we are told now to send letters through. Gen. Dix can tell you how they should be addressed. Don't attempt to enclose greenbacks. They are confiscated. Give my love to all the dear ones.

Your son  
HAVEN.

DANVILLE PENITENTIARY FOR  
OBSTREPEROUS "YANKS"

Nov. 29th, 1864.

DEAR SISTER MINNIE,

I can hardly hope under my present circumstances to be able to carry on with you the correspondence that I had promised myself for this winter, but I can at least send you a brotherly greeting, which may reach you by Christmas. I must also warn you that I can hardly hope to receive an epistle from you if you write in your usual discursive philosophical style, for all letters that pass between us have to be examined by the C. S. authorities, and I fear they would hardly have the patience to investigate carefully theories on the origin of matter, or speculations as to the chemical nature of spleen. Your forebodings at our parting in the University that something might happen to the subscriber, have been, you see, verified, but the something, though disagreeable enough, is not so bad as it might have been, and tho' decidedly dirty, ragged, somewhat attenuated, and (O ye gods and little fishes! must I confess it) engaged in frequent contests with animalculæ, I am still "right side up with care," and trusting in a few months at Uncle Abraham's good pleasure, to be ret'd in a "serviceable condition" to the "vine and fig tree." I am studying Spanish and Algebra, and teaching German and French, so that my time is fully occupied, and my thoughts do not wander *very* often to what Mrs. Chadband calls the "Belly gods." Tell father to write to the

Act. Adj. of my regt. (3rd B, 2nd D, 19th C. Washington) and have my valise etc. sent home if it has not been captured. I am told that letters to me should be addressed to Danville Mil. Prison, and enclosed to Major Mulford, Fortress Monroe, for transmission, so also with packages. I repeat the list of *wants* sent in previous letters. Bible, shirts and pr. drawers, 2 prs. socks, warm jacket, dark corduroy pants, soap, sponge, towel, brush and comb, writing and sewing materials, algebra, small slate, pencils, chemistry, condensed coffee, and tea and sugar, pepper, Bologna sausage, and money *wenn Sie es in etwas verbergen können*. Don't make the package too large. Enclose in a valise, and that in a box, screwed down.

Merry Christmas to you all.

Your loving brother

HAVEN.

DANVILLE, VA., Dec. 11th, 1864.

DEAR FATHER AND MOTHER,

I did not write to you last week because I have but one or two sheets of paper left, and have no money to buy more. Do not be anxious if you should fail for any length of time to hear from me, as my impecuniosity will be the most probable cause. I invested my last funds in soap and writing materials, and am now solely dependent for support upon the Confederacy, and (with no intentional disrespect) I might easily be in better hands. There will be some *interesting* accounts to give one of these days. I

spend my days studying, teaching, and "skirmishing" with minute allies of the "Confeds," who have no respect for our defenceless condition. I am not able to study as much as formerly, as my eyes refuse to work on "low diet." Our evenings we spend in talking of home and army experiences, and our nights in dreaming of friends and good dinners. We are becoming fearfully material in our philosophy, and are all perfectly convinced of the existence of matter, and the absence of certain kinds of the same that would further our well being. As our hopes of a speedy exchange seem weaker, our thoughts are turned towards letters and boxes from home. At the risk of wearying you, I repeat the list of wants sent in previous letters, as there is much risk in the transmissal. Bible, warm jacket, dark corduroy pants, soap, sponge and towel, woolen shirts, and pr. drawers, 2 prs. socks, silk hdkf., woolen sleeping-cap, writing and sewing materials, slate, pencils, algebra, book of chemical problems, (Dublin) "Idyls of the hearth," cayenne, mustard, condensed coffee, tea and sugar, bologna sausage, pocket knife, anything condensed that is eatable, and can be easily investigated, money, *wenn es in etwas verbergt werden kann, (im hemde)*. Place in a valise, and that in a box screwed down, address Dan. Mil. prison, and send, I believe, to care of Major Mulford, Fort Monroe. We have just rec'd the President's message—anxiously awaiting other news. Have my valise sent to you from regt. if it was not captured. I am hungry for some news from home, and want especially to hear of Edith's success. Remember

me to all friends and relations, and give love to all the family circle. I won a match game of chess yesterday, and am thus far champion of the Prison.

Your son,  
HAVEN.

DANVILLE, VA., Dec. 18th, 1864.

DEAR MOTHER,

I don't know how successful my former letters have been in reaching you, but in spite of the chance of its being perhaps useless, I continue to write because the act itself seems to bring me nearer home, and is in itself a comfort. My circumstances have somewhat improved lately. I have borrowed some little money from an officer lately arrived, whom I had formerly known, and am able therewith to purchase some small additions to my rations which are very acceptable. I have had for a chum since my capture a young fellow named Vander-Weyde, with whom I get along very well. He contributed to the partnership a blanket, cup, plate and knife, I a plate, fork, spoon, cup, blanket and canteen; for the last two months we have marched, hungered, feasted, slept and lived in common. Two blankets make a better bed than one, and the majority of our officers have formed such partnerships. It would be interesting to you to be able to look into our "apartment," and observe the various ways in which men manifest themselves in captivity. Many are engaged in the laborious task of splitting wood with table knives and wooden wedges, some

are playing chess, cards or checkers; some fortunate ones who have obtained books are reading or studying; a few like myself are engaged in the pleasing occupation of writing home, while some unfortunates on whom imprisonment has acted hardly, are sitting gazing vacantly, stupidly, desolately into nothingness—waiting for brighter days. The floor serves as seats, bedstead, and table for us all. We are hoping that boxes from home will reach us by New Year's. I have sent several lists of wants. Money is the principal one. Reciprocations are sometimes effected with the friends of Southern prisoners North.

Yours trustfully

HAVEN.

DANVILLE, Va., Jan. 1st, 1865.

DEAR FATHER AND MOTHER,

I hardly expected, when I was at home with you a few months ago, to commence the New Year in prison, but such being the case I must make the best of it. My health is still good, I have a pleasant circle of friends, some books, and thanks to the kindness of a comrade, enough to eat. My clothes are thin, and becoming somewhat tattered, but I think with care they will last a few months yet, by which time I trust either to be again among you, or to have established some means of communication by which I can obtain supplies. Several of the officers here have had arrangements made by which they are furnished with a certain amount of articles by the friends of some Southern officer confined North,

and this latter is in return furnished with similar articles by the friends of the Federal officer. If I am to pass the winter in "Dixie" I should be glad if you could find some responsible Southerner from this part of Virginia confined in Fort Lafayette or Delaware, with the friends of whom such a reciprocity could be effected. We hear but little news at present; rumors of exchange are rife, and we are very willing to believe what we so eagerly desire. We passed Christmas in a tolerably cheerful manner, exercising our memories and imaginations as to what our friends at home were doing, and what *we* should be doing if we were our own masters. Yesterday the Confederate post chaplain gave us a sermon, the first we have had for some time.

I have not yet heard from you; have written five or six times.

May God keep you all, and in his own good time again unite us.

Your loving son  
HAVEN.

DANVILLE, VA., Jan. 2nd, 1865.

DEAR FATHER,

Through the kindness of Gen. Hayes, confined here with me, I have heard of the following opportunity of effecting a special exchange, which I doubt not you will be very ready to take advantage of. There is confined on Johnson's Island, Ohio, a lieutenant James B. Clark of Co. K. 18th Miss. regt.; his address there is Block 5, Mess 2. His friends, who live in Greenville, N. C., have been promised

by Col. Ould that application should be made for his exchange. Col. Ould wrote to them saying that he would offer to the Federal authorities to deliver a Fed. lieut. in exchange for Lt. Clark. Gen. Hayes has been requested to use his influence to forward the matter, and has suggested to me that if you would use your influence in Washington (if possible going thither yourself) you could probably bring it about that my name should be proposed by Major Mulford to Col. Ould as one for whom he would be willing to exchange Lt. Clark. I shall write myself to Col. Ould telling him that I have written North to effect the exchange of Clark for myself, and there will probably be no objection on his part. Gen. Dix, or Asst. Sec. Dana could I presume be of assistance in the matter. It is to be effected through Major Mulford, Asst. Com. of Exchange, Fort Monroe.

I shall wait and hope.

Your son  
HAVEN.

DANVILLE, VA., Feby. 4th, 1865.

DEAR FATHER,

I have not written to you for some time, as there seemed to be much doubt whether any of my letters had reached you. I have sent sundry requests for boxes etc. and also as to a chance that I heard of for effecting a special exchange. As far as I am able to learn, the chances appear to be unfavorable for a general exchange, at least for some time to come. I must therefore endeavor to make some arrangement by which I can obtain supplies of food or money,



for the lot of those dependent on prison rations is *hard*. Have you no business acquaintance in Richmond, Lynchburg, Raleigh or Wilmington who could be induced to supply me with some money, on the assurance that you would repay the same to whom-ever he should designate north? There are one or two officers here supplied in that way. You could write under cover thro' Maj. Mulford. Or if you could find any needy Confed. officer in one of our northern prisons who has responsible friends in Va. or N. C. you could supply him with the articles he needs, and have him write to his friends to do the same for me, making the value of the articles equal. Several operations of this kind are in successful working among my acquaintances. I have not yet heard from you. My health is tolerably good. I have at present means of adding to my ration somewhat, also some books to read and am as patient as can be expected. Give my love to all the dear ones.

Your son  
HAVEN.

RICHMOND, VA., Feby. 19th, 1865.

"Hdqrs. U. S. Agency for distribu-  
tion of supplies to Federal  
prisoners."

Lt. G. HAVEN PUTNAM, Asst. Agent.

DEAR FATHER,

I wrote to you ten days ago acknowledging your letters of Jan. 20th, 25th and 30th, the first enclosing \$90.66. I also told you that Gen. Hayes, who has been paroled for the purpose of issuing supplies to

our prisoners, has selected me as an assistant. I came up from Danville Feby. 17th, rec'd my parole, and am now living in very comfortable quarters with the general and Col. Hooper. It is a great luxury to get out of that Danville pigstye, outside of locks and sentries, and into decent clothing and a decent domicile. I shall probably be on duty here eight or ten days, and then trust to be *homeward* bound. I have rec'd my valise and box; many thanks for both. My dress suit comes very conveniently for my present staff duty, but it would have been much out of place in our dirty crowded prison. The mess stores were very happily selected, and are very acceptable. The valise had broken open, and some of its contents may have been lost. I have preserved my health very well thus far, and am at present only troubled with the lingering traces of my prison scurvy. Gen. Hayes is a very pleasant man to serve under, and Colonel Hooper is an energetic co-worker and agreeable companion. It is enjoyable to be the instrument of furnishing comforts to men who need them so much, but it is a great pity these supplies could not have arrived a few months sooner, for they would have saved many lives. I have not yet had much opportunity for seeing the town, but it strikes me as a very quiet place. It is comical to see the sentries stare as I walk past them in my good Yankee blue coat and straps complete. It makes me feel *almost* like a free man. I have a few books here, and when not busy with my work find no difficulty in occupying my time pleasantly, though of course I am very anxious

to get home and see you all. Tell Mother that Col. Hooper commands the regt. in which Will Hutchings was, and Jim Thompson is Quartermaster. Hutchings is now Corps quartermaster, and Thompson is probably still with the regt. I wish you could send me some news about my regt. I understand a new Colonel has been appointed. I should like to hear what are the chances of consolidation etc. All my Danville comrades have been brought to Richmond and will probably be exchanged shortly. If they get off before I do, I shall send my chum, Lieut. Vander-Weyde, to call upon you with latest data. I have been issuing private boxes all day to our enlisted men, and am fairly fagged out, not being yet used to work.

Love to all the dear ones.

Your son  
HAVEN.

NAVAL SCHOOL HOSPITAL,  
ANNAPOLIS, MD.  
Feby. 24th, 1865.

DEAR FATHER,

You have already heard by my telegram of my exit from the land of corn-bread, and arrival in Yankeedom. I wrote to you from Richmond acknowledging the receipt of box and valise, and stating that I was paroled and on duty with Gen. Hayes assisting in the distribution of supplies to our prisoners. I spent a week with him very pleasantly; we were assigned good quarters in a warehouse near "Libby," had a good mess, and lived altogether in

comparative luxury. We had as we supposed work enough to detain us two or three weeks, but the rebel government having decided to exchange our prisoners in the far South at Wilmington, Gen. Hayes was unable to obtain transportation for the supplies to any prisoners south of Virginia. He decided therefore to close up his warehouse, and to leave it in charge of Judge Ould until some officer should be captured who could take charge of it. I enjoyed much the few days of freedom and comfortable living, and considered it somewhat of a distinction to have been selected out of four hundred officers as an associate with the general.

We had a pleasant sail down the James, passing safely over obstructions and torpedoes. The channel has been made a very difficult one, and as you have probably heard, one of the rebel gun boats was blown up by a torpedo a short time ago. We received a warm welcome from Colonel Mulford, and what was as much to the purpose, a drink of whiskey and a good dinner on board his boat. It being Washington's birthday, all our boats were decked out with flags and streamers, and the old gridiron was hailed with enthusiasm by our "with Dixie-disgusted" prisoners. Being on the general's "provisional staff," I obtained cabin quarters and had a pleasant trip to Annapolis. They are very short of accommodations here, and have placed a good many of us who are not at all sick in the hospitals simply because they have nowhere else to put us. There are seven men besides myself in the room none of whom is expected to survive unless they can be sent

home shortly. I have been fortunate enough to meet an officer of my regt. here, who has given me all the news I wanted.

I have received two months' pay. Col. Mulford told me he had heard from you frequently in regard to me and was sorry he had not been able to do more to assist me.

I find Annapolis a very dull place and shall be right glad to leave for home. I have to report to Camp Parole here when my thirty days' leave has expired. Here I remain until declared exchanged, when I shall start for Savannah where the regt. is now stationed. There is but a remnant of the regt. left, but that remnant has gained a splendid reputation. The old colors that were lost in Louisiana have been recaptured on their way to Richmond, and sent to the regt. The hospitals here are beautifully conducted and are models of neatness. We are much crowded (eight men on six beds) but everything seems comfortable compared with the pigstyes we have left, and everyone is happy.

I shall receive my leave of absence in a few days, and shall not delay I assure you in reporting to my delightful Governor.

Your obt. Servt. and affectionate son  
HAVEN.

ANNAPOLIS, MD.  
8 P.M. Feby. 26th, 1865.

MY DEAR FATHER,

I have this moment rec'd your letter of the 24th, and am much obliged to you for writing so promptly.

It is always a pleasure to see your familiar handwriting; and there is especial pleasure in receiving a letter that has been uncontaminated by rebel hands.

I do not think the matter of my furlough can be hastened. My application went on with three hundred and ninety-nine others as soon as we arrived. There is a certain routine to be gone through but it can only take a day or two. I am very comfortably situated here, well boarded and lodged, and associated with a pleasant coterie of companions. We are all however impatient enough to get home. You speak of having written to Gen. Emory concerning my discharge. I must beg you not to be hasty in taking any such steps. I have determined not again to attempt to resign unless disabled. Glad as I should be to remain at home with you, I cannot afford to risk my honor or reputation as a soldier even to effect that desirable result. I have lost caste already in my division on account of endeavoring to get out of the service; my furlough and subsequent capture having prevented my sharing in the triumphs of my regt. and may also have been unfortunate for my name in the corps.

I can't write well by gaslight, so good night.

Love to mother and the children,

Your affectionate son

HAVEN.

## ISRAEL PUTNAM

ADDRESS AT THE UNVEILING OF THE TABLET AT THE  
BIRTHPLACE, DANVERS, MASS., SEPTEMBER 14, 1923

*Members and friends of the Putnam clan, fellow  
Americans:*

WE are gathered together in this historic town to honor the memory of a sturdy American, a born leader of men,—one who dared to lead where any dared to follow,—a man who was able to render noteworthy service to his country during the strenuous years that marked the evolution of our Republic. These were years of toil and struggle, in which our forefathers were carving homes out of the wilderness, carrying on fierce conflicts with the Indians, and later, with the forces of a stupid monarch of German ancestry whose claim to govern by divine right was indignantly contested by the men who had come to this continent in order to live their lives in freedom.

We find a description of these forefathers of ours in the well-known lines of the English statesman Sir William Jones,—

What constitutes a state?  
Men who their duties know,  
But know their rights, and knowing, dare maintain.

To this group of the founders, who were, of necessity, also the fighters, belonged our sturdy kinsman, Israel Putnam, who was born in Danvers, on the seventh of January, 1718. The house in which the boy first saw the light is still, after two centuries, a Putnam homestead. This constitutes a very respectable antiquity for the home of an American family and gives to that family a claim for a place with the American aristocracy.

At the time of Israel's birth, New England was just one century old. The American settlements which preceded the landing of the Pilgrims in 1620 were Jamestown in Virginia, founded in 1607, Quebec founded in 1608, and New Amsterdam, founded in 1614.

These English settlements in America constituted at the time of Putnam's birth a mere fringe along the Atlantic Ocean. Back of the villages on the coast of New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, stretched across the continent the unbroken aboriginal forest, and from these forests from time to time came fierce onslaughts from the Indians who felt that their home lands were being appropriated by the white invaders. There was burning of houses, slaying of men, and carrying off of women and children. As late as 1704, the men of the Connecticut Valley were called upon to defend Deerfield and other villages against fierce assaults from the Indians of



New England and of Canada. It took nearly a century for the sturdy settlers of our America to extend from the Connecticut to the Ohio the frontier line of, more or less, protected settlements.

In 1786, Abraham Lincoln, the first, was shot down by Indians while ploughing in his fields on the Kentucky side of the Ohio, and his son, little Thomas, then a boy of ten, and later the father of our Abraham, ran to tell his mother that the father lay dead by his plough.

In this year of 1718, George I was King of England, and Louis XV was reigning in France. The dreams of Louis XIV of domination over Europe had been destroyed by the victories of Anne's great General Marlborough. The Empire of Austria had for its ruler Charles the Second, shortly to be succeeded by Maria Theresa.

Frederick the First ruled as the first King of Prussia, but his little kingdom was far from being a world power.

Shortly thereafter, however, under Frederick's son, Prussia was to begin the long struggle with Austria which ended only a century and a half later with the triumph of Prussia at Königgratz and the expulsion of Austria from Germany.

The Empire of Austria no longer exists and the Empire of Prussia, the development of which dates back to the battle of Königgratz in 1866, has also passed.

The Republic founded by the men among whom Israel Putnam was to become a leader, is today the great power in the family of nations.

George Washington, to whose leadership the creation of the Republic owes so much, was born in 1732, fourteen years later than Israel Putnam. Israel was one of the oldest of the men who, having done active work in previous wars, was able to fulfil responsibilities in the War of the Revolution. Abraham Lincoln was born in 1809, ten years after the death of Washington.

It is a wholesome belief that leaders will arise at the time when leadership is needed for the saving of the State.

In 1740, Israel decided to migrate from his homestead in Danvers to what were believed to be more fertile lands in Connecticut. He was fortunate in securing a good price for lands in Salem village and elsewhere, and with this money he purchased in a district in Connecticut then known as Mortlake, which was later included in the town of Pomfret, 514 acres. He paid for this at the rate of five pounds an acre, giving a mortgage for a portion of the amount. The purchase was made in partnership with his brother-in-law, Joseph Pope. The two young men were at that time of the same age, 22 years.

In 1740, Israel took his wife and child to his new home in Pomfret. His energy and industry brought

success, and within two years he had purchased his brother-in-law's share of the property and had paid off the mortgage.

In the winter of 1742-'43, occurred the wolf hunt, which may be said to have brought the name of Israel into the legendary history of the country. The farmers were trying to protect their sheep against the wolves, but they had had special difficulty with an old she-wolf which had repeatedly eluded their guns. One night, no less than 70 of Putnam's sheep and goats were killed, as if from pure wantonness, by this old wolf. They were able to trace her presence by the mark on the snow of a foot that had been wounded. Putnam and his neighbors spent a day in tracing the animal to its den, a big cave in Pomfret. Israel took upon himself the task of entering the cave with his gun. His aim was directed by the fiery eyes of the wolf as she crouched at the end of the dark cave, but he was fortunate with his first shot, killing the wolf as she was about to spring. The only damage that came to Putnam was through the fright of his friends at the mouth of the cave. In pulling up the rope, under the signal, they brought out not Putnam, but the wolf; they were so frightened that they let go the rope, allowing the dead wolf to fall upon Israel.

The story of Putnam and the wolf has had fascination as an American household tale and it brought to

the young farmer throughout the community a reputation for courage, which undoubtedly influenced his selection later as a leader.

In 1755, at the beginning of what is known as the French and Indian War, Israel was thirty-seven years old. He left his farm and his growing family and took service, which proved to be very active service, with Captain Rogers, who had a more or less independent company entitled the "Rangers." Israel was promptly promoted from the ranks to be a Lieutenant. He had as a comrade in the Company, John Stark, who later became famous in history because the battle of Bennington did *not* leave Molly Stark a widow. In October, Israel is appointed Captain.

During the months in which the Rangers were fighting their way backwards and forwards through the forests about Lake George, Israel was always one of the men picked for active service. In a letter from Commander Rogers, giving to the Captain a brief leave of absence in May, 1756, Israel is described as "the blunt and sturdy Israel Putnam."

In May, 1757, Israel is in service at Fort William Henry, and his command is there joined by his cousin Rufus, who was about twenty years younger. Rufus was later to secure fame as the first of Washington's engineer officers.

Senator George F. Hoar speaks of Rufus Putnam as follows:

“To the genius of Rufus Putnam was due the favorable result at three great turning points in American History. It was his skill as an engineer that compelled the evacuation of Boston. It was his skill as an engineer that fortified West Point. To Rufus Putnam was due the settlement of the Ohio Territory and the framing and adoption of the ordinance of 1787 which dedicated the Northwest forever to freedom, education, and religion, and, in the end, saved the United States from becoming a great slaveholding empire.”

In Cooper's *Last of the Mohicans*, we have a dramatic picture of the capture of Fort William Henry by the troops of Montcalm and of the massacre by Indians, whom Montcalm did not succeed in restraining, of a large portion of the garrison. Captain Israel had been sent to Fort Edward to hasten the coming of re-enforcements, and he escaped, therefore, being a prisoner.

In December, Israel was commended in dispatches for gallantry. At the time the barracks were burning, he was able to save the powder magazine, the explosion of which would have been a great disaster.

In 1758, we find Israel serving as a Major in the disastrous campaign of Abercrombie.

In August, he is made a prisoner by the Indian allies of Montcalm and is tied to a stake for burning.

He is rescued by a French officer and taken to Montreal, and in October secured his exchange.

In 1759, he is in command of a battalion at the capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and in 1760 he serves with Gage in the taking of Montreal. The attack on Montreal had been delayed because the French cruiser *Ottawa* made difficult the crossing of the St. Lawrence. Israel secured the service of a couple of oarsmen, and taking with him his weapons and mallet and some wedges, had himself rowed out in the dark hours of the night to where the *Ottawa* was lying in the stream with her guns turned on the lines of the besiegers. With clever use of the mallet, Israel succeeded in wedging the rudder so that it would not obey the helm. When, with the coming of the day, the cruiser got under way for the purpose of shelling the camp of the English and Colonials, in the absence of steering power, she was driven ashore by the force of the current and was then easily captured by the Colonial troops.

In 1761, Israel is assigned to the work of reconstructing the fortifications along the frontier. These are to be useful in the future for defense not against the French, but against the Indians.

In 1762, we find Putnam again leaving his farm and his local interests for active service in command of his Connecticut regiment in the expedition to Havana. His vessel was wrecked, but his men ar-

rived in time to take part in the capture of the City.

In 1765, we find our hero brought into proceedings which constituted in fact the beginning of the Revolution. He was appointed Chairman of the representatives of Connecticut to tell Governor Fitch that no attempts must be made to enforce the stamp tax which had been imposed under the decisions of the British Parliament, decisions in which the Colonial legislature had had no voice. Israel tells Fitch that if the stamps are received by him and are placed in the Governor's house, this house will be razed to the ground. Washington Irving refers to Putnam at this time of his career as "a soldier of native growth, seasoned and proved in frontier campaigning."

In 1766, there comes to Israel a great sorrow in the loss of his wife Hannah. She had borne to Putnam ten children, seven of whom were at that time living. The death of his wife brought to the old fighting farmer a revived interest in matters of religion and he becomes a member of the Congregational church of Pomfret. He is at the same time selected as a member of the State Committee organized to protect the charter of Connecticut against further interference from the Crown, and in the same year he is elected to the Colonial legislature. A year later, he takes as his second wife a capable widow, Mrs. Deborah Gardiner, who was at that time forty-five

years of age. She proved in the full sense of the word a helpmate and a very capable partner. It was under her advice that in 1769 the Putnam homestead became the Putnam Inn. She contended that this was necessary if the veteran was to save himself from being ruined by his hospitality. Putnam selected as the sign of the Inn a painting of General Wolfe. This sign now finds place in the collection of the Historical Society at Hartford.

In 1763, Israel is serving as a selectman for Pomfret. It is interesting to note that while our kinsman had had no time for education, he was always pressed to the front when public service was required. He had secured a distinctive reputation for good judgment, will power, and public spirit. He had the capacity, which was valuable in his citizen's life as well as in his army work, of infusing public spirit and will power into the men who were working with him.

In 1772, he was selected as the representative citizen of the town to ring the bell for the Church services. When, later in the year, he is called to Florida, this task devolved upon the Pastor. Israel's work in the South was in service as Chairman of a Committee to inspect and select lands in West Florida which were to be assigned, under the promise of the British Government, to the Colonial veterans of the French and Indian War. His cousin Rufus was one of his associates in this committee. His diary covers



the trip by the sloop *Mississippi* through the West Indies, to Pensacola, New Orleans, and up the Mississippi as far as the present site of Vicksburg. In connection with the fresh troubles that broke out between the Colonies and the authorities in Great Britain, the promised grant of land was never issued, to the serious disappointment of the "military adventurers," so-called, who had given much labor to the exploration for these lands.

1773 brings further events in the development of the revolutionary spirit. Parliament imposes a duty on tea and the leaders in Boston, of the Liberal party, which was becoming the Revolutionary party, taking for the time the rôle of Pequot Indians, threw into the harbor of Boston the first importations under the act. I am interested in recalling that the leader of those "Indians" was a direct ancestor of mine, Joseph Palmer, at that time a youngster of twenty-six. Palmer afterwards served with Putnam and under Washington as ordnance officer and became a Brigadier General.

In 1774, we find Israel Chairman of the Committee sent to give to the citizens of Boston assurance of the backing and the active support of Connecticut. The letter from Connecticut was delivered by Putnam to Samuel Adams in Boston. He is the guest in Boston of Dr. Joseph Warren, whose name is familiar in connection with the Battle of Bunker Hill. War-

ren was one of the first of the noteworthy citizens to sacrifice his life for the country. Israel is not content, in going to Boston, to carry merely empty compliments from Connecticut. He takes with him as a gift for the citizens of Boston from the farms of Pomfret, 130 sheep. A Boston paper of the day chronicles the arrival of the "celebrated Col. Putnam, so well known throughout North America." Israel finds in Boston a group of old army comrades, General Gage, Lord Percy, Colonel Small and others, and he holds friendly discussions with these British Leaders in regard to the issues with England.

In September, 1774, on the strength of a report from Boston, which was later found to be erroneous, of fighting between the troops and the citizens, Putnam issues a letter which arouses the men of Connecticut. He calls upon his fellow citizens to fall into line, or rather into marching column, in order to help Massachusetts. It was not yet time for the march, but as a result of this letter Putnam comes to be accepted by Connecticut as its leader in the constitutional issues and in the work of withstanding the assaults upon the liberties of America.

In 1774, Putnam receives his commission as Lieutenant-Colonel of the 11th Connecticut. I have a personal association with this regiment. The 11th Connecticut, containing probably descendants of the Connecticut men of the Revolution, was brigaded

with my own regiment during the campaigns in Louisiana in 1862-'63, and did, as its predecessor had done nearly a century earlier, first-rate fighting.

On the 19th of April, there came to Pomfret the news of the fight at Lexington. Israel, at that time in the field, turns over the plough to his son, and without waiting to change his dress, goes at once to Governor Trumbull. From the Governor he receives orders to report to Boston, and he rides the 100 miles in eighteen hours. While in Boston, he is appointed, by the General Assembly of the State, Brigadier General of the Connecticut troops. At headquarters in Cambridge, he meets in May, General Ward, Colonel Prescott, and General Warren. He gives attention at once to the planning of fortifications, and in this work he secures the aid of his cousin Rufus, who was much better trained for engineering service. While in Cambridge, he receives from General Gage, commander of the British troops in Boston, offer of a commission as Major General, if he will give his support to the English Government. We have no record of the answer given by Israel to Gage, but we find him, on the 19th of June, accepting a commission given, through the hands of Washington, by Congress, as Major General in the Continental Army.

On the 27th of May, Israel is the commander in a skirmish at Chelsea, in which he succeeds in rescuing certain cattle that were being taken for the use of the

British troops in Boston. This was the second fight of the Revolution. Later in the year, Israel succeeded, partly on the ground of his old-time personal relations with the British commanders, in securing an arrangement for the exchange of prisoners. When this had been accomplished, Israel points out to General Gage that "the granting of this exchange constitutes a recognition of the belligerency rights of the Colonials."

The plan for putting up entrenchments on Breed's Hill and Bunker Hill, which should serve as a menace to the British lines, in Boston, was Putnam's. The digging of the trenches on Breed's Hill, which had been planned by Putnam, was placed in the hands of Colonel Prescott. Putnam was given the general command of the troops sent out from Cambridge to occupy the two hills. General Warren reported for service, but insisted upon fighting as a volunteer without command. We have from a contemporary writer named Johnson, the report of the order given by Putnam to Prescott's men in the entrenchments on Breed's Hill:

"Hold your fire until you see the whites of their eyes. Fire low; save your shot; powder is scarce. Pick the officers." Putnam checks the too previous firing on the part of the inexperienced troops.

"We have the description of Putnam riding backwards and forwards between the two hills and across

the neck (a region particularly exposed to fire from the fleet), rallying the men and giving instructions for the use of their rifles.”

At the second attack, still on horseback, riding along the line and being in the front of the line, Israel saves the life of his old friend, Colonel Small, who had fallen wounded in front of the entrenchments.

Irving, in his description of the Battle, writes:

“Putnam was a leading spirit throughout the affair; one of the first to prompt and one of the last to maintain it. He appears to have been active and efficient at every point; sometimes fortifying; sometimes hurrying up reinforcements; inspiring the men by his presence while they were able to maintain their ground, and fighting gallantly at the outpost to cover their retreat. The brave old man, riding about in the heat of the action, on this sultry day, ‘with a hanger belted across his brawny shoulders, over a waistcoat without sleeves,’ has been sneered at by a contemporary, as ‘much fitter to head a band of sickle men or ditchers than musketeers.’ But this very description illustrates his character, and identifies him with the times and the service. A yeoman fresh from the plough, in the garb of rural labour; a patriot brave and generous, but rough and ready, who thought not of himself in time of danger, but was ready to serve in any way, and to sacrifice official rank and self-glorification to the good of the cause. He was eminently a soldier for the occasion. His

name has long been a favorite one with young and old; one of the talismanic names of the Revolution, the very mention of which is like the sound of a trumpet. Such names are the precious jewels of our history, to be garnered up among the treasures of the nation, and kept immaculate from the tarnishing breath of the cynic and the doubter."

Silas Deane, later Commissioner in Paris for the U. S., refers in a letter of the time to the "brave intrepidity of old General Putnam on whom by every account the whole army has depended ever since the Lexington Battle." Deane goes on to say:

"Putnam's merit rang through this Continent; his fame still increases,—and every day justifies the unanimous applause of the continent."

Lieut. Samuel B. Webb, who was in service at this time with the Army in Cambridge, writes:

"General Washington and General Lee (Charles Lee) are fonder of Putnam and think more highly of him than of any man in the Army. He is truly the hero of the day."

Worthington Ford, writing in 1901, concerning this Bunker Hill period says:

"At this time the opportunity of serving under 'Old Put' was something to be desired. He was the most popular of the commanding officers."

On the 18th of July, Putnam had the privilege of raising in Cambridge the first flag that had as yet been put up by the Revolutionary troops. It was a Connecticut flag with its letters in scarlet and its armorial bearings in gold. It bore the name "Putnam's Flag."

At a dinner to Washington's officers given in Cambridge, September, 1775, General Washington gave as a toast,—

"A speedy and an honorable peace."

Putnam took the opportunity of saying later:

"I drank, as in duty bound, the toast as presented by your Excellency. I should myself prefer to drink to the toast of a long and moderate war."

Putnam went on to explain:

"I can expect nothing but a long war and would have it carried on moderately, in order that we may hold out until the mother country becomes willing to cast us off forever."

In December, Putnam and Heath were putting up fortifications on Cobble Hill. The route for Putnam's workers came under heavy fire from one of the ships and the men naturally scattered. A narrative of the time says:

"Putnam, who never runs, remained to help off the field the engineer, Col. Gridley, who was lame."

In January, 1776, Rufus Putnam, who had won the confidence of Washington as a capable and trustworthy engineer, prepared, in co-operation with Israel, the works on Dorchester Heights, the guns of which commanded the vessels of Howe's fleet lying in the roads. Howe and Gage had supposed that the frozen condition of the ground would prevent any work on entrenchments. Washington had raised question in regard to this entrenching, on the ground that they had very few guns, but a small number of cannon balls, and practically no powder. Some of the guns which appeared over the edge of the Dorchester entrenchments had been dragged across the country in the winter weather from Ticonderoga. These were part of the lot captured by Ethan Allen. During January, Putnam had a demonstration made on a sandy hill in order to incite firing from the ship *Somerset* lying in the harbor. As a result, he was able the next day to pick up some hundreds of cannon balls buried harmlessly in the sand. When the muzzles of the guns appeared over the entrenchments in Dorchester, Howe reports to Gage that the ships in the roads cannot be protected, and that unless Gage will capture the Dorchester lines, the fleet must be moved out. The memory of Bunker Hill deters Gage from assaulting the lines at Dorchester. These lines were but thinly protected, and Washington's troops had no ammunition sufficient to withstand a



determined assault. The influence of Bunker Hill was, however, valuable all through the years of the Revolution in discouraging the British commanders from assaulting Americans in entrenchments. Gage decides to evacuate Boston and takes off with him on the 17th of March, 7000 men. To Col. Rufus Putnam is given the honor of leading the Continental troops into Boston.

In April, Putnam was sent to fortify the City of New York, which then had a population of 26,000. In June he has occasion to quell riots and to save the lives of Tory citizens. It is proper for Americans to admit in any reference from now in the events of the Revolutionary years that the treatment of American Tories in Boston, as in New York, was unfair and unpatriotic, and was unwise for the interests of the future nation. We do not lessen in the least our admiration for the pluck, persistence, and wisdom with which the founders of the Republic maintained their cause during the long years of contest and of discouragement. Then, as always in time of war, the leaders, and the people back of the leaders, had bitter feelings towards their English antagonists, feelings which were natural and, under the circumstances, unavoidable. It is time now to take an historical view of the conditions, a view such as has been taken by an American historian like John Fiske and by an English historian like Sir George Trevelyan. We

may now realize that it was quite possible for a Colonial to be a patriotic American and yet be sharply critical of, and fiercely antagonistic to, the schemes for domination and for taxation without representation, which had been attempted by the Parliament and the King of Britain. At the same time, such patriotic Loyalists might well believe that there were better ways of securing redress from those evils than by breaking away from the British Empire and embarking upon the hazardous experiment of founding a new state. The judgment of the Tories has been proved to be wrong, but it was not in order under the circumstances to criticize them as traitors or to press them into exile while appropriating great portions of their properties.

In June, 1776, a clever man and capable officer, in regard to whose patriotism there came later to be well-founded doubt, Col. Aaron Burr, joins the staff of Putnam.

On the fourth of July, came the Declaration of Independence, which constitutes the formal beginning of our national existence. On the fourth of July, 142 years later, a great meeting was held in London, under the direction of Lord Bryce, the purpose of which was to extend to the American Republic congratulations for having succeeded in maintaining the independence declared in 1776. This meeting was called by a British Committee and was presided over

by Lord Bryce. King George's Government was officially represented by one of the Ministers, and ministers from Australia and Canada were there to speak for the two great Dominions. The Ambassador, my good friend, Page, who died a few weeks later, was too ill to be present and I was permitted to speak for America.

I took the ground that the commemoration of the 142nd anniversary of the Declaration of Independence that had separated the two countries was a fitting time for a new declaration on the part of both the nations, a Declaration of Interdependence. Our boys in blue and our boys in khaki were in July, 1918, fighting shoulder to shoulder with their English kinsmen in defense of representative government and to prevent the world from being dominated by military militarism. The two nations would have work to do together when the war was won in maintaining the peace of the world. The term suggested by me was utilized as description for the meeting. It came to be known as The Interdependence Gathering.

In August, 1776, Israel Putnam is working over, with a man named Bushnell, of Connecticut, plans for a torpedo boat. It proved difficult to time the torpedo correctly, and it exploded too soon to do mischief to the British vessel at which it was aimed. It is possible that this Bushnell was an ancestor of

the Bushnell who, in 1862, joined Abram S. Hewitt and John S. Griswold of Troy, in building the *Monitor*, which saved Washington against the *Merrimac*.

On the 27th of August, Putnam has the sad experience of being in command of the little American force on Long Island which was defeated and nearly captured by the British forces. The army was in a perilous position, exposed to attack from the front and from both flanks,—(the British from their headquarters in Staten Island controlled the Bay) and with the swift stream of the East River in the rear. The placing of the army on Long Island was, however, the responsibility not of Putnam, but of Washington. Washington had yielded to the insistence of the Congressional Committee on the management of the war in attempting to defend the City of New York. The narrow Island of Manhattan lies, as you will remember, between two streams, the waters of which were in the complete control of the British fleet. The landing of British forces north of the Island would have ensured the capture of any American troops left south of Spuyten Duyvil Creek. The mortification of the defeat was partly offset by the skill and courage with which the beaten troops were taken in the night across the East River, in spite of the pressure of the British lines on Long Island and of the presence of the British frigates in the stream. The wounded and nearly all of the artillery were

saved. Putnam was, naturally, one of the last of the officers to leave the Long Island shore. Upon him also was placed the task of bringing up from the lower end of Manhattan, when the evacuation of New York was decided upon, the rear guard with the guns and the wounded. The British struck across at Murray Hill (33rd Street), but were too late to intercept Putnam's retreating column, which was making its way along the edge of the Hudson shore. There is a story that the British officers commanding the advance of the troops landing at Kipp's Bay, stopped for lunch at the country house of Colonel Murray, which stood near the present site of Thirty-second Street and Fifth Avenue. The Colonel was himself a loyal Tory, but it was reported that the two daughters were engaged to officers in the Continental line. In any case, the British officers were delayed over their lunch and with some good Madeira, so that when finally, late in the afternoon, they steered their troops across towards the Hudson, they were too late to cut off Putnam's rear guard. Putnam shared in the Battle of Harlem Heights and in the defense of Washington's lines at White Plains. In December, he was placed in Command at Philadelphia and missed, much to his own regret, the chance of taking part in the Battle of Trenton, and a week later in the Battle of Princeton. The advance of Washington across the Delaware, which resulted in those two

battles and in the pressing back of the British troops to New York, has been described by historians and military critics as giving evidence not only of enterprise and courage, but of real military genius on the part of Washington. In May, 1777, Putnam is placed in command of the Hudson Highlands with headquarters at Peekskill. He is credited with having selected the position for the fort planned to protect West Point from assaults by land. The construction of the Fort was placed in the hands of his cousin Rufus, and the fort was named after the engineer. The river, narrow at this point, was under the fire of batteries placed on Constitution Island.

In 1777, Putnam finds occasion to take sharp action with British spies. A certain Edmund Palmer of the British service, had been found within the American lines in civilian clothes, and Putnam ordered him to be hanged. Captain Montague, of the *Mercury*, hearing of the order, sent a protest. Montague took the ground that the American General represented no acknowledged sovereignty and had no legal authority for inflicting the death penalty. Montague threatened vengeance if Palmer should be executed. Putnam writes to Montague under date of August 7th:

“Edmund Palmer, an officer in the enemy’s service, was taken as a spy lurking within our lines; has been tried as a spy, condemned as a spy,

and shall be executed as a spy, and the flag is ordered to depart immediately.

“ISRAEL PUTNAM.

“P.S. Palmer has accordingly been executed.”

In October, the Americans were, after the battle of Germantown, forced out of Philadelphia, and Putnam and Clinton moved further up the river before the advance of General Howe. In October of this year of '77, comes the death of Israel's wife.

In December, Putnam is able to defeat the cowboys and capture their commander, Col. De Lancey. In this month, he is reporting to Washington, “one of my regiments has no blankets. Few of the soldiers have either a shoe or shirt, and many have neither stockings, breeches, or overalls.”

It is difficult to imagine even patriotic Americans able to carry on their duties in the ranks and to protect any portion of American territory when they were left in such a condition of destitution.

In December, 1778, Putnam secures for his staff Colonel, later General, Humphreys. Humphreys tells us that he came to have an affectionate regard for his chief. The Colonel was later on the staff of General Washington, and it was while a guest of Washington at Mount Vernon, after the close of the war, that Humphreys prepared the *Life of General Putnam*, the first of the Revolutionary biographies.

In one of Humphreys' poems, he speaks of his chief as "the death-daring Putnam." Joel Barlow, of Connecticut, writes in his poem *Columbiad*:

Here's Putnam, scored with ancient scars,  
The living record of his country's wars.

These lines of old Barlow recall the verses of our schoolboy days, which in the collection of American war verse carry only the signature "Anon."

In their ragged regimentals,  
Stood the old Continentals,  
    Yielding not,  
When the grenadiers were lunging,  
And like hail fell the plunging,  
    Cannon shot;  
    When the files  
    Of the isles

From their smoky night encampment bore the banner of the  
    rampant Unicorn,

And grummer, grummer, grummer, rolled the toll of the  
    drummer

Through the morn!

In 1778, old Israel has on his hands a mutiny among the Continental troops at Redding caused by the want of clothes. Israel received the thanks of Washington for his judicious management of this mutiny.

In February, 1779, Putnam is defending his old State of Connecticut against the invasion by Tryon. It is during this campaign that Putnam, on his way



to secure reinforcements in the hopes of cutting off one of Tryon's landing parties, makes the famous ride down what are known as the Putnam steps at Horseneck, Greenwich. He succeeded after this ride in capturing 100 or more prisoners of the raiders.

In December, 1779, Putnam on his return to camp after a brief vacation, was stricken with paralysis, and this brings to a close his military career. He was only 61 years old, but he had been aged in arduous years spent in the service of his country. He was still to linger for eleven years crippled in body, but always active in mind and with full sense of humor. He was sufficiently recovered to be in camp at Tappan for a few days in the autumn of 1780, at the time of the discovery of the treason of Benedict Arnold.

In 1783, after the evacuation of New York, Washington, who never forgot an obligation, writes to Putnam a long letter of appreciation of the distinguished service that Putnam had rendered to the country. In this letter, I find the following sentences:

“Among the many worthy and meritorious officers with whom I have had the happiness of being connected in service in the various vicissitudes of a complicated contest, the name of Putnam is not forgotten. . . . But while I contemplate the greatness of the object for which we have contended, and felicitate you on the happy issue of our toils and labors, which have terminated with such general

satisfaction, I lament that you should feel the ungrateful returns of a country, in whose service you have exhausted your bodily health, and expended the vigor of a youthful constitution. . . . You are assuredly entitled to a full measure of recognition from your associates and from your fellow countrymen.”

In 1790, on the 29th of May, Putnam's life, a life characterized by toil, peril, and full measure of public service, came to an end.

The old gentleman used to take pleasure, sitting as a cripple in his armchair on the porch of the farmhouse that had now, owing to the wise action of the second Mrs. Putnam, become an Inn, of telling of the old days of adventure in war times. I find place for one of these stories: He had accepted during his association with the English Army, a challenge for a duel by an English officer who believed that he had cause for offense. Putnam, as the challenged, had the choice of weapons. The Englishman, on arriving at the appointed place, found Putnam sitting beside a powder barrel, calmly smoking a pipe. Bidding the officer take a seat on the other side, Putnam lighted a match, which had been placed in a small opening in the head of the barrel and in a nonchalant tone remarked that there was an equal chance for them both. The British officer promptly retired and then Putnam explained later to some associates who

were criticizing his foolhardiness, that the barrel was filled with vegetables with a thin layer of powder on top.

The biographer, General Humphreys, says:

“General Putnam was unanimously acknowledged to have been as brave and as honest a man as America ever produced. His native courage, his unshaken integrity and his established reputation as a soldier were essential in the early stages of our opposition to the designs of Great Britain, and gave unbounded confidence to our troops in their first conflicts in the fields of battle.”

In the funeral sermon, Putnam's pastor said:

“Israel Putnam was a man of public spirit, an unshaken friend of liberty. . . . His disposition was kind and benevolent; he was pitiful to the distressed; charitable to the needy, ready to assist all who wanted his help. In his family, he was the tender, affectionate husband, the provident father, an example of industry and close application to business.”

Dr. Waldo writes in June, 1790:

“Born a hero, whom nature taught and cherished in the lap of innumerable toils and dangers, he was terrible in battle! But, apart from the amiableness of his heart, when carnage ceased, his humanity spread over the fields, like the refreshing zephyrs of a summer's evening. . . .” “He pitied littleness, loved goodness, admired greatness, and ever aspired

to its glorious summit. The friend, the servant, and almost unparalleled lover of his country; worn out with honourable age and with the toils of war, Putnam rests from his labours."

His biographer Livingston says:

"He must ever retain an honoured place among the makers of American history. He was more than the bold ranger or the undaunted fighter. He was the true man. He had most exceptional endurance, which made him at the point of danger the efficient commander or worker. The generosity of his nature cherished only friendship. He was always hopeful and refused to be cast down by any discouragement. As a soldier he was intrepid, hopeful, brave to the end. This indomitable hero, of generous soul and sterling patriotism, must always hold high place among American men of energy."

The spirit and character of the man are fairly presented in the statue by Ward that stands before the Capitol in Hartford of Putnam's adopted state. Ward gives us "the embattled farmer," and this is the personality that the kinsmen of Israel and all Americans who have regard for the careers and the services of the founders of the Republic, must pass on for the appreciation of future generations.

---

Inscription on Tablet placed September 14th, 1923, on the Putnam Homestead in Danvers, Mass., the birthplace of Israel Putnam.

IN COMMEMORATION OF THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE BIRTH IN THIS HOUSE OF

## ISRAEL PUTNAM

MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, WHO RECEIVED HIS COMMISSION  
BY THE HANDS OF WASHINGTON AT CAMBRIDGE,  
JULY 4, 1775

GREAT-GRANDSON OF JOHN AND PRISCILLA PUTNAM WHO MIGRATED FROM ASTON ABBOTS,  
BUCKINGHAMSHIRE, ENGLAND, AND SETTLED AT SALEM, 1640; DESCENDED FROM THE ANCIENT  
FAMILY OF PUTTENHAM OF HERTFORDSHIRE. ISRAEL WAS SON OF JOSEPH PUTNAM, MEMORABLE  
FOR HIS OPPOSITION TO THE WITCHCRAFT TRIALS, AND OF ELIZABETH PORTER, HIS WIFE  
NIECE OF JOHN HATHORNE, COLONIAL MAGISTRATE.

HE MARRIED, IN 1739, HANNAH POPE, AND HAVING THAT YEAR PURCHASED MORTLAKE MANOR  
IN BROOKLYN, THEN POMFRET, CONNECTICUT, COMPRISING 514 ACRES, HE REMOVED THITHER  
IN 1740, WITH HIS WIFE AND SON ISRAEL, WHO LATER WAS ASSOCIATED WITH HIS KINSMAN

GENERAL RUFUS PUTNAM IN THE SETTLEMENT AT MARIETTA, OHIO.

IN 1742, PUTNAM OVERCAME THE WOLF IN HER DEN AT POMFRET.

IN 1755, HE SERVED AT CROWN POINT, AND WAS COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT.

IN 1756, HE TOOK PART IN THE DEFENSE OF FORTS WILLIAM HENRY AND EDWARD, AND IN 1758,  
WAS RESCUED FROM THE INDIANS AS HE WAS ABOUT TO BE BURNED AT THE STAKE.

HE SERVED AS MAJOR IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1759-1761, WITH AMHERST AT LAKE ONTARIO,  
AND AT THE CAPTURE OF MONTREAL.

COMMANDING A CONNECTICUT REGIMENT, HE PARTICIPATED IN THE CAPTURE OF HAVANA.

IN 1762, AND IN 1763, IN PONTIAC'S WAR, HE COMMANDED A REGIMENT AT DETROIT.

AN ACTIVE PATRIOT, ON LEARNING OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT LEXINGTON, PUTNAM LEFT HIS PLOW  
IN THE FURROW AND RODE, 100 MILES IN 18 HOURS, TO CONCORD AND CAMBRIDGE, AND THE  
FOLLOWING WEEK WAS COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL OF CONNECTICUT FORCES.

HAVING SECURED THE OCCUPATION OF THE HEIGHTS OF CHARLESTOWN, THE RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR PLANNING THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL, JUNE 17, 1775, RESTED WITH GENERAL PUTNAM

AND IT WAS HE WHO GAVE TO PRESCOTT'S MEN THE COMMAND:

"DO NOT FIRE UNTIL YOU SEE THE WHITES OF THEIR EYES."

IN 1776-1779, HE HELD IMPORTANT COMMANDS AT LONG ISLAND, IN NEW JERSEY,  
AT PHILADELPHIA, AND ON THE HUDSON, WHERE, AT WEST POINT, HE SELECTED THE SITE ON  
WHICH RUFUS PUTNAM ERECTED FORT PUTNAM COMMANDING THE HUDSON.

WHILE COMMANDING THE CONCENTRATION CAMP AT REDDING, CONNECTICUT, IN 1778,  
PUTNAM ESCAPED THE ENEMY AT GREENWICH BY RIDING DOWN THE CLIFF  
WHERE THE BRITISH DRAGOONS DARED NOT FOLLOW.

DISABLED IN DECEMBER, 1779, BY PARALYSIS, HE DIED IN 1790,

AND HIS GRAVE AT BROOKLYN, CONNECTICUT, IS MARKED BY AN EQUESTRIAN STATUE.

HE DARED TO LEAD WHERE ANY DARED TO FOLLOW.

AN OUTSTANDING FIGURE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, THIS BRAVE AND POPULAR OFFICER  
WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE "FIRST AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY," WRITTEN AT MOUNT VERNON BY  
DAVID HUMPHREYS, FORMER AIDE-DE-CAMP TO WASHINGTON AND PUTNAM, AND DEDICATED  
TO THE SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI IN CONNECTICUT.

ISRAEL PUTNAM WAS ONE OF NEARLY 100 OF THE NAME WHO RESPONDED TO THE ALARM OF  
THE 19TH OF APRIL, 1775, A RECORD OF PATRIOTIC SERVICE REPEATED IN 1861 AND 1917.

CONNECTICUT ACKNOWLEDGES TO MASSACHUSETTS AN ILLUSTRIOUS SON,  
WHOSE NAME IS JUSTLY CLAIMED BY BOTH.

PRESENTED TO THE ISRAEL PUTNAM CHAPTER,  
DAUGHTERS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AT DANVERS,  
BY THE PUTNAM ASSOCIATES:

THE ELIZABETH PORTER PUTNAM CHAPTER, D. A. R., PUTNAM, CONN.  
THE DEBORAH AVERY PUTNAM CHAPTER, D. A. R., PLAINFIELD, CONN.  
THE COLONEL DANIEL PUTNAM ASSOCIATION, BROOKLYN, CONN.



# Works by George Haven Putnam, Litt.D.

- I. A Memoir of George Palmer Putnam**  
Together with a Record of the Earlier Years of the Publishing House  
Founded by Him  
8°. *With Photogravure Frontispiece.*
- II. A Prisoner of War in Virginia (1864-65)**  
12°. *Illustrated.*
- III. Abraham Lincoln**  
The People's Leader in the Struggle for National Existence  
12°. *With Photogravure Portrait.*
- IV. The Censorship of the Church of Rome  
and Its Influence upon the Production and the Distribution of Literature**  
A Study of the History of the Prohibitory and Expurgatory Indexes,  
together with Some Consideration of the Effects of Protestant  
Censorship and of Censorship by the State.  
*Two Volumes, 8°.*
- V. Books and Their Makers During the Middle  
Ages**  
A Study of the Conditions of the Production and Distribution of  
Literature from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the Close of  
the Seventeenth Century.  
*In Two Volumes. 8°. (Sold separately)*
- VI. Authors and Their Public in Ancient Times**  
A Sketch of Literary Conditions and of the Relations with the Public  
of Literary Producers, from the Earliest Times to the Fall of the  
Roman Empire.  
*Second Edition, Revised. 12°.*
- VII. The Question of Copyright**  
Comprising the Text of the Copyright Law of the United States, and a  
Summary of the Copyright Laws at Present in Force in the Chief  
Countries of the World.  
*Second Edition, Revised, with Additions, and with the Record of Legislation  
Brought down to March, 1896. 8°.*
- VIII. The Little Gingerbread Man**  
With Pictures and Decorations in Color by Robert Gaston Herbert  
*Cr. 8°.*
- IX. The Artificial Mother**  
A Fantasy.  
*Illustrated.*
- X. Authors and Publishers. By G. H. P. and J. B. P.**  
A Manual of Suggestions for Beginners in Literature  
Comprising a Description of Publishing Methods and Arrangements,  
and Directions for the Preparation of Manuscript for the Press,  
together with General Hints for Authors.  
*Seventh Edition, Re-written, with Additional Material. 8°.*
- XI. Memories of My Youth (1844-65)**  
A Record of Sojourns in England. Experiences as a Student in France  
and in Germany and of Service in the Civil War.  
8°. *Portraits.*
- XII. Memories of a Publisher (1865-1915)**  
A Continuation of the Author's Personal Reminiscences from 1865,  
the date to which had been brought the earlier narrative, "Memories  
of My Youth."  
8°. *Portrait.*

New York

G. P. Putnam's Sons

London







# Date Due

<del>APR 8 1974</del>		
<del>MAR 9 1976</del>		<del>APR 0 5 1988</del>
		JAN 0 6 2004
<del>NOV 16 1976</del>		
<del>APR 28 1983</del>		
<del>NOV 1 1985</del>		
<del>NOV 2 1985</del>		
<del>FEB 23 1995</del>		
<del>FEB 23 1995</del>		

6d

CAT. NO. 23 233

PRINTED IN U.S.A

E 468 .P98  
Putnam, George Haven, 184 010101 000  
Some memories of the civil war



0 1163 0220343 9  
TRENT UNIVERSITY

E468 .P98

Putnam, George Haven  
Some memories of the civil war

DATE	164093 ISSUED TO

164093

